(Pre-) EU Accession in 2030: The Western Balkans and the Eastern Wing - Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, Analysis by Dionis Cenușa

Op-Ed
	For Ukraine, EU accession is of an existential nature, but the achievement of the goal depends on the dynamics of the war. Moldova has limited resources and the quality of reforms is offset by a geopolitical favoritism of the EU. The results of the elections in Georgia in October will have an impact on the dialogue with the EU and, respectively, on the thawing of the accession process...
Dionis Cenuşa, Senior Contributor

The integration of the Eastern Partnership candidates - Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia - represents a geopolitical and security objective, not just a mechanical reasoning of the EU's enlargement policy. This approach may point to some incipient and sectoral differences, of conceptual and practical nature, in the way the EU applies the logic of accession to the Western Balkan candidate countries and those of the Eastern Partnership.

From a conceptual point of view, the EU is governed by a majority of supranational and national political forces that perceive eastward expansion as an investment in European security in the face of the destructive force of Russia. This is not (yet) found in EU enlargement policy, at the level of technical procedures, and is only partially reflected in the assessments of the accession chapters on external relations (chapters 30 and 31). Moreover, the security argument dominates the political discourse behind the scenarios of future expansion waves. At the same time, at a practical and operational level, the EU in some cases finds it difficult to demonstrate continued and unconditional impartiality when it comes to accession requirements towards all candidate countries. This has been evident in the way Brussels tolerates Serbia’s non-alignment with sanctions against Russia, while being tough on Georgia, where sanctions are applied rather selectively. Rather than treating the candidate countries equally, especially given that both Serbia and Georgia are ruled by elites accused of suppressing democratic institutions, the EU is willing to penalize Georgia and validate the behavior of the Serbian government, despite the fact that of the ten candidate countries, Serbia has the closest ties to Russia, followed by Turkey.

Any kind of double treatment attributed to the EU may compromise the intention to prepare the candidate countries for a wave of enlargements in 2030 (Politico, August 2023). Some national governments of the 10 candidate states may resort to self-centered discourses about European accession. Others may use Eurosceptic populism to cover up their failures in terms of reforms with accusations of geopolitical favoritism in Brussels’ relations with other candidate countries. From this point of view, the 2030 deadline for a new enlargement requires a perfect symbiosis between the success of the candidate countries’ transformations and unbiased evaluation by the EU, generating a competition based on merit, not on geopolitical criteria.

The (anti)model of the Western Balkans

The EU strategy for enlargement does not establish a formal geographical division between the Eastern Partnership and the candidates from the Western Balkans, including Turkey. While the view persists that the new candidates from the East have energized the process, those from the Western Balkans are stuck in slow and nebulous accession negotiations, compromised by EU reservations on the one hand and by the stagnation of transformation processes at local level on the other. The regime of Alecsandar Vučić in Serbia and the pro-Serbian region of Bosnia and Herzegovina feed an (anti)model of European integration at the subregional level. Inspired by the balancing act used by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the Serbian leader is resorting to tactics of cooperation and confrontation (“hedging”) to extract an attitude of tolerance from Brussels, inhibiting its side of conditionality when it comes to accessing pre-accession funds.

The EU's interdependence on Serbia's lithium resources and Belgrade's (de)escalation in relation to Kosovo keep Brussels in a strategic uncertainty. The EU's intention is to combine a mutually beneficial partnership with Serbia in the field of critical mineral resources with the revival of the accession dialogue, the "green transition" and investment in "European strategic autonomy" and the reduction of dependence on China ("de-risking"). The main drawback is that in this process the EU voluntarily reduces the requirement of political accession criteria towards Serbia, which, for the moment, are sacrificed in favor of Serbian lithium resources. In addition, Russia's military actions against Ukraine make Brussels more cautious with Belgrade in order to keep Serbian-Kosovar tensions within a manageable margin. In other words, to ensure peace in the Balkans and to avoid armed instability, concomitantly, in two neighborhoods, Brussels does not exert excessive pressure on the Vučić regime. This is helped by the position of individual Member States, such as France, which puts the interests of its military industry before the convergence of the candidate countries with the EU sanctions policy against Russia. The predominance of national priorities was made clear when Emmanuel Macron justified in Belgrade that Serbia has no obligation to adopt sanctions against Russia because it is only a candidate country.

