Viorel Cibotaru: Three scenarios for the Transnistrian conflict. Survey by Info-Prim Neo

Info-Prim Neo News Agency has launched an opinion poll on the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict among leaders of political parties, representatives of the civil society, and opinion shapers from both banks of the Nistru. The survey is aimed at finding out viewpoints that could contribute to the improvement of the present situation. All the participants were asked the same two questions. This time, the answers are given by Viorel Cibotaru, director of the European Institute for Political Studies in Moldova. [- How can the Transnistrian dispute be solved in the opinion of the institution that you represent? In what way, through what mechanisms and during what terms is a settlement possible?] - If we apply the system of the three scenarios (the good, the bad and the probable one), the Transnistrian conflict can be solved in the following ways: [1. The IDEAL scenario:] Chisinau and Tiraspol reach an agreement on the distribution of powers and the way of making a union according to a “finalized” model, backed by the political elites from the two sides, preserving Moldova’s status of integrated country (almost unitary by form and with a broad autonomous decentralization for Transnistria and the Autonomous Territorial Union of Gagauzia) and sovereign state (the documents can be signed during weeks or months and fully implemented within two-five years). These decisions and processes are supported by the 5+2 format and are abundantly financed by the donor community. Under such a version, Moldova could much sooner become a member of the EU (10-15 years), both of the banks become “democratized” and the people forget of “conflict”. [2. The BAD scenario:] “Tough” external factors get involved (Russia recognizes the “independence” of Transnistria, Chisinau argues with the entire world) and contribute to the development of internal negative factors (economic, energy, political crises on both banks of the Nistru, rebellions that turn into unrest and then armed incidents; the divergences get wider; the trust fades away ...) Stop. The conflict ends in a noisy divorce with consequences expected in a far away future. [3. The PROBABLE scenario:] The “confidence building measures” begin to apply. Certain problems will be solved (especially economic and social problems, and problems related to transport, telecommunications and ecology, as well as security), but the talks aimed at reaching viable understandings will reach deadlock over the delimitation of powers and the identification of a solution will be postponed until a new window of opportunity appears, most probably in 4-5 years (effectively). In this case, the political and geopolitical solutions will be of a different kind and the talks will not center on the powers, but on the exteriorization of the status-quo. [ - How do you think, how efficient and relevant to the created situation are the actions taken by the administration of Moldova at present? When do you think the effort made by the authorities will begin to produce results and what results we can expect?] - Only the present government (represented by PCRM) could choose such a hard but probably the only efficient way in the present circumstances. The risks are great, but the projected effects could be beneficial for the general climate of the settlement process, are accepted for the mentality of the electorate of this party and enable solving current problems faced by Moldova. At strategic level, there is full uncertainty and a situation of tsug-tsvang (term from chess, which means that any move can lead to the worsening of the situation). The direct talks and discussions with Moscow brought Moldova and Russia closer, but they negatively influence the spirit of the European integration and the reformation process in general. The answer to the second part of the question can be found in the IDEAL scenario.