Voronin-Smirnov meeting under EU’s umbrella

Commentary by Nicu Popescu, researcher with the London-based European Council for External Relations Nobody questions the fact that the Russian diplomacy contributed to relaunch the Voronin-Smirnov talks through diplomatic effort. In fact, however, the real impetus for these negotiations was triggered by the European Union. Namely the EU changes the relations on the field, forcing Tiraspol to negotiate. For the first time since 1992 Moldova does not appear as a beggar of unification before Transnistria, but as a partner discussing, to some extent, from strong positions and having what to offer. This thing is due to the EU, which has a strategy of supporting Moldova’s reintegration promoted in three streamlines. The first is pressing Transnistria. The travel restrictions, and especially the border assistance mission (EUBAM) and the new customs regime introduced in March 2006 are the results of the EU’s getting involved in the Transnistrian settlement. Namely the EU pressed Ukraine to make it implement the new customs regime, and namely the EU’s actions at the border indirectly forced the Transnistrian companies to register in Chisinau. The tandem of the new customs regime and the EUBAM creates substantial social and political tension in Transnistria. The elites have less access to corrupt incomes from trafficking and smuggling. The population copes with inflation and economic crisis. It was only Russia which could smooth the effects of the EU’s actions by granting assistance to Tiraspol. Re-launching the Moldo-Russian dialog contributed to curb the Russian assistance for Transnistria. But it was namely the EU which created this situation around Transnistria and lay the grounds for reintegrating the single economic space of Moldova. The second element in the EU’s strategy envisages Moldova’s Europeanization, to make it more attractive for Transnistrian residents. The action plan, the visa-easing accord, the economic assistance, the assistance to customs services and border guards -- all are part of this strategy. Yet, the most important is easing the trade, through the Generalized System of Preferences plus (GSP+) and, starting March 2008, through the Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP), a regime applied only as to the Balkan states and Moldova. In addition, Moldova has become one of the largest recipients of European assistance per capita. To-date the EU offers Moldova financial assistance comparable with the aid granted to the Balkan states, which have chances to enter the EU. What are the results of these measures? In November 2007, at a meeting with the UE representative for Moldova, Kalman Mizsei, at the Trade and Industry Chamber in Tiraspol, Transnistrian businesspeople asked that they should also benefit of the visa ease. As Moldovan citizens. Even more important is the increase of the Transnistrian exports to the EU. In 2006-2008, the area’s exports to the EU soared by 59%, more than the exports to Russia. Now the EU is the main sale market for the Transnistrian companies. The further we go, the more the Transnistrian economy will be dependent both on the EU, and on status of the companies registered in Chisinau. To the same degree important is will of Transnistrian universities to get accreditation from Chisinau, thus gaining access to international cooperation projects and European scholarships. These are but several examples through which the EU makes Moldova attractive and indispensable for important layers of the Transnistrian society. The third strategy element refers to the promise of some economic benefits, even bigger in case of reintegrating the country. Within a reunified Moldova also Transnistria’s residents will benefit of the EU’s assistance. Even more important do become the talks of internationally supporting infrastructure projects related to Trans-European transport corridors to cross Moldova, including Transnistria. Neither Russia, nor Moldova will fund such projects, but the EU and the USA namely. In this context, a rational discussion about the benefits and costs of reunifying Moldova is needed. There is a certain consensus as for the benefits: creating a single economic space, the border control, re-establishing the territorial integrity etc. Yet the costs are discussed less. Yet, it is important to discuss those, too. E.g., what would be the impact of the settlement for upon Moldova’s process of European integration? What will be the impact of the reunification upon the political and party systems from Moldova? Is the Chisinau political system mature enough to absorb and transform Transnistria without “transnistrizing” itself? Is Moldova ready to appoint Valery Litskay as deputy foreign minister, Yevgeny Shevchuk – as a speaker or a prime-minister, and Yelena Chernenko – as economy minister? What is going to turn out from the fusion of the ministries of domestic affairs from Chisinau and Tiraspol? And from the merger of the SIS with the MGB? (secret services – e.n.) What is going to happen to the debt of $1.8 billion Transnistria owes Russia? Will it be taken over by Moldova? How Moldova will pay it off? By ceding the rail-way, power networks and plants to Gazprom? Or will Russia forgive a part of the debt, and Moldova, the EU and USA will make up for the other part? Moldova’s genuine reunification is not going to happen by signing a sheet of paper called Constitution, Accord or Memorandum. Cyprus was reunified in 1964 through a new constitution, but that agreement failed in 1974 conducting to a conflict more serious, still unsolved. Also Moldova’s reunification will fail, unless it is part of the country’s Europeanization. Including the state structures from Chisinau which remain unreformed and deeply non-European. The EU can help Moldova to solve some of the above-mentioned dilemmas, but everything depends on Moldova’s will to reform itself politically and economically. To date, by the mix of pressures upon Transnistria, strengthening Moldova and the promises of assistance for a unified Moldova, the EU has created realities making possible not only the re-launch of the negotiations, but also the realization of a perspective of reunifying the country. This is not going to happen in five-six months. Yet for the first time since 1992 time works in Moldova’s favor. Only Moldova getting even closer to the EU makes it a state more functional and more attractive drawing closer the perspective of really, not declaratively, settling the conflict.