IPN interview: It is unlikely that Russia will attempt to annex Transnistria under current circumstances because the region would become an isolated enclave that Russia could not protect militarily; however, in the event that other parts of southern Ukraine opt to join Russia, the annexation could become more feasible, Ivan Katchanovski, who teaches political science at the University of Ottawa, said for the Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail. In this connection, IPN Agency asked for the opinion of Iulia Serbina, senior researcher at the Odessa Branch of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Ukraine, about the possibility of the population of Odessa region seeking the withdrawal from Ukraine in order to join Russia, by the model of the Crimean peninsula.
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- What is the situation in Odessa compared with the general situation in Ukraine? Is it true that some of the region’s inhabitants also want to separate themselves from the rest of the country? Do certain events in the region endanger other countries, including Moldova?
- The information about Odessa’s wish to withdraw from Ukraine is incorrect and is inflated by the pro-Russian mass media. We cannot deny the fact that there are citizens who would like to live as part of Russia or the invented “Novorossia”. But it would be a mistake to say that they represent an overwhelming majority.
Indeed, these people take part in the meetings in support of Russia, use the symbols of the Soviet Union, and hoist the Russian flag above the tent camp set up in the Kulikovo field, creating an opposition to Euromaidan in Odessa. However, many of their activities are rather a response to the active spirit of the Odessa residents, who are in favor of the unity of Ukraine. By the way, after a protest involving over 10,000 people against the war and for the territorial unity of Ukraine was mounted in Odessa on March 2, those who called for the separation from Ukraine tried to occupy the building of the State Regional Administration of Odessa on March 3. They burned Ukraine’s flag and raised Russia’s flag on the building of the State Regional Administration. But their actions were neutralized. The active spirit of the pro-Russia citizens from Odessa region (and other regions in southeastern Ukraine) is nothing else but the result of well-organized mobilization.
Sociological researches show the people who are for moving towards Russia represent 20% in Odessa region. It is a significant, but insufficient figure for separation. Moreover, according to the opinion poll conducted by the prestigious analytical center “Democratic Initiatives”, there is no region in Ukraine whose population would support the separation from Ukraine and would be for joining Russia.
The problem lies in the fact that the ideologists of the separation of Odessa region fuel the social phobias of their supporters. The regional mass media close to them during the last few years asserted that the people in Odessa would be banned from speaking Russian, while the ‘inexistent partisans of Bandera’ would kill everyone. In other words, such rhetoric endangers the identity of the citizens and even their safety. Unfortunately, these atrocities turned from an electoral mobilization method into an efficient method of inciting national hatred, which is absolutely inadmissible for Odessa region, which is home to representatives of over 130 nationalities.
I want to underline that 20% is a significant figure, but not sufficient enough to represent the whole population of the region. Indisputably, we must discuss possibilities of satisfying the cultural rights of this category of people.
The special regional identity of the Odessa residents is an as important factor that prevails over the civic one, and it is very hard to substitute this identity with the Russian one.
Owing to the coordinated activity of the active citizens, regional authorities and local police subdivisions, bloodshed in Odessa was prevented. Regretfully, it couldn’t be prevented in Donetsk and Harkov, in the March 14-15 protests and the altercations accompanying them.
Generally, Ukraine poses no threats to Moldova, but a lot depends on the further actions of Russia. The consequences of such an active behavior lead to large-scale perturbations not only in the Black Sea region, but also all over the world. Surely, you should not worry about the export of revolutionary transformations from Ukraine to Moldova, given the not very high level of activism of Moldovan society (except for the mass events in support or against the European integration course staged in Moldova last autumn).
- What are the current risks faced by Ukraine in general and Odessa in particular and how can they develop if the existing problems aren’t solved?
- Currently, the risks threatening Ukraine are concentrated at different levels. The first and most serious challenge is related to the ensuring of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The economic crisis caused mainly by the corrupt activity of the previous government intensified following the occupation and annexation of Crimea by Russia. At macro-level, reforms should be done, which will be painful, but their successful implementation will depend on the intelligent communication with the population. In the given situation, the EU and the U.S. must work out a so-called “Marshal Plan” for Ukraine, while the financial support is needed not only for implementing reforms, but also for supporting the financial welfare of the state. The one billion euro that the EU will allocate to Ukraine is surely a large amount, but it does not change the financial situation of the state and does not cover its needs.
If salaries and pensions are not paid, the fiscal pressure on small and medium-sized businesses increases and the charges on public utilities are raised, the social dissatisfaction will grow and we can expect new social protests to be staged in autumn. In fact, these events will be different from the activism on Euromaidan as they will be more radical. The Euromaidan represented a protest of the free people, but the subsequent events may be a protest of the hungry ones and will pose a greater threat.
In order to ensure the integrity of the state, the agenda must obligatorily include decentralization, which would envision the separation of the powers of the state administration from those of the local self-governing authorities and the organizational and financial development of regions. Currently, at most 30% of the collected taxes remain in the local budgets. The rest of the money is distributed through the state budget. The Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Communal Living of Ukraine pledged to initiate, within a month, the decentralization reform that was prepared during several years, but the previous authorities didn’t commence it. As a result of the reform, the regions will benefit from important powers for their development.
Absolutely all the spheres of the social life are now in a risk zone, but the increased level of self-organization of the people and their willingness to provide the necessary assistance are positive aspects. In particular, about 40 million hrivnas (approximately US$4m) has been collected for the needs of the Ukrainian army through telephones and SMSes during ten days. This is not the only example of the kind.
- Ukraine and the EU signed the political part of the Association Agreement. Does this fact have a certain effect on Ukraine already?
- Unfortunately, Ukraine followed its specific path towards the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union. At the start of the talks, the EU put concrete tasks on the Ukrainian authorities as regards reforms, but now the list of requirements is shorter. After the previous Ukrainian administration suddenly refused to sign the accord at the Vilnius summit, the situation changed radically. The signing of the political part of the Association Agreement is rather an act of symbolic support provided by the EU to Ukraine following the heavy casualties suffered in the fight against the regime of the previous power. The political part generally envisions intensifying the role of civil society and consulting its representatives when taking decisions. It’s known that a number of ministries of the new administration have active consultations with representatives of circles of experts on the package of reforms (especially in such areas as the fight against corruption, education, extension of the rights of local self-governing authorities). Given such a situation, the signing of the agreement didn’t have serious repercussions for the situation in Ukraine. The liberalization of the visa regime for Ukrainians is the next step that can bring definite benefits to the state.
Certain changes can appear after the signing of the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU as the essence of association resides in it. Intense consultations on the matter are held this week, especially during the visit by Commissioner Štefan Füle to Kiev and the visits by other commissioners (on such issues as budget, taxation, customs duties, etc.). Unquestionably, these negotiations should have started at least one-two years before the signing of the accord, but things now develop according to a ‘fire extinguishing’ regime. Changes will become visible in the medium and long terms.
- How can and how does the situation in Ukraine influence the state of affairs in Moldova?
- You should not expect essential changes like those in Ukraine to take place in Moldova. It is evident that Moldovan society is not very interested in the events happening in Ukraine. Certain social activism can appear rather as a result of crisis situations in the Moldovan economy. Even if Moldova has been considered during many years an ‘eminent’ country within the Eastern Partnership, the economic reforms and improvement of people’s welfare represent current objectives of the Government.
At the current stage, given Moldova’s and other European countries’ dependence on Russian energy, the Moldovan administration’s position on the events in Ukraine will be moderate (we will not bring the Transnistrian issue into special focus in the context of the crisis in Ukraine).
Mariana Galben, IPN
