Whither Moldova goes? Info-Prim Neo analysis, part IV

The first three parts of this analysis tried to examine post-factum and in calmer conditions the new features of the contemporary political process in Moldova in the context of the talks that followed the November 28 elections. Thus, {part I published on January 18, 2011} pointed to the end of the unitary and authoritarian government era and revealed two distinct models of negotiations. {Part II published on January 19, 2011} centered on hypocrisy and total political distrust as expressions of the inter- and extra-political relations in Moldova. {Part III, published on January 24, 2011} focused on the role and performance of the national and foreign players involved in the negotiation process. The fourth, last part of the Info-Prim Neo analysis “Whither Moldova goes?” deals with the effects of the post-electoral talks on the country’s development course. [The first real chance of modernizing the country] The post-electoral negotiations ended with the (re-)constitution of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI). This way, Moldova got a real chance to modernize in real, predictable terms. Practically speaking, this means a first chance to improve the living standards in Moldova as for the first time the internal and external preconditions for modernization met. At the same time, a chance is only a chance and it is rather illusory as it depends on such a subjective factor as the behavior of the Moldovan political class in the next period. Moreover, this chance can be the only one for a rather long historical period. [Internal preconditions for modernization] After a number of pre-electoral, electoral and especially post-electoral battles, the components of the ruling alliance showed political will to follow the path to modernization and the capacity, even if relative, to learn the lessons of the coalition government. The given conclusions result from the fact that the AEI was formed, in very dramatic conditions, and from the provisions of the agreement on the constitutions of this alliance and of the government program titled “Freedom. Democracy. Welfare”. The first document ensures greatly the functionality and sustainability of the government, including by creating mechanisms for implementing what the political players named consensus, consultative spirit in decision-making, balance in governance, efficient communication between the components of the AEI and with society and the foreign partners. A separate role in this respect is to be played by the Council of the AEI, the Government’s presidium and other similar bodies that were created in Moldova for the first time. They are expected to be rather efficient even if their creation was not planned by law. The most serious guarantee is to be provided by the self-preservation instinct that the members of the AEI should strengthen as the non-observance of the agreements means the destruction of the AEI and the inevitable loss of power, possibly for good. If this instinct ensured the existence of the AEI – 1 in more difficult conditions, the rules worked out beforehand and by consensus will undoubtedly be obeyed. [External preconditions for modernization] The external preconditions are now closely connected with the foreign ones, even mutually dependent. This is their greatest value. They include the European integration as a key propriety of the present government at the levels of foreign and internal policy. To put it simply, the European integration will be obtained first of all by reforming and modernizing the internal life according to models that are efficient in the EU. Moreover, the EU and other development partners of Moldova provide significant financial and logistic support in the form of grants and preferential loans, “communitarian IQ”, “roadmaps”, “plans of action”, “etc. “At the same time, the responsible fulfillment of the commitments that result from the European integration plans represent the most efficient method of modernizing the country politically, socially and economically.” This is how the two abovementioned documents decipher the mentioned idea. All the other internal priorities set out in the government program like the supremacy of law, sustainable economic growth, poverty reduction, and decentralization of power are rather derivates or consequences of the European integration process because we cannot expect changes in this respect without the EU’s support. In order to obtain the European ‘carrot’ {see “the stick and carrot policy” in part III}, including in the form of money, liberalized visa and trade regimes, the Moldovans will have to force the internal reforms first of all. I said it was a unique chance because it harmoniously joints the internal and external preconditions, the necessity and wish with the real possibilities of modernizing the country and improving living standards. It is also unique because there is now no other foreign partner than the EU that could provide economic support to Moldova and such an attractive model of way of life. The Commonwealth of Independent States or separately Russia, as single alternative, cannot assume this role now and will not be able to assume it for many decades ahead. We have only one chance to modernize the country now and it is rather different from the chance that Moldova had when it was ruled by the AEI – 1. Then, the temporariness