Moldova under Government and Opposition regime: the cycle is over. Info-Prim Neo analysis

These days Moldova comes closer to a turning point that should be probably analyzed more thoroughly during the last week of the election campaign for the 2009 parliamentary elections. This turning point marks the end of a complete cycle of work of the major political forces in the Government and as part of the Opposition. [Government and Opposition: equilibrium in time, doctrines and electorate] The cycle of promoting political doctrines by the Government and Opposition is also over: from the Liberal and national right to the etatist and international left. Meanwhile, we could witness the intersection and/or on-the-fly modification of the doctrines in a way that is absolutely abnormal for other societies, but, as it seems, acceptable for the Moldovan society. The current state of the political class in Moldova shows an almost perfect equilibrium: the government showed that it is equally prepared to govern and to act as part of the Opposition. The present Opposition showed practically the same preparedness. During practically equal periods of time, both of the camps got to know the feeling of absolute power offered by the government act and of frustrations and humiliations experienced while in opposition. The abovementioned assertions are rather relative given that a number of political organizations succeeded each other on the Moldovan political arena – some of them already inexistent, the others transformed even into the opposite, while about the rest it is not possible to clearly say if and when they had governed and had been in opposition. But this did not change the essence of things as most of the times only the names of the political parties changed, while the politicians that were constant in their options or turncoats and migrants remained the same. Very few names appeared in the Moldovan politics during the last 20 years. It should be noted that the Moldovan voters have had the same experience: from the coming of parties, doctrines and political leaders to the full disappointment in them. It is a natural process for any society that has hopes for a change to the better, as quickly as possible, counting on certain political forces then on others by alternation. As a folk song appreciated by practically all the voters says: “ours come, ours go, we remain fools again…” Each of the camps gained the government-opposition experience practically the same way, but the dose of approximation is rather significant. [Government No. 1: surplus of idealism with deficit of strategies, organizations and technology] If we divide the history of the independent Moldova into the period before the coming of the Communist Party of Moldova (PCRM) to power as distinct and unique force that ruled for eight consecutive years, and the period after their coming we can say that the Government No. 1 was formed by political organizations that we traditionally call Democratic or had the word ‘Democratic’ in their names. They significantly influenced the country’s political life from 1991 until 2001, when time came for the PCRM to become the Government No. 2, earlier being conventionally the Opposition No. 1. The Democratic parties and/or their elites used their influence on the fate of the country, sticking principally to Democratic ideals, general-humanistic principles and values and less to strategies, organizational framework, techniques and technologies. They lacked the experience of their forerunners partially because they were the pioneers of the democratic processes in the politics and of the liberal processes in economics on a ground invaded by totalitarian traditions in both areas, and partly because the political groups from the center to the right had very eclectic doctrines and political visions about the organizational pattern and political leaders. The pluses and minuses result from here, associated with the terms of government of the given political forces, both having most of the times objective reasons. We will not speak about the internal and/or external pluses and minuses because the present analysis has another goal - to give a political overview of the whole independence period. As a matter of fact, a part of the minuses of the Government No. 1 are allegedly connected with group, clan interests, this ‘school’ being indispensable for any government as it is the only one that offers access to public property and finances. Objectively again, the electorate had expected a radical change, a new government for 10 years. [Government No. 1 versus Opposition No. 1] The relations between the governments from before 2001 with the present government, which was then the Opposition No. 1 in the person of the PCRM, had been generally within the parliamentary principles: broad debates, mutual attacks and accusations, but the plenary sittings were broadcast live and all the political players had practically equal access to the state print media, the national radio and television, etc. It is true that the former Communist Party of Moldova, which succeeded the former PCUS in the independent Moldova, had been outlawed by parliamentary decision for several years. In several years, the Moldovan communists were reinstates also by parliamentary decision, while the conditions created in the country enabled them to take over the power in a short period of time, democratically, by elections recognized as free and fair at the international level. No other attacks with the use of non-parliamentary means on the PCRM or its leaders were recorded. No political criminal case, no serious attempt to track the financial funds known as “the party’s money” or the archives of the local branches of the KGB and Soviet militia was made public. [Government No. 2: the end justifies the means] If the Government No.1 could be suspected of surplus of idealism with deficit of experience, organizations and technology, the Government No.2 based its activity on the experience of the forerunners from the PCUS with dominant organizations and discipline and on permanently improved political technology. The Communists learnt the lesson while in opposition and memorized well the frustrations accumulated during the 10 years while outside the political life or marginalized as that meant for them the impossibility of using the advantages offered by the government act, including access to public property and money. Their long memory turned out to be fatal for the Opposition No. 2 for many times because the PCRM during the two terms in office acted according to the principle “the end justifies the means”, the major aim being to preserve the power and annihilate any kind of serious opposition. In the same connection, the doctrines and programs with which it came to power were changed with others, the reorientation from the Russia-Belarus Union to the European Union being rather relevant for the foreign policy. The acceptance of the Christian Democratic People’s Party as strategic political partner after being sworn enemies was as relevant for the internal policy. The same happened in the economy. During the second term, the PCRM pursued liberal reforms not typical of a left-wing, especially Communist party. The principle “the end justifies the means” is applicable in this case too if taking into account the numerous accusations of economic offences in the interests of the party, group, clan, and ‘family’ leveled against the Government No. 2. [Government No.2 versus Opposition No. 2] The PCRM as the Government No. 2 used the key principle “the end justifies the means” and “its historical memory” in the relations with its political rivals. The parliamentary principles were reduced to the minimum, or even liquidated. The legislature was more like a voting machine that did not take into account the proposals of the political Opposition. The live broadcasts of the parliamentary sittings were replaced with eulogistic reports about the government that denigrated the Opposition, made daily and massively by the media holding strengthened by the Government No. 2, allegedly using the levers of the government act, legally and illegally. For the first time after the declaration of Moldova’s independence, the political opponents began to be openly harassed with the involvement of the state authorities. Such methods have been used by the Government No. 2 during its two terms in office. They include the accusations made against the Opposition in the form of legal cases, arrests and confiscations most of which enforced by a final court decision. Or if such final decisions existed inside, all of them were revealed by the European Court of Human Rights. In fact, the international organizations during the eight years have pointed to the permanent degradation of the freedom of the press and expression in Moldova and serious problems in the activity of the democratic institutions, including the legal system, human rights, etc. Even if the international organizations periodically praised the Government No. 2 for its accomplishments, this government did not manage to free Moldova from the Council of Europe’s monitoring even if it had more possibilities than the previous governments. Besides, the 2001 elections, when the PCRM took over the power, seem to be the last elections that were recognized as fully free and fair at the international level. The next elections, either local or parliamentary, could not be named free and fair and the blame was put on the Government No. 2. [Who will incline the balance of complete equilibrium?] Each of the two political groups gained experience and showed their capacity to play two roles – to govern and to act as part of the Opposition – in practically equal periods of time. Therefore, we can speak about a practically total equilibrium that will be inevitable disturbed in this last week of the election campaign for the April 5 legislative elections. There are only two factors that can incline the balance in favor of one of the groups. [The first:] A powerful electoral move by an election contender or a group of election runners that would be appreciated by the voter. It is well-known that many people decide who to vote on the last days or even before going to the polls. [The second:] The electorate that decided, or not yet, what kind of government it wants.