Moldova’s foreign policy regarding Transnistria settlement has reached a turning point, expert

Moldova’s foreign policy regarding the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict has reached a turning point. Now the Moldovan authorities need to decide whether to stick to the present course of the settlement or go for the plan B. And the first option will require Russia’s backing, which will most probably involve a host of concessions, way beyond the ‘red lines’ of the negotiated terms. This opinion was formulated by analyst Andrei Popov, executive director of the Foreign Policy Association, at the closing press briefing of the second international conference “Achieving a Transnistrian Settlement in the Context of Moldova’s Europeanization”, held during March 26-27 in Chisinau. According to the expert, achieving a Transnistrian settlement and the European integration are two interdependent processes. In both of them Moldova has an important role to play. While in the case of the integration process the progress largely depends on internal achievements, when it comes to identifying a solution to the Transnistrian dispute, Moldova faces a series of factors which it cannot control, like the level of acknowledgment and the capacity of Russia to alter its policy vis-à-vis Moldova and the frozen conflicts as a whole. “Russia is interested in establishing a circle of friend-states around its borders. And, as far as things stand now, it seems that accomplishing this goal with respect to Moldova implies maintaining a status-quo. Keeping the conflict frozen is a handy leverage to bear on the Republic of Moldova”, said Popov, adding that Russia is not willing to relive the experience it had with the Baltic States, which, once the troops withdrawn, opted unwaveringly for the West, leaving the Kremlin without a chance of restoring its control over the region. According to the analyst, Moldova has been stuck for two years in a stage of the settlement process in which it has marshaled its efforts to find a compromise with the Russian Federation. In the wake of the meeting between President Voronin and President Putin on 26 August 2005, the first after the failure of the so-called Kozak memorandum, a new course has been established. The in-principle understanding which the two heads of state reached was to find a compromise that would end in an acceptable settlement for the Russian Federation, but at the same time wouldn’t harm Moldova’s status of a unitary state. In August 2006, after a year of seeing how the land lies, Voronin proposed in Moscow a new settlement package by which Moldova accepted to make three concessions. First – it reconfirms its status of neutrality and makes sure that the withdrawn Russian troops are not replaced by other ones. Second – the Russian property in Transnistria, which makes up from 70 to 80 percent of the region’s economic potential, are unconditionally recognized, without any further checkups. And third – Moldova gives solid and systematic guarantees to the people living in the Transnistrian region. So, Popov says, none of these are able to undermine the soundness of the reintegrated state. Although this formula seems to be reasonable, the analyst questions its feasibility. According to him, the proposals made by Chisinau do not take into account Russia’s interests, which needs much stronger leverages to maintain its position in the region. “Without doubt, Russia is concerned to keep Moldova neutral. An international declaration that would recognize Moldova as neutral would be a significant yet insufficient step. To rest assured that Moldova, together with Transnistria, doesn’t slip from the Russian orbit of influence, the Kremlin needs other positional advantages, too”, the analyst believes. Russia looks for this particular kind of reintegration which would offer it a say through Transnistrian representatives, who could break at any time a potential wind of change. But the proposed solution suggests a population-based representation system for the legislative assembly of the reunified state; that is just 14-16 seats for Transnistria, which is not enough. Another lever would be the economic one, meaning control over the main facilities in the region. And of course, the Kremlin wants Russian military presence there, no matter what form it takes. The Moldovan offer, however, doesn’t give any of these guarantees. Moldova hoped in vain that Russia would understand that there was nothing more to offer. “I am sure that in a week or two the leadership of Moldova will realize that the old pattern doesn’t work anymore and will have to make a choice”, Popov concluded. The International Conference “Achieving a Transnistrian Settlement in the Context of Moldova’s Europeanization”, organized by the Foreign Policy Association with the support of the UK Embassy in Moldova, took place on March 26-27 in Chisinau, bringing together officials, politicians, representatives of international organizations and political analysts from a number of countries.