The Parliament is... gone! Long live the Parliament! Fifth Part

The news agency Info-Prim Neo is concluding the series of analyses on the performance of the outgoing XVI Parliament. The previous chapters described the distinctive traits of this legislature as a whole (March 9); the majority faction of the Moldovan Communists Party (PCRM) and their Christian-Democratic allies (March 10); of the Opposition, including the factions of the Moldova Noastra Alliance (AMN) and the Moldovan Democratic Party (PDM); as well as the unaffiliated MPs who grouped around some influential centers, like the Social Democratic Party (PSD), headed by MP Dumitru Braghis, the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM), headed by MP Flad Filat, and the European Action Movement (MAE), headed by Anatol Petrencu, who was joined by MP Vitalia Pavlicenco, the ex-president of the National Liberal Party (PNL) (March 12). While the episode published on March 14 examined the conduct of the coalition factions in the ongoing parliamentary race, this concluding chapter will focus on the campaigns of the parties that formed the parliamentary Opposition. [AMN: rejuvenation or a simple facelift?] Relatively solid and quite large, the Moldova Noastra Alliance has established a reputation as a virtually conservative and sometimes circumspect party. It looks that this party relies mostly on the middle class, in particular on more or less prosperous people in rural communities. Rash moves and unpredictability are strange to such kind of people. However the term “rural communities” doesn’t necessarily mean people who actually live in the countryside, because many Chisinau folks who moved relatively recently to the city can be easily called the same term. Having its back against the wall after the 2005 elections, the AMN faction in the Parliament was the first to sharpen its political message, providing the same tonal framework for the entire party. This transition has been a difficult and enduring process, which is not over yet. Anyhow, in the ongoing election campaign the AMN tends to enhance its image, to inject some young blood, to get a facelift. During this race the AMN is rather active and uses various methods to catch attention, from protest rallies to smart mobs. A representative of this fresh stream is the young and well educated Victor Osipov, the party’s spokesman. It seems that his appearance on AMN’s ticket at number 7 has produced a shock, including inside the party. An even heavier argument in favor of AMN’s rejuvenation is the fact that this number 7 has been given a strong say in planning and conducting the party’s campaign, strong enough to outdo many of the ‘old and wise’ below number 7 as well as many, if not all, before him. And this could be an indicator of a change in the mentality of the party’s conservative elite. Another novelty in AMN’s campaign is the “Urecheanu for President” game. Even though treated with scorn by nearly all the political rivals, people got used with this slogan eventually. The other Opposition parties either haven’t proposed any presidential candidate at all, or nominated someone less heavy than Urecheanu. The idea for a candidate has been piked up and used, but to a lesser degree, by the Democratic Party, whose leaflets promote Valeriu Bulgari as the Democrat nominee for Prime Minister. The greatest danger in this game for the AMN is that Serafim Urecheanu has dared President Vladimir Voronin to a duel. Dangerous is not just the fact that Voronin’s image or, say, charisma, could appeal more to the traditional Moldovan electorate. It’s also the fact that Voronin’s voter base is more sedentary and more disciplined when it comes to voting, while those who would vote for Ureacheanu could be working abroad on election day, or simply lack in voter discipline, as it was seen on many previous occasions. Other shortcomings of AMN’s campaign are related to a late start and a difficult recovery from the collapse of the Democratic Moldova Bloc, which some consider to be AMN’s failure. But the almost Hamletian question for the AMN is whether this facelift comes with a rejuvenated content, too. In a previous article, Info-Prim Neo was demonstrating that the Moldovan voters are not as simple-minded as they seem. [PDM: expansion or surrender?] The Moldovan Democratic Party (PDM) has adopted an active attitude in this parliamentary campaign, appearing heavily on the public agenda and being quite outspoken. The party has extended its area of concerns, showing that it counts on a broader segment of the national electorate than one or two years ago. The present-day PDM, first of all, targets its center-left base voters, who are quite numerous, and in this regard the Democratic Party remains to be a traditional rival of the neighbor parties on the political spectrum, including the Social Democratic Party as well as the Communists. However, the PDM's anticommunist message, more acute than ever, doesn't quite affect the PCRM, but rather attempts to attract the voters from the center-right spectrum. As a result, the electoral message as well as the entire political orientation of the PDM at this moment indicates a certain motion towards the center-right wing. This is largely due to the fresh stream which came into the party following the merger with the Social Liberals. The Serebrian-Klipii tandem is famous for its pro-European, pro-Romanian, and pro-NATO rhetoric. Moreover, Oazu