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Permanent neutrality: security factor or risk to Moldova’s stability and security? Political analysis by Victor Chirila


https://www.ipn.md/en/permanent-neutrality-security-factor-or-risk-to-moldovas-stability-7965_969083.html

This year, Moldova is to mark 14 years of permanent neutrality, status confirmed in Article 11 of the Moldovan Constitution adopted on July 29, 1994. Since then, the permanent neutrality has become a constant refrain of Moldova’s independence and statehood. Such a thing is not accidental if we take account of the fact that the present Government and the ones that had been in power until 2001 consider the status of neutrality as the most indicated approach for ensuring and strengthening our country’s stability and security. This perception was reiterated by President Vladimir Voronin at the Munich Conference on Security Policy organized by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on February 8-10 as well as during an interview with the Russian publication Kommersant on March 11, 2008 and will certainly be reiterated at the NATO Summit that will take place in Bucharest on April 2-4 and will be attended by the Moldovan President. For the Communist Government as well as for the Governments that had been before, the main argument used to explain why Moldova needs a permanent status of neutrality was and continues to be the necessity of convincing Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldova’s territory unconditionally and as soon as possible. At the same time, the unilateral declaration of the status of permanent neutrality is perceived as an important tactical instrument for obtaining Russia’s consent to favorably solving the Transnistrian conflict, in other words, to find a solution close to Moldova’s interests. During 14 years of uninterrupted neutrality, Moldova has accumulated a unique experience that enables it to thoroughly analyze the impact that the status of permanent neutrality has had on Moldova’s stability and security and to make corrections and reviews required by the regional geopolitical changes on the basis of the possible conclusions of the analysis. We do not intend and it is not the case to make a comprehensive analysis of the neutrality within the restricted limits of this article. Yet, we think that the time has come to break the taboo on the issue of neutrality and to start to pragmatically, critically and coldly analyze the questions accumulated on this topic during 14 years. Initially, we should ask ourselves if the permanent neutrality brought the wanted stability and security to Moldova, especially to its citizens. I’m sure that the answer to this question will vary from person to person. However, many of us will not be able to leave aside the Russian troops that include 1,300 military men and 21,000 tons of munitions and continue to remain in the Transnistrian region, flagrantly violating thus Article 11 of the Moldovan Constitution by which our country proclaimed its permanent neutrality and stated that it does not accept the dislocation of military troops of other states on its territory. It is practically impossible not to take into account the fact that a Transnistrian army with over 10,000 soldiers was created instead of the 14th Soviet Army dislocated in Tiraspol. Of course, it is true that during 1999 – 2003, Russia destroyed or withdrew from Moldova almost all its heavy weapons and about 20,000 tons of ammunition. But, as it is well known, Russia did this after pressurized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and, especially by the NATO member states which said they would ratify the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe only after Russia unconditionally withdrew its troops from Moldova and Georgia. As it was earlier said, and not only once, Moldova’s status of neutrality creates an environment that favors the pursuing of a foreign policy that constantly oscillates between the West and the East and that was fairly named “the policy of the lamb that tries to feed simultaneously from two ewes.” For many of us, such a foreign policy is harmful to Moldova’s future and credibility, especially because of its incoherence and unpredictability. A relevant example is the diplomatic disaster known as the Kozak Memorandum, which was followed by a sudden redirection of the foreign policy course to the West by the present government. Many experts consider that this sudden change was more of facade than of content. Not accidentally, after 2006 Moldova’s foreign policy began to return, slowly, but safely, to the ambiguous normality that existed before the Kozak Memorandum. Another example that confirms the inconsistent character of Moldova’s foreign policy is the sinusoidal development of the relations between Moldova and its only neighbors Ukraine and especially Romania. Some consider that the neutrality means political stability, while others say the neutrality means that Moldova will remain in the “grey zone” of regional geopolitics. In other words, we are in a zone with turbid waters and gloomy development prospects, where the superpowers claim supremacy. The remaining in this zone is accompanied by direct repercussions, mainly unfavorable, on the internal situation of the states from the zone. Consequently, the states from the region are characterized by political instability, fragile