The next year in the Republic of Moldova will mark the end of the electoral cycle that will determine the political configuration of governance for the next four years. This cycle began with the local elections in November 2023, which resulted in a pronounced fragmentation of the political spectrum. Formally, the local elections were won by the governing PAS party, followed by the opposition Socialist Party, with both securing the highest number of mandates across all levels. Even though PAS ranked first in the number of mandates obtained, it could not claim a clear victory, losing in all municipalities. This result served more as a serious alarm signal, but it was not clearly heeded by the pro-European government, which initiated the referendum with a narrow result on October 20, 2024.
The territorial distribution of votes in the local elections revealed a trend indicating the electoral penalization of the PAS regime along the line of disappointment accumulated in a broad segment of voters, due to insufficient management of expectations. PAS's predominant reliance on the European agenda proved insufficient in the face of economic and social crises.
It should be noted that PAS failed to win the mayoralty in any of the 11 municipalities and in the majority of cities in the Republic of Moldova, which indicated a national political voting trend and created premises for the party's vulnerability in future elections.
Insisting on holding the referendum with a pro-European agenda in these circumstances was an enormous risk. Ultimately, the referendum had a negative result for Moldova's European orientation, recorded within the country, with the situation being salvaged by a minimal surplus from the diaspora vote.
Two weeks after the narrow victory in the constitutional referendum on Moldova's European orientation, the presidential election took place. At that time, the English publication The Guardian reported, "Maia Sandu's position was weakened after a referendum initiated by her, in which Moldovans were asked whether they supported EU integration, and it passed by only a small margin on October 20." This observation was shared by some experts in the Republic of Moldova, who acknowledged the probability of the Socialist candidate's success in the presidential election, which he ultimately achieved among internal voters.
The presidential election echoed the referendum's result, and the pro-European candidate secured the presidential mandate only through the surplus votes obtained in the diaspora, where almost 83% of the votes were cast for Maia Sandu.
After the resounding victory of the pro-European electoral message that brought PAS to power in the 2021 parliamentary elections, the subsequent three electoral events - the 2023 local elections, the 2024 referendum, and the 2024 presidential election - raised significant doubts about the success of this message, as articulated by PAS, in the 2025 parliamentary elections.
This question became more pronounced after it became clear that Alexandr Stoianoglo won domestically in the second round of the presidential elections with a diluted pro-European message combined with an appeal to restore good relations with Russia. This message from the pro-Russian presidential candidate led to active mobilization of the left-wing electorate in the Republic of Moldova, against the backdrop of palpable absenteeism among the right-wing electorate.
Once again, as in the case of the referendum, the active participation of the diaspora covered the vote deficit that Maia Sandu had within the territory of the Republic of Moldova. Thus, the diaspora's votes ensured Maia Sandu's victory, but Stoianoglo's electoral dominance within the country suggests that the pro-presidential PAS party faces a tough challenge in the upcoming parliamentary elections, which will decide the government's policies for the next four years.
From the perspective of the parliamentary elections, most experts agree that PAS cannot repeat the electoral result from four years ago, and the next pro-European government, if this trend persists, will likely be a coalition. The main criticisms of PAS, formulated by both supporters and detractors of the current government, boil down to the slow pace of reforms, poor political communication, inadequate judicial reform accompanied by major accusations that thieves, including corrupt magistrates, are not being arrested. It should be noted that this perception is shared by representatives of all political camps, including the pro-European one.
The main issue for the continuation of the European path after the next parliamentary elections lies in the lack of a political force capable of attracting the votes of those disappointed by the current pro-European government. All polls indicate that PAS will win the elections but will not secure a majority in parliament to form the government. Based on the current state of affairs, polls favor an anti-European or pseudo-European coalition in the parliamentary elections.
An analysis of vote distribution at the referendum and presidential elections shows that regions that previously voted pro-West did so again, although voter turnout was below expectations. Meanwhile, in regions where more "NO" votes were cast, this vote was directed more against PAS than against Europe. This "NO" vote manifested in areas along the Prut border, which have abundantly benefited from EU funds and numerous partnerships with Romanian municipalities.
Beyond the general electoral depression generated by PAS's inefficiency in certain areas, explanations for this phenomenon must also be sought in the delay in diversifying the pro-European message regarding Moldova's path to EU accession. This pertains to the unionist approach to European integration, whose supporters are not fully represented in PAS's electoral message, resulting in voter absenteeism among a significant number of unionists.
The PAS government is often accused of not contributing to the formation of a broad front of pro-European forces, the only one capable of guaranteeing the continuation of the European integration course. These accusations contain only a degree of truth. In reality, there are no competitive incentives for PAS to engage in activities that would lead to the emergence of a genuine competitor in the electoral segment it claims. Responsibility lies more with the leaders of pro-European political parties, who are currently unable to organize into a credible electoral force in competition with PAS and capable of capturing the votes of the disappointed electorate.
The mission to form a competitor to the current government in the pro-European segment has been assumed by the "Together" bloc, consisting of three political parties, whose message was generically summarized as: "We will achieve European integration better than PAS".
The results of the referendum and presidential elections, as well as sociological surveys, invalidate such an approach as inconsistent for conceiving a successful electoral competitor in the pro-European zone. The concept underlying the creation of the "Together" bloc has produced a pale copy of the governing party and has not led to the formation of a credible electoral force. The derisory electoral result recorded by the bloc's presidential candidate, who in public opinion identified as unionist but renounced the unionist message during the campaign, further discredits the political message embraced by the "Togetherists."
In conclusion, the exemplary mobilization of the pro-European electoral segment in the upcoming parliamentary elections is intrinsically linked to the establishment, in the coming months, of a pro-European force with an electoral message distinct from PAS. This differentiation must be highlighted not as a final objective but as a different path from PAS's variant in achieving the European integration plan. This distinct project is contained in the unionist political program, which affirms the shortest and safest path for European and Euro-Atlantic integration for the Republic of Moldova. It now remains for the euro-unionist political components to formalize the creation of a common political and electoral pole for the next parliamentary elections, launching a unified electoral list and a detailed program for restoring Romanian national unity.
