The results of the presidential election in the Republic of Moldova, held alongside a constitutional referendum on European Union membership, left many citizens with a profound sense of unease. In the absence of a clear winner in the first round, the presidential race will proceed to a runoff on November 3. The pro-European referendum met the validation criteria, but came dangerously close to failing. For the pro-European electorate, this is a victory, but one with a bitter taste.
Although the electoral campaign and the elections themselves were well-managed and conducted without severe irregularities, and voter turnout exceeded 51%, the overall electoral exercise was accompanied by a sense that a parallel effort to derail it was in full swing. Moldovan authorities uncovered several well-funded attempts to influence the election results through disinformation and subversive actions, including a well-organized voter-bribing network and criminal groups paid to organize violent mass protests. Judging by the available information regarding the amount of Russian money directed for this purpose, it can be assumed that the scale of these efforts is overwhelming. Unfortunately, the Moldovan authorities’ response to these threats was partial and did not significantly affect these hostile networks.
In the first round of the presidential election, the incumbent president, Maia Sandu, received a solid score (42.45%) but insufficient for a decisive victory. Surprisingly, former Prosecutor General Alexandr Stoianoglo garnered a significant result (25.98%), despite his quasi-anonymity, limited visibility, and allegations of ties with corrupt oligarchs. Furthermore, several other pro-Russian presidential candidates received unexpected popular support, allegedly backed and generously funded by Moscow through the fugitive convicted oligarch Ilan Shor. Given the common themes in these candidates' pre-electoral discourse, it is expected that all will urge their supporters to back Stoianoglo in the presidential runoff. Together, these "spoiler" candidates secured more than 30% of the popular vote, and there are concerns that a substantial share of their supporters had been "purchased" in advance through the well-organized voter-bribing network set up by Shor and his associates.
Finally, the referendum on European Union membership, which was expected to be a manifesto of Moldova’s pro-European commitment, was on the verge of a spectacular failure, despite the optimism inspired by many opinion polls conducted before the elections. It can be speculated that this is one of the results of massive external interference and vote-buying efforts carried out by Moscow in Moldova through Shor and his affiliates. At the same time, it seems that a growing awareness of Russia's efforts to undermine Moldovan elections also led to increased mobilization among the Moldovan diaspora, which once again saved the country’s pro-European course.
With the runoff approaching, the authorities face several challenges: ensuring the integrity of electoral processes against the risks of hijacking through vote-buying and proactively combating online disinformation campaigns. An additional challenge for Moldovan society will be to mobilize pro-European voters who did not participate in the first round, both in the country and among the diaspora, to effectively counterbalance any potential influx of paid voters.
These preliminary observations need to be further analyzed to better understand the root causes of Moldovan society’s vulnerabilities to external influences. The Moldovan authorities urgently need to come up with appropriate responses to these concerning challenges, including measures to prevent similar interferences during next year's parliamentary elections.
Petru Culeac is executive director of Moldova Development Institute