The (anti)model promoted by Vučić in Serbia, if not overshadowed by the positive political energy of EU accession in the Western Balkans, minimizes the possibility of the next wave of enlargements materializing in 2030. The (anti)model is growing despite the lack of a competitive and effective pro-European model among the other five Balkan states. Finally, the resurgence of Turkey's interest in EU enlargement policy multiplies the number of candidate states that want to establish a relationship of parity with the EU in the accession process, undermining the traditional patronizing-mentorship role of Brussels in relation to the candidate countries.

Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia: high ambitions in the face of uncertain prospects for 2030

Of the 10 candidate countries interested in joining the EU, those in the Eastern Partnership are among the most eager (but not the only ones). Although Ukraine has opened the door to the EU enlargement policy to Moldova and Georgia, the latter two have an advantage in terms of accession due to their size and lack of direct Russian aggression.

In the case of Ukraine, the agenda of accession to the European bloc is linked to the post-war reconstruction of the country, traumatized by continued Russian aggression at social, political and economic levels. Achieving this goal in just 5 years until 2030 seems an intangible deadline because, in addition, to absorbing European policies, strengthening the rule of law and creating strong anti-corruption policies, Kyiv must repair its economy and infrastructure, but also return the approximately 4 million Ukrainian refugees or at least some of them. One factor that may push forward progress toward the 2030 accession goal may be the lack of a real option to join NATO, which will depend on the terms of peace negotiations.  For now, the prolongation of the war reduces Ukraine's ability to join the EU in general, and even more so in 2030.

Among the states that are part of the eastern wing of the enlargement policy, Moldova is the one with the least resources at its disposal to advance in the accession dimension, both in terms of competent human resources (emigration and other demographic deficiencies) and financial capital (indebted state, limited direct investment, etc.). It is not enough for a pro-EU government to set the pace necessary to accelerate the accession negotiations, which are being prepared. Moldova's advantage is that the EU is ready to accept it according to the "Cypriot model" (IPN, July 2023), i.e. with a delayed accession of the Transnistrian region, if the reintegration of the country is not achieved in time. Failures of key reforms (justice, fight against corruption, administrative reform, etc.) will not be the only challenge. The eventual fragmentation of bilateral relations with the EU due to electoral cycles, especially the presidential elections of 2024 and 2025, may be another major problem. This risk may materialize if EU-Moldova relations remain personalized and strongly tied to political representatives of the current or future ruling party, to the detriment of the accession process at the institutional level.

Georgia could face serious complications for its accession in 2030 if the current government (the “Georgian Dream”) remains in power and continues to obstruct democratic institutions. Estimates of the technical progress of the accession process are useless for the moment, as all processes are on hold. The EU will not review its decision to freeze Georgia’s candidate country status until the results of the parliamentary elections on 26 October 2024 are known. Unlike Moldova, Georgia has greater capacity to implement reforms, including from a financial point of view. However, the political dialogue between Tbilisi and Brussels, as well as other European capitals, is so damaged that significant diplomatic efforts will be necessary to revive it, including political changes in the member states (Germany, France, etc.). Since Ukraine has a strong voice within the EU, the Georgian government's conflicts with Kyiv create additional negative noise among European elites sympathetic to Ukraine about Georgia's preparedness to enter into negotiations (like Ukraine and Moldova).

In lieu of a conclusion…

The 2030 enlargement agenda is extremely ambitious, both for the EU and for some candidate countries. However, the Western Balkans are faced with the implications of the transactional (anti-)model promoted by the Vučić regime in Serbia, with the direct blessing of Brussels. On the other hand, the candidate countries for the Eastern Partnership denote greater ambitions to join the EU at an accelerated pace, not yet affected by the fatigue of slow and uncertain accession, in which most Western Balkan countries find themselves. For Ukraine, EU accession is of an existential nature, but the achievement of the goal depends on the dynamics of the war. Moldova has limited resources, and the quality of reforms is offset by a geopolitical favoritism of the EU. The results of the elections in Georgia in October will have an impact on the dialogue with the EU and, respectively, on the unfreezing of the accession process.

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