The decision of the Central Electoral Comission to request the Court of Appeal to annul the registration of the “Patria” Party in the electoral race is a moment that may change the fate of the elections on November 30. In this analysis, IPN will explore the implications of this decision for democratic practice in Moldova and the public debate surrounding this case.
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Good news and bad news
At the moment, the fate of the “Patria” Party and Renato Usatii is hanging in the air, awaiting the decision of the Court of Appeal and, possibly, of the Supreme Justice Court. Usatii has been surrounded by scandals since his first appearance on the Moldovan political stage and it was to be expected that this electoral campaign would have a more spectacular ending that Usatii's TV ad with a cute dog. As a result of a notification from the General Inspectorate of Police, his party may be removed from the list of runners for Sunday's elections. For some, it's a good sign: one less agent of Kremlin, an act of justice that should have been done earlier. For others, it's a worrying sign: Usatii may be a bad guy, but there are laws and principles underlying the functioning of a democracy and removing the “Patria” Party from the list of candidates in the last days of the campaign is undemocratic.
This case and the discussions surrounding it illustrate well some problems of Moldovan society and of democracy in general. First of all, it's about the mistrust in the state institutions: the accusations that the removal of Usatii from the electoral race is undemocratic make no sense unless accompanied by mistrust in the trueness of the reasons behind this decision. Many of those who think like this, previously agreed that Usatii is indeed a dangerous candidate, with hidden interests and, most likely, an agent of Moscow. However, just as the authorities acted on the basis of these very suspicions, the same guys suddenly changed their tune. Why? If Usatii is actually financed from abroad, then it's correct, legal and democratic to penalize him. In fact, it would be illegal and undemocratic to not do it. Why then this condemnation of the authorities?
The problem of mistrust
Partially, this mistrust increased during the electoral campaign, when most of the runners had at least some sort of message accusing the governing parties of being corrupt, oligarchic and mafia-like, accusations that didn't target only the politicians, but all of the state's institutions. Here, one must remark the irresponsibility of the electoral competitors that aren't in power: their wholesale, unfiltered, all-inclusive accusations discredit and undermine the functioning of the targeted institutions, the same institutions these candidates will have to work with if they come to power.
In the case of Usatii, we face mistrust in the police, in the Security and Intelligence Service, in the Central Electoral Comission (CEC) and the Court of Appeal. One must remember that all these institutions are independent of each other and, theoretically, at least partially independent from the central political authorities. To doubt and condemn the removal of Usatii equals to saying that these institutions aren't independent and, even worse, under someone's control, coordinated and involved in a joint illegal scheme. This accusation is more serious that it sounds and is a recognition as truthful of the accusations made by Usatii and other electoral runners that we live in an oligarchic state, wholly controlled by a couple of rich politicians. Opinions like “we all know how easy it it is to fabricate a file” circulate way too casually. This lack of trust in the judiciary can have negative consequences, such as the continuation of the situation that generated it in the first place. An institution lacking public trust is weaker, less responsible, less accountable, and can thus be controlled easier.
Usatii's play
Another thing that influenced the public opinion is Usatii's play of always anticipating some kind of real or fictive attack against him and his party, showing himself as the undesirable guy persecuted by the government. These anticipations are highly effective in limiting the efficiency and credibility of the actions they denounce. The “Patria” leader said it himself: “If Usatii goes public ans says that you are going to do this, this and that, then you must be really stupid to actually do it afterwards”. It's a kind of anticipatory blackmail and an excellent defensive weapon. People don't think that Usatii is anticipating these actions precisely because he is guilty and knows the authorities are on to him. People don't ask how does this politician have access to so much information from so many state institutions. What kind of connections does he have? With whom? How and why did he obtain them? These questions are just as important as whether the CEC decision was fair.
In the meanwhile, the hypocrisy of some moments is obvious, but it seems that Usatii's public play is efficient enough for some to ignore them. Today, Usatii called a press conference minutes before the CEC meeting and said exactly what the meeting would be about and why he would be removed. At the meeting however, his representative complained that he didn't see or hear the report behind the decision and was thus unable to defend his party. So Usatii managed to know and not know the issue in the space of just a couple of minutes.
The dilemma of democracy
This issue raises some questions regarding the essence of democracy and the rule of law: what matters most – the principles and the goal of democracy, the spirit of the law, or the democratic form and procedures, the letter of law? For some, even if Usatii is guilty of what he is accused, the manner and moment of his removal from the electoral race is undemocratic. Let's explore this version: if Usatii is guilty, what is more important – to respect the procedures with the risk to allow a party financed from abroad to accede in the supreme legislative body of the country, or to follow the spirit of the law, which forbids foreign financing of parties, in order to protect the national interest, with the risk to violate some procedures? This is a dilemma of political theory that doesn't have a definitive solution. Of course, it would be ideal to have harmony between the form and content of democracy, but cases as Usatii create tension between the goal and practice of democracy. It's not democratic to allow him to candidate, but it's not democratic to remove him from the elections either.
A possible solution would be to compare the consequences of the two scenarios: who and how much loses in one case or another, the risk to undermine the country as a whole or the risk to do injustice to a political party and its supporters. In the end, democracy isn't just a set of rules and principles for their own sake. They are meant not only to establish a way of electing those in power and a way of governing. The principles of democracy also refer to the protection of the people's interests even when their real interests are different from their declared interests: the well-being of the people is just as important as the choice they make, especially when these are different.
All the defenders of democracy must not forget how vulnerable and easy to pervert is this system. The textbook example is Hitler's coming to power democratically. The Nazi leader won the elections, it's true, but it must not be forgotten that before this he had set the Reichstag on fire, blaming the Communists and removing them from the electoral race. It's not a mere coincidence that this historic moment is brought up by both sides of the debate about Usatii.
Who loses?
On the whole, the Usatii case is regrettable and highlights major problems in Moldova. On one hand, we have the government who managed to discredit itself by all kinds of scandals during its mandate and the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary opposition that fueled the people's mistrust in the government and its institutions. One the other hand, we have a shady politician, seemingly financed from abroad, which may be removed from the electoral race. In this confrontation of mistrust and accusations of oligarchy, the government will lose most. Usatii can be removed and he can return to his business in Russia and won't lose much. On the contrary, his reputation might even receive a boost. The governing parties, however, stand only to lose. Unlike Usatii, they are accountable for 5 years of governance and the public mistrust and antipathy is higher for them than for Usatii. From this perspective, regardless of Usatii's fate as an electoral runner, he will accomplish at least partially his mission by discrediting even further the pro-European parties and the institutions of the Moldovan state.
Eugen Muravschi, IPN
