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Moldova is no longer ‘home alone’, IPN analysis


https://www.ipn.md/en/moldova-is-no-longer-home-alone-ipn-analysis-7978_1013835.html

IPN analysis: By signing and ratifying the Association Agreement with the EU, Moldova obtained one of the most powerful allies in its history for overcoming the internal and external problems faced.
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The completion of the internal procedures for signing and ratifying the Association Agreement between Moldova and the European Union set off a series of system changes in the sociopolitical landscape of the country, generated by the  complex, long and difficult negotiations on this accord. The first and most important novelty is the fact that Moldova is no longer alone in the face of internal and external dangers that are traditionally faced by states of the same size and with the same problems as Moldova.

Simply speaking, now the repeat of the scenarios implemented in Crimea, Donbas, Luhansk, Abkhazia and South Ossetia and of the yet unsolved conflict started in Moldova on March 2, 1990, when foreign military forces entered openly a battle against the constitutional authorities on the side of separatist forces, which are now named terrorist forces and this name is probably more appropriate, is less probable in Moldova. For the first time, Moldova fell, even if only as an associate, within the orbit of the most important organization on the continent, which, despite the fact that it does not have own armed forces, has a considerable political and economic potential that any possible enemies of Moldova will be unable to neglect. Very recently, the same potential started to be applied in the case of the regional crisis in Ukraine. Owing to this and other factors, the crisis didn’t have, and we hope will not have the ending projected by its architects.

It’s true that Moldova has formed part of an interstate organization – the Community of Independent States (CIS). However, on the one hand, the CIS turned out to be helpless and useless in the case of the aforementioned scenario and other similar scenarios. On the other hand, the CIS played the role of ceiling for this kind of deviations from the international coexistence norms. Against such a background, the difference between the European and any other continental organization becomes possibly even more evident.

It’s one thing when Moldova says it and it’s another thing when the EU says it for Moldova

The EU’s gesture the next day after the ratification of the accord by Moldova’s Parliament, when it officially expressed its regret at Russia’s decision to ban the export of certain meat products from Moldova on the very day of the ratification, is relevant in this respect. It should be noted that the EU made public its position before getting in touch with the Moldovan partners to understand all the facts related to this ban imposed by the Russian authorities … This is an absolute novelty in the relations between Moldova and the EU, which are based on the principle of reciprocal solidarity that is stipulated in the agreement. The accord also envisions the formulation of plans of response to the asymmetrical risks that appear in Moldova’s relations with other countries. These are measures aimed at dealing with such problems as migration and embargoes that can affect Moldova’s economy, or more exactly countermeasures for the risks that can appear principally because of political reasons. On this first occasion related to the implementation of the accord, the EU reminds that the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Moldova are compatible with the preferential trade regimes between Moldova and Russia and they will have no negative impact on them. It’s one thing when the small Moldova from the post-Soviet area says it, even if for many times, and it’s another thing when the EU says it for Moldova.

The economic factor will influence the political one

Given these new realities, we can expect ‘warmer’ and closer prospects of solving the seemingly frozen Transnistrian conflict. The UE does not have armies, but it has will and the necessary financial resources to contribute to the modernization of the country’s territory on the right bank of the Nistru River so that it becomes attractive for the population from the left bank. The EU has wisdom and patience and offers technical and financial assistance for development to the left bank too, in the amount that the Transnistrian administration can accept. The EU has understanding and insistence to stimulate, including financially, the building of confidence between both banks of the Nistru. The EU has the perspicacity to offer the Transnistrian businessmen, through the Association Agreement with Moldova, the chance to maintain and extend the rather close economic relations with the EU for a rather long period of time. The business community and the budget of the Transnistrian region will lose a lot, possibly to a catastrophic extent, if the substantial exports to the EU are stopped now or in the future. Most probably, the Transnistrian business community will not easily yield to the political pressure to break up the relations with the EU. This time, the economic factor may influence the political factor in the Transnistrian region, unlike the whole period before the signing of the Association Agreement between Moldova and the EU. The goal of this ‘inverse’ pressure is to make the region accept the European regulations and economic relations governed by the DCFTA, signed with the official Chisinau.

In this connection, the recent  information according to which the assistance provided by Russia as bonuses to the pensions of elderly people and invalids in Transnistria for the first time is late, the public utilities grow more expensive, while the salaries of budget-funded employees decrease is relevant in this respect. On the other hand, the fact that one day after the ratification of the accord, the Government of Moldova allocated additional financial assistance to the inhabitants of the Moldovan-administered Transnistrian villages cannot be accidental. The European money represents a large part of Chisinau’s money. Thus, the EU gives clear signals that it wants relations of partnership with the whole Moldova and that it does not want an unpredictable and dangerous ‘black hole’ at its borders and does a lot for this country to reunify politically, socially and culturally. Maybe for the first time since the start of this conflict, there appeared preconditions that make us think that the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute is a matter of time.

This conclusion is confirmed by the new position on the Transnistrian issue of the neighboring Ukraine, which also signed an Association Agreement with the EU and, respectively, fell within the EU’s orbit as well. In light of its sad recent experience, Ukraine understood better the dangers deriving from the unsolved Transnistrian dispute. The dangers are major even for the existence of Ukraine as a state, if taking into account the scenarios for Transnistrianizing the neighboring country, especially is south and southeast, with goals that were far from the interests of the Ukrainian people.

