Novo-Ogarevo – Rostov-on-Don – Kennebunkport or the denouement of the story might be close. Political analysis by Andrei Popov

As other persons, the expert in political sciences Andrei Popov wonders what has Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin discussed with Vladimir Putin and essentially what have they agreed upon during the meeting held on June 22 in Novo-Ogarevo? Practically without information, the expert tries, by means of a comparative analysis of the press-releases from the recent meetings Putin-Voronin, and of the information “for the press” presented before the meeting Putin-Voronin, in order to infer the significance of the meeting. [Strange, suspect and… substantial] Andrei Popov is convinced that despite the lack of any information about the discussed matters, a fact which he considers strange and even suspect, the recent meeting of the two presidents is the most substantial since the Kozak Memorandum. The meeting in Novo-Ogarevo was carefully prepared and preceded by tens of discussions between experts and intermediary discussions between Voronin and Putin. Thus, no general discussion could have been held last Friday, but there might have been discussed in concrete details a single issue – the Transnistrian dispute. The rest – wines, investment and energy issue etc, were probably tackled not as separate points in the agenda but in context and in close relation to the Transnistrian issue. The expert says that the discussion held on June 22 is the culminant point of the Moldovan-Russian dialogue on the Transnistrian issue since 2005 until now. Everything that was done so far was in fact a preparation. Now the things get more rushed. We are on the last 100 metres. We are one step closer to the denouement of the story. The ambiguity can not be maintained for a long period. Popov thinks that very soon, probably the next few weeks – in September or October at the latest – this stage will end, which he calls “the package agreement” and we will enter a new stage. What stage? According to him, there are two options. [Plan B] One of the variants is that the Moldovan leader gets rid, at last, of the illusion that he can obtain from Russia a real settlement and will start working on intensifying the reforms on the right bank of the Nistru River in order to prepare a better solution for the next 3-4 years, in a better international context, with a stronger and less vulnerable Moldova (possibly with a more clear European perspective, thus, more attractive). But the expert does not believe in a full success of this scenario, including because, before leaving for Moscow, President Voronin came back “disappointed” from Luxembourg – where the European officials, despite his expectations (based on what?) could not assure him that EU will sign the Association Agreement with Moldova by the end of his tenure. [An apparently impossible plan] Popov excludes the possibility of a bilateral agreement with Moscow, signed behind the back of EU and USA and promoted despite their opposition. He considers that today (after Luxembourg, but especially after the changes occurred on 3/17 June), it would be fatal for the official Chisinau from the political point of view to follow a formula which is not agreed within the “5+2” format and especially if it would be openly criticised by the West and rejected by the majority of internal political forces. [Plan A] The plans of Chisinau today are not related to a “conspiracy with Moscow”, but to a combination in two moves. The first move is to find a compromise with Moscow. Afterwards, together with Russia to opt for including the solution in the “5+2” format talks. In this case the “final” solution is at least a pro forma, supported by all the involved actors. Popov considers that this was the stake of the Moldovan negotiators according to the new strategy agreed upon in Kazan in August 2005, and confirmed by Moscow in August 2006. That package (without the unconfirmed “annexes”) included an autonomous status for Transnistria, viable central institutions, advantageous delimitation of competences, nothing that would look like a veto right for Transnistria, not federalisation, not legalisation of the Russian military presence, not giving up the European integration plans. Yet, the plan which looked reasonable started to become more risky during the talks held in Moscow by the presidential counsellor Mark Tcaciuc and the minister of reintegration Vasilii Sova. From Chisinau’s viewpoint, the Moldovan proposals were perfect for the Russian interests, without sacrificing the viable settlement of the conflict. However, Moscow was negotiating without saying yes or no. In light of this fact, at the end of January the talks failed or at least seamed to fail, after Moscow has clearly hinted that the proposals of Moldova are not enough and directed the Moldovan negotiators to agree first of all with Tiraspol. Chisinau was not prepared to offer more now – they already knew what the negotiations with Tiraspol mean. However, the negotiations were resumed after the visit of Iurii Zubakov to Chisinau at the beginning of March. On what ground? In exchange for new guarantees or concessions? Or the Russians were changing their view? If yes, why then? And if they wanted a speedy and viable settlement why did they wait so much before answering to the Moldovan proposals? These are the questions Andrei Popov has and gives them to the public opinion, as well. By chance or not, but namely after this enigmatic visit new elements of the settlement started to occur, elements which confirmed could completely distort the idea of the initial package and of the Law of July 22, 2005 on the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute. For example – dissolving the Parliament and starting early election together with Transnistria as a separate electoral constituency, fixed share for the representatives of Tiraspol in the Government and Parliament, the possibility of making legal (even if temporary) the presence of the Russian peacekeepers, without guaranties that they will withdraw after 2008 etc. On June 20, in Luxembourg, President Voronin managed to be convincing and to assure the European Union that it has no reasons to worry about the settlement of the conflict by means of a separated agreement with Russia and without the consent of the “5+2” format. [The dangers of the stage] At first sight, one can say everything is all right. Andrei Popov however says the society is concerned. According to him, the greatest danger is related today to the possibility that Moldova accepts the new requests of Kremlin (probably even on June 22) which would completely change the initial package and would lead to a poor settlement and to a reintegrated but dysfunctional state, which is not capable of spurring reforms in order to catch a more clear European perspective in 2010-2011 (at the moment when Europe will seriously think about the Western Balkans minus Croatia which will already be part of EU). Why would Voronin do that? Because he wants very much to settle the dispute by the end of his term, he is more and more disappointed about the European perspectives of Moldova, feels the increasing cost of the Russian embargo on wines. After he invested so much in the idea of a settlement, he becomes madder on the background of evasive answers coming from Moscow and its new requests. All this is amplified by the effect of the loss suffered in the local election and imminent elections of 2009. It is hard to recognise that you can not be the Reintegrator (you can only prepare the ground). The plan B – would mean exactly this thing – giving up the hope of settling the dispute in the near future and carrying out more firm reforms, which unavoidably will intensify the loss in popularity of the present state leadership and of the Party of Communists. It is a hard and difficult decision to make. Moscow understands this fact and uses it because Voronin has clearly proved that he has no alternatives and that Plan B is rather a bluff. That is why Kremlin is setting the process back. It wants to make Chisinau more nervous and determine it to make mistakes, so that it comes with new proposals, and accepting the maximum price Russia will ask for the support of conflict’s settlement (on the paper). Andrei Popov considers that in Novo-Ogarevo, Voronin managed to understand better what price Moscow will ask. And that he has acknowledged the fact that Moscow will not accept a good solution, as included in the package. In this case another question appears: how far will Moldova go to meet the requests of Kremlin in order to have a fast solution (in the situation when Moscow does not want and does not understand why it should voluntarily leave Moldova out of its influence)? [Possible moves] The traditional horse races are organised at Rostov-on-Don on June 30. There, the CIS presidents will meet again and a new discussion might take place (maybe even a meeting) between the two heads of state. Vladimir Vladimirovici, might wait for a sign from Vladimir Nicolaevici – maybe even a clear and final answer: how flexible Moldova would be according to the new ideas (possibly) presented in Novo-Ogarevo. June 30 could be the deadline for Moldova, the date when it should give its answer. On July 1-2, Putin will meet with Bush in Kennebunkport and will need clarity in order to know how (and if) to discuss the issue of Moldova with the U.S. president, expert in political sciences Andrei Popov says, quoted by Info-Prim Neo.