of the power was evident and inevitable, but the important reforms are not implemented in a short period of time. The government now has chances, though small, of serving a full, four-year-term and this time is sufficient for carrying out reforms and making them irreversible. The modernization chance is also unique because in case of failure, the EU will no more have reasons to help the unstable governments and a country that does not know what it wants 20 years after proclaiming its independence. This instability and uncertainty will reproduce during a long historical period and will have rather unfavorable consequences for the country. [“God helps, but does not say exactly what to do”] On the other hand, the only chance is mainly illusory because it depends on certain legalities, objective rules and traditional behaviors of the Moldovan political class. The AEI can obtain a full four-year mandate to modernize the country only if the political crisis is overcome. This means that the head of state will be elected by all the parliamentary forces, including the PCRM. But the political interest of the PCRM runs counter to the political interest of the AEI. The PCRM’s political interest is to return to power, possibly in a format that it calls ‘wide coalition’ or as a result of early elections. Four years in the Opposition will mean the political death of the PCRM for two reasons: 1.”The eyes that are not seen are forgotten.” This means that the parties that are in power will meanwhile attract a large part of the supporters, members and even heavyweights of the PCRM; 2. In four years, the Communist leader Vladimir Voronin, on whom the party greatly depends, will be 74. He is the oldest MP already now. Voronin does not yet have an evident successor as party leader. But there are things like the political charisma that one can pass to no successor. A wide coalition is not possible because draws are impossible in political battles as in such sports like boxing. You either win or lose power. Thus, the PCRM can choose only one of the two declared options – early elections. Possibly, the party is now looking for methods to avoid responsibility for a new political crisis and new early elections. The given position is confirmed by the Communist MPs’ determination not to vote for the head of state in the conditions imposed by the AEI. It is a rather natural political behavior as the essence of a political fight is the fight for power. There is yet one more possibility. The PCRM may show capacity to lose in a civilized way and to vote for the AEI’s candidate for the presidency, as many of the Opposition MPs voted in favor of Vladimir Voronin in 2005, in the “name of the national cause”. On the one hand, the PCRM has never had such a capacity. On the other hand, references to the ‘national cause’ and the ‘political interest’ in politics are often made by the ‘cunning ones’ and form part of political hypocrisy. [Control of the Opposition’s control] The talks between the AEI and the PCRM over the election of the head of state should start from the abovementioned preconditions. The sincerity of the PCRM’s adherence to the ‘national cause’ is to be tested by accepting certain conditions put forward by the Communists unofficially. For example, they want to control the Audit Office, the Broadcasting Coordination Council, the Central Election Commission and other bodies. In the countries with democratic traditions, they do so usually: the Opposition obtains certain instruments of control over governance. But do the Moldovan broadcasters want to return to the practices used during the eight years of Communist government in broadcasting? Ask the state institutions about the style of the inspections performed by the Audit Office or the companies about the inspections carried out by the Center for Combating Corruption and Economic Crime in that period. The PCRM may reply that it does not bear responsibility for the possible complaints against the mentioned institutions as they were under the control of the Opposition parties. Anyway, these conditions of the PCRM can be accepted only if true parliamentary control is instituted over the institutions controlled by the Communists. But for this to happen, the work of the Parliament of Moldova and the government in general will have to be reformed. In this connection, we cannot agree with the statements of former Speaker Mihai Ghimpu, who complained that as Head of Parliament he did not have other powers than to open and close the microphones during the sittings. The Parliament’s powers as regards control over the implementation of the legislation are as important as those concerning the making of laws. A political Opposition can be set to work and it can contribute to the country’s modernization if the government also obeys the rules of the democratic game. Civil society can be more actively engaged in the negotiations between the Opposition and the power at the present stage so as to maintain correct relations. Moldova’s civil society proved its abilities of moderator and impartial observer of the political developments and this quality can be put to good use. Society in general should also assume greater responsibility and be patient in relation with the political players and the created situation as it offered no one a definite mandate for the country’s development course. [Valeriu Vasilica, Info-Prim Neo]