Nantoi, a valuable acquisition from the PSD, has built a reputation as an outspoken and uncompromising opponent of the Smirnov regime, and consequently of the Kremlin, which he suspects of endorsing the separatists. The high rankings in PDM's hierarchy of these figures demonstrate their influence on the party's movement towards the center-right, and on the party's campaign, as well. One aspect deserving particular attention in the context of the campaign, but also from the perspective of the PDM's post-election fate, is the fact that Kiril Lucinschi, the son of ex-President Petru Lucinschi, joined the Democrats shortly before the campaign, to become a member of its leadership. This was a very serious move, bearing in mind that the second president is said to still have control of considerable financial and human resources. These will undoubtedly be employed. No one can imagine the coming of Kiril Lucinschi to Dumitru Diacov's PDM without the blessing or even the initiative of his father. But everyone can remember the sharp rivalry between Diacov and Lucinschi in late 90s and early 2000s. Those disagreements cost Lucinschi his presidential seat and his entire active political career. Kiril Lucinschi's coming to the PDM could mean that Diacov looks ready to repay the debt in full. In this context, there were press reports that Dumitru Diacov wouldn't claim any important seat in the next parliament if his party reaches there. Rather such a position will be surrendered to Kiril Lucinschi. Let's not rule out the possibility that the leadership of the entire party could be surrendered into his hands, if such a possibility was negotiated. But that would mean a return to the initial standing of the Democrats, because both Lucinschi Sr. and Lucinschi Jr. are believed to have a pro-Russian inclination, which, experts say, is incompatible with the pro-Romanian, pro-European, pro-NATO endeavors. Or, the PDM could enter a stage of self-destruction, where skirmishes between the rival groups inside the party will cause it to collapse. The electorate – while being not as simple-minded as it seems – could equally encourage the diversity of the PDM's message, and punish what they could consider to be unnatural, incompatible and contradictory. [PSD: between politics and economics] It must be noted that Lucinschi Jr. chose Diacov's PDM, and not Dumitru Braghis' Social Democratic Party, as a runway for his launch into the big politics. And that happened despite the fact that earlier Lucinschi Sr. was an outspoken supporter of Braghis. Maybe this time they just disagreed over the price, or maybe it's because in this election campaign the PDS has been reluctant to formulate a distinct political message, especially with respect to the current government. Even if earlier in the race the PSD leaders Dumitru Braghis and Eduard Musuc said they hoped to attract the left voters, with the PCRM being their main rival, their present electoral offer is mainly centered on economic issues, particularly measures to fight the recession. It is a serious metamorphosis in the attitude of the party, bearing in mind that not long ago the PSD and its components practiced a combative style, involving many people, from various regions. The fact that the PSD tried to lead the patentees' protests some time ago was a relevant example in this regard. In fact, the PSD's economic message in this campaign is quite professionally shaped and might convince some specialists, but not the left voters, too, because usually in Moldova they vote symbols, personal charm, or other things, rather than doctrines, platforms and all kinds of theoretical elaborations. It might happen that this detachment of the PSD from pure politics will appeal to the Moldovan voters, who are either tired of the power struggle or do not quite understand it. But they could equally dislike it and consider PSD's message too hard to chew. After April 5 the party will see for itself whether it was right or wrong to have chosen this path. [The PLDMization of the Moldovan political life] The Moldovan Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM) has adopted an active strategy, being always on the offensive on various directions. It used all the means, including the platform of the Parliament, to make itself visible. In fact, the PLDM was the first party from the Opposition to enter the race, much before its formal start, even before PLDM was officially registered as a party with the Ministry of Justice. Only the PCRM got an earlier start in the campaign than PLDM, but that's because the PCRM never quit campaigning. (To learn more about the particularities of PCRM's campaign, please see the previous chapter of this analysis.) This very young party has become some sort of a trend-setter in Moldova's political life, and we can even talk about a phenomenon, which we'll call PLDMization, and which influenced especially the Opposition, pushing the other parties to toughen up and become more combative. Until the emergence of the PLDM, it seemed that the only goal of the Opposition was to get some political leaders into the Parliament, and then … repeat the attempt four years later. We can also talk about a phenomenon that preceded the PLDMization, and which we'll call PRCMization, where the lack of transparency and the atmosphere of quasi-conspiracy was a norm. The PLDM can boast a great team of professionals who receive plenty of great publicity. The