Moldova-NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan: uncertain anniversary. Analysis by Andrei Popov

The NATO North Atlantic Council came together for a meeting on July 4 in Brussels. It discussed the progress made by Moldova in implementing the Moldova-NATO Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) on the basis of the March report of the NATO assessment mission. [Official viewpoint] According to a communiqué from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, Andrei Stratan spoke about the results achieved in implementing the IPA and the priorities in the reformation of the security and defence sector. He pointed to the areas that need the continuous support of the Alliance. According to the cited source, the representatives of the allied countries positively assessed the institutional mechanisms that Moldova set up to implement the IPAP and the efforts made in this respect. At the same time, the Republic of Moldova was encouraged to finalise the creation of the political an legal frame for reforming the security and defence sector, this being one of the key elements for the successful implementation of the Plan. [Reading between the lines retrospectively] As in other cases, political analyst Andrei Popov tried to read the official sources between the lines and to fill with impressions and own data the gap of information on this important topic for the Moldova society. The analyst ascertains that the Brussels meeting took place exactly one year after the approval of the IPAP, which constituted a revival in the relations between Moldova and NATO. The turn occurred in fact in June 2005, when, on the eve of the Parliament vote regarding the appeals and the declaration on Transnistria, President Vladimir Voronin met with the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and announced Moldova’s intention to draw up an Individual Plan. The respective decision was welcomed, but it was adopted with a delay of at least two years, the analyst considers, given that this superior cooperation framework between the Alliance and the Partner States was announced at the Prague Summit in 2002. After the initial interest manifested by the administration of the country, at the start of the talks over the so-called Kozak Memorandum with Russia in May 2003, President Vladimir Voronin imposed a real embargo on this issue: no discussions about the IPAP if the Presidential Office does not approve the theses. Popov considers that the reason was evident: “not to let Russia believe that we are not friends; otherwise it will not help up solve the conflict.” Meanwhile, other countries did not have such concerns and managed to sign individual plans long before Moldova. And not only Georgia, which, fixing on the NATO objective, immediately accepted the idea and signed an ambitious document at the end of 2004, and one of the partners of the GUAM - Azerbaijan. Armenia signed the individual plan in 2005, and Kazakhstan in January-February 2006. [Preliminary impressions] Anyway, at the respective moment, Moldova’s decision to draft the plan was presented by the officials and press as an almost revolutionary decision. After Moldova expressed its interest in the Plan in June 2005, it seemed that it is on the brink of a new page in its foreign policy, when it will not look over the shoulder every time, thinking how not to make Russia angry and how Moscow and Tiraspol will interpret even the most innocent decisions (an important aspect in the case of the IPAP was the reaction of the traditional wing of the PCRM). The next year, the experts, first of all those from the Foreign Ministry and from the Defence Ministry, succeeded in working out a good document, with the support of NATO specialists and on the basis of a political mandate from President Vladimir Voronin. In July 2005, Andrei Popov contributed to the drawing up of an analysis that was published by the EastWest Institute and had a telling title and subtitle: “Upgrading Relations with NATO - A Chance for a Real Reform of the Moldovan Armed Forces” and "Chances of the IPAP", which ends with the following phrase: “Nevertheless, the IPAP could only supplement and not substitute the concerted efforts that Moldova must make in the months to come to fix the precise commitments and the extent to which it will allow NATO to involve”. The analyst judges the events that happened in reality by the assessments made by a NATO expert, whom he regards as “one of the best” in the area, during a private discussion half a year after the approval of the IPAP: a) It is important for Moldova to make a difference between the declarative commitments and actions (“because it is not an individual plan of intentions, but of actions; and not We imposed them on you, but You assured us for many times that You are interested, need them and are able to fulfil them”), b) A lot depends on the political will to implement the IPAP: “You have signed the document, but you did not do any changes that would show that you are determined to fulfil it.” No action was taken to allocate the necessary resources (not very large sums of money), and to consolidate the human resources. One thing is when three persons write the document and another is to set up an interministerial team that would coordinate and ensure the implementation of the Plan. It is obvious that many people should deal with it, first of all from the Foreign Ministry and from the Defence Ministry. After half a year of implementation, these were just primary personal impressions. [Anniversary findings] The impressions found confirmation at the first anniversary of the Plan also, says the analyst Andrei Popov. After an ambitious outset and assurances that we understand what the reform commitments we assumed really mean, there began to come confuse signals, which made NATO believe that we are not serious, do not know what we want and cannot make a distinction between reform intentions and reforms. More seriously, it looked that Moldova does not have political will to implement the IPAP. It also seemed that the Plan became for the official Chisinau almost a burden that hampers the fruitful dialogue with Russia over the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute. The working committees dealing with different aspects of the reform practically do not come together for meetings, there are not enough personnel in the Foreign Ministry and in the Defence Ministry that will be responsible for the implementation of the IPAP and no military representative has been sent to the Mission of the Republic of Moldova in Brussels. It is a detail, but this is a clear signal for NATO that Moldova is not seriously committed to implementing the Plan.