The demarcation line EU vs. CU

In fact, the new status of Ukraine, legalized by its Association Agreement with the EU, offers Moldova also for the first time official exemption from the necessity of joining the Customs Union (CU), which, neither theoretically, nor practically, can be done without the member states having common borders, and the Russian World project that is mainly promoted by force, including military, by embargos, blackmail and bans, unlike the civilized methods of the EU. 

The preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement generated particular qualitative changes within the Moldovan political class, including at government and opposition levels, because the line that delimits the internal political confrontations since 2010 has gone through namely the dilemma “European Union vs. the Customs Union”, or the Eurasian Economic Union, as it is now called.

At government level, it’s not hard to imagine what would have happened to the parties, alliances and coalitions that came to power after April 7, 2009, if the unifying idea of the European orientation hadn’t existed. Now that an important stage in this process was covered, or even two stages if we take the liberalized visa regime separately, the initial different level of pro-European political will, capacity and sincerity of the components of the three democratic governments now counts less. It is the ending, their will and capacity to adjust themselves to the increasing conditions within the negotiations on the accord with the EU that count. Maybe in parts they cheated and pursued personal or political rather that economic interests in this ‘remunerative’ relationship with the EU, based on the ‘more for more’ principle, but this may be the only way by which the political elite can be obliged to build its own ‘democratic trap’ in the form of rules and viable democratic institutions that would enforce the law and the observance of the rights by everyone in Moldova, without exception. The other ways include the revolutions and civil wars that are initiated by enthusiasts, but their results are usually exploited by villains. In any case, not by the ordinary people. 

A behavioral change inside coalition

From another viewpoint, the signature and ratification of the accord offers a clear occasion for noticing the behavioral change inside the ruling coalition. It became more humane and civilized. During over a year, the components of the Pro-European Coalition gave no real reason for being criticized for the way they communicate between them, even if someone tried hard to generate such reasons. We can presume that certain tensions continue to exist, as the leader of the People’s Movement “Antimafie” Mocanu asserts. But the parties of the ruling coalition learned the lesson as regards the washing of their dirty linen in public. Without this permanent goal – the signing of the accord with the EU – it’s hard to imagine what would have been achieved. As the worst example, we can mention the way the decision about the person who was to go to Brussels on June 27 to sign the accord on behalf of Moldova was taken. Surely there were rivalries that were again stimulated from inside and outside the coalition. But, the best solution was ultimately identified, probably by consensus. Iurie Leanca went to Brussels. This way, there were highlighted the merits of the Filat 1 and 2 Governments and of the current Government, and even of the whole coalition, the Moldovan political class and society in general. President Nicolae Timofti who, if he had a choice, chose not to go, deserves being praised.

Thanks to the opposition as well

In a way, the merit of signing the accord belongs to the anti-European political opposition, not only because it kept the government awake, pointing to the danger of the European course being thwarted. Some of the processes that can be regards as modernization of important political parties, especially the Communist Party (PCRM), can be considered as more important in this respect. What is going on in this party can be described as ‘detalibanization’ of the political process in Moldova, which implies banking more on the power of the argument than on physical strength. We should not forget that the purely internal party processes were also powerfully marked by the extra- and inter-party dispute between the supporters and the opponents of the pro-European idea. Maybe in these processes too we should look for explanations as to the easy improvement of the internal situation in Moldova, at least in the period when the accord was signed and ratified, compared with the period around May 9. We can suppose that wiser opposition leaders realized better than others the risks of the Ukrainian scenario being repeated and did not want to play the role of arson authors.

It’s true that some of the anti-European parties and leaders, slightly less important than the PCRM, continue to ‘talibanize’ the political atmosphere in the country. But we hope that this is a matter of time and political will, not of something else, more dangerous for the interests and fate of this country. We hope they didn’t know what they said when they spoke about the risk of losing the country at a time when even the most ardent opponents of Moldova’s Europeanization from outside made only threats, saying Moldova will lose a freight car or two. Maybe they will also learn the elementary rule of this century, according to which any change of course can be ensured exclusively by winning elections.

Blame put on current government will be a weak consolation

The signing and ratification of the Association Agreement marked the greater mobilization of the pro-European civil society leaders and organizations. The recent launch of the Pro Europe Platform points to a model of behavior that everyone who cares about this development prospect of the country should follow, including persons and organizations that do not want or cannot support the current government for electoral or other purposes. But the communication with the population about the benefits of the rapprochement with the EU is no longer the government’s cause only, including because the government admitted that it didn’t achieve much. But the results of the November 30 elections and the chance of continuing the European course, by implementing the Association Agreement, depend greatly on this communication and on the conclusions that society will reach. A possible failure in elections would mean throwing Moldova back into the history’s drawers for minimum 10-20 years, if not forever. The blame put on the current government will be a weak consolation as it did what it could best to reach this point, even if things could have stood better.

This is indeed a merit not only of parties and politicians, but also of the Moldovan society that offered legality and legitimacy to the current government for the pro-European course. Surely, the regional crisis contributed to hastening the signing of the Association Agreement, but the special merit belongs to the Moldovan society and the political class. The most conclusive example in this respect is the liberalization by the EU of the visa regime for Moldovans because not only Leanca and Corman, not only Filat Lupu and Hadarca, but also all the citizens of Moldova, without exception, will benefit from it. This means that each of us passed this confidence testing exam – someone by laws and other documents that are in compliance with the EU legislation, others by the vote they gave, while the third by the daily civilized behavior at home or abroad, at work and at the education institution. Before the signing of the accord and especially by it, the Moldovans showed and confirmed the wish and capacity to become integrated into the European family. That’s why they deserve not remaining ‘home alone’.

Valeriu Vasilică, IPN