engine of this team and, at the same time, its biggest problem is the party's leader Vlad Filat. He is the only man who can settle it, and the sooner the better for the entire party. Whether he was ever involved in corruption activities, as the government alleges, Filat must recognize and declare his riches – and the legislation adopted at the initiative of President Voronin provides for total amnesty – or demonstrate the contrary. As long as this problem imposed by the present government remains unsolved, he cannot claim to have the legitimacy to overthrow it. [MAE: “An offer you can’t refuse”] The Actiunea Europeana Movement offered a rehabilitation chance to the Opposition parties that the current power accused of corruption acts in the past, when their representatives had access to public money and property. The current government knows very well that the cases of large-scale corruption are undoubtedly connected with the governance act. Even if the majority PCRM-PPCD coalition could not prove even a single case of large-scale corruption among the Opposition members during eight years of government, it used all the means available to convince the population that the most corrupt persons of this country form part of the parliamentary Opposition, especially the AMN and PLDM. The National Anticorruption Pact launched by the MAE can be used by the accused parties to try to solve this problem. It is up to them to decide how to do it because the MAE put a general framework or a kind of lifebuoy at their disposal. The anticorruption component as basic element in the election campaign was the lifebuoy for the MAE also, but in another meaning. After a number of failed attempts to join more influential and established Opposition parties on the last 100 meters of the election campaign, the MAE made a move aimed at forcing these parties to cooperate with it and eventually recognize it as a more or less equal partner. The move is in the style of Don Corleone's famous quote: “I'm gonna make you an offer you can't refuse!”. MAE offered them to sign the National Anticorruption Pact. During election campaigns, every election contender, including the independent candidates, has an electoral trick of the kind. They make a proposal and ask all the contenders to back it. If supporters are found, it is to the candidate’s advantage because it is a possibility of emphasizing one’s importance. If not, the contender reserves the right to criticize everybody, presenting oneself as the most consistent defender of the interests of the nation. Anyway, they consider that this is for their benefit. This is a trick resembling a rooster running after hens: “if I cannot catch it, I will at least warm myself up!” The case of the MAE and its National Anticorruption Plan was a more special one and therefore it succeeded. Without attacking directly, the MAE made it clear that large-scale corruption exists not only in the current government, but also in some of the Opposition parties. It was a political move to the morally accepted limit because it was in consensus with the government’s attacks. But it was efficient and useful both to the MAE and to the other Opposition parties that were forced to assume clear anticorruption obligations in front of the voters. If the other Opposition parties had ignored the National Anticorruption Pact, they would have indirectly confirmed the accusations made by the government. The pluses of the election campaign of the MAE reside in its active position and in the list of candidates free from the sins of the previous governments, respectively, the sins of large-scale corruption. The minuses result from pluses: the candidates do not have experience to govern, with small exceptions, and, respectively, to fight large-scale corruption. [Instead of prologue and epilogue] This short retrospective analysis of the performance of the parliamentary groups could help the voters select the best election contender that they would like to see in the new Parliament as their representative, but might also offer the possibility of forming a general opinion about the configuration of the next legislature. In particular, it could help the voters decide whether they want or not that the model of the 2005-2009 Parliament is reedited or modified and how. As the vastness of the election campaign cannot be covered in a single analysis, even in a five-part one, the study focused on the parliamentary groups for two reasons: 1. the voters put their trust in them in 2005 and they have the right to know more about them because more is asked from the one that was offered more; 2. most of them appear in opinion polls as possible election contenders that can pass the election threshold and, respectively, can enter the Parliament of 2009-2013. So, the voters have the right to examine them in general and in detail. From among the parties offered chances in polls, only the Liberal Party (PL) was not included in this analysis, also for two reasons: 1. it does not have representatives in the current Parliament; 2. in the election campaign and earlier, the PL has behaved like a solitary wolf in the Moldovan electoral and political thicket. It wasn’t seen and cannot be accused of contacts or cooperation with the parties forming part of the majority coalition or with the Opposition parties. Therefore, the PL could not be analyzed in a general context. Maybe, it deserves a ‘solitary’ political analysis.