political institutions, defective functioning of the political system sanctioned by the Constitution, extended transitions to a veritable democracy and functional market economy, abusive interference of the political authorities in the economic sphere, unstable and unattractive investment climate, violations of fundamental human rights and non-observance of the democratic values and principles such as the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly and the independence of the judiciary etc. We can say that during the past seven years the political situation in Moldova has been stable, but the messages about the situation in such areas as business environment, democracy and functioning of democratic institutions, observance of human rights and independence of the judiciary that come mainly from the European Commission and the Council of Europe seem co confirm that this stability is in essence a latent perpetuation of systemic drawbacks typical of the states from the “grey zone” of regional geopolitics. At the same time, some local politicians consider that the neutrality offer Moldova the possibility of asserting itself as a bridge between the West and the East. A series of pertinent questions appear in the given context: Can Moldova assume the role of a bridge between the West and the East in the circumstances in which the political relations with Romania almost reached stalemate, while the relations with Ukraine are far from being functional?; Is Moldova capable of playing the given role without taking account of Ukraine’s, Russia’s and the EU’s interests in the region?; Is Russia ready to accept and support Moldova’s wish to become a link between it and the Euro-Atlantic world at a time when Moscow would prefer to see Moldova a buffer zone on the way to NATO’s and the EU’s extension into its pretended geopolitical area?; Can Moldova afford becoming a buffer zone between the West and the East in a globalization era?; Can Moldova become a bridge between the West and the East while it is bypassed by the most important energy and transport networks that connect the EU and Russia?; Can our country become a bridge that would favor trade between the West and the East at a time when the Free Trade Zones in the CIS or GUAM continue to be virtual projects and not functional realities, while Ukraine and Russia want to sign separate Free Trade Agreements with the EU?. If we answer sincerely these questions, we can realize that given the lack of a serious of abovementioned conditions, our neutrality could be perceived as contentless or an exercise of self-isolation. The fervent supporters of the idea of neutrality think that all the deficiencies of Moldova’s neutrality could disappear overnight if Russia, Ukraine, the US, the EU and OSCE recognized and guaranteed Moldova’s permanent neutrality through an international document. Attempts were earlier made to promote the idea of guaranteeing Moldova’s status of permanent neutrality through the Kozak Memorandum of 2003 and through President Vladimir Voronin’s initiative of 2004 regarding the signing of a Stability and Security Pact for Moldova by the same international players. In both of the cases, this idea was supported neither by the US nor the EU. Why? Because both the US and the EU observe [de facto] and [de jure] Moldova’s neutrality confirmed in the Constitution; because the given idea is outdated, taken out of the dusty drawers of the XIX century, when the powers of the time decided the fate of small people without asking them; because the idea of guaranteeing Moldova’s status of permanent neutrality runs counter to the Declaration of Independence of 27 August 1991, which clearly states [“THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA IS A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC STATE, FREE TO CHOOSE ITS PRESENT AND FUTURE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE..”]. There is no other clearer and more concise answer to the abovementioned question. At the NATO conference in Munich, President Vladimir Voronin stated that the Republic of Moldova does no longer need foreign guarantees for its neutrality, but an international recognition. In Voronin’s opinion, which was also expressed in the mentioned interview given to the Russian paper Kommersant, the international recognition of Moldova’s status of permanent neutrality would materialize if Russia, Ukraine, OSCE, the US, the EU and Moldova signed a relevant Declaration. The signing of such a Declaration, by which the given international players would take cognizance, recognize and, more important, observe the permanent neutrality of Moldova, could volens-nolens lead to the assumption of legal responsibilities by every signatory, responsibilities that could limit the sovereign right of the Moldovan people to decide their fate themselves. In such a case, the first question that we should put to the politicians and especially to ourselves remains the same: Will this possible Declaration on the recognition of Moldova’s permanent neutrality be in accordance with the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of Moldova in which the right of the Moldovan citizens to DECIDE THE PRESENT AND FUTURE WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OUTSIDE is laid down? We will all have to answer this question …. [For INFO-PRIM NEO – Victor CHIRILA, programs director at the Foreign Policy Association]