Moldova between European Union and Eurasian Union: polls and tendencies

Op-Ed
	Polls confirm that the EU enjoys reduced popularity among the Moldovans, lower than the popularity enjoyed by the Eurasian initiatives of Russia. A communication strategy is urgently needed...
Dionis Cenuşa

The pro-European inclination in society remains at a low level, while the pro-Eurasian sympathies stay at a high level. Such a tendency is proven by the recent polls presented by the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the Institute for Public Policy (IPP) of Chisinau.

The decline in the pro-EU aspirations is seen especially if we compare the current share of the pro-EU sympathies (35-40% according to the IPP poll) with the one that existed in the period of the governments considered not pro-European, which exceeded 70%. Consequently, we speak about a difference of about 30% between the support for the EU expressed now and the one seen in 2003 – July 2009, when the country was governed by the Party of Communists.

The harshness and criticism of the European officials in relation to the government of Moldova intensified after the frauds committed in the banking system became known (December 2014), restoring partially the EU’s image. The work done by the EU Delegation to Moldova, in particular through the public interventions of Pirkka Tapiola, counterbalanced the negative trends that affected the pro-European attitude among the Moldovans.

The joint efforts of the Europeans had particular effects, even if limited, on the improvement of the public perception of the EU. However, while the IRI poll of March 2016 showed an improvement in the situation in favor of the EU, the poll presented by the IPP in May shows a decline in the pro-European feelings in society.

UE versus Eurasian Union in polls

In general, both of the analyzed polls show that the pro-European aspirations stagnate and remain under the level of 50% (See Table 1.). At the same time, the geopolitical perceptions of the Moldovans remain practically unchanged and more positive in relation to the Eurasian Economic Union (Eurasian Union)/Customs Union.

The fluctuation in the public attitude to the European integration and the EU shows that these subjects are in a permanent and dynamic process of public debate. The maintaining of the pro-Eurasian sympathies at practically the same levels or at favorable quotas reveals rather the absence of public discussions. Partially, the distribution of the geopolitical options among the people in favor of the Eurasian Union and to the detriment of the EU results from the absolutization of the fair or unfair criticism leveled at the EU by Moldovan politicians and by political players coming from the political-media space whose coordination center is in Moscow.

Table 1. Distribution of pro-EU and pro-Eurasian Union/Customs Union sympathies: Entry into EU or Eurasian Union?, %

IRI – 11-25 March 2016, sampling error +/- 2,8%; IPP – 16-23 April, sampling error +/- 2,9%

Contradictions between polls

It is strange that after almost three weeks of the first (IRI) poll, which showed that the European course is gathering  support, the second (IPP) poll reveals a decline. The rise revealed in March by the IRI poll (+5% on October 2015) can be probably explained by the holding of the second Moldova-EU Association Council in Brussels (March 14). On this occasion, the government tried to increase its legitimacy and to show to the public that it is close to overcoming the external isolation. On the other hand, the EU demonstrated that it keeps its fingers on the pulse and insists on conditions in the relationship with Chisinau more than ever. The visibility of the Europeans players (in particular of the European MEPs) is added to this as these contributed partially to the improvement of the image of the EU that continues to be accused by voices from the Moldovan opposition of supporting a corrupt and oligarchized government.

It is yet not clear why the pro-EU sympathies decreased (- 3.4% on last November), as the IPP poll carried out in April (about three weeks of the IRI poll) shows. On the contrary, in the period Pirkka Tapiola had several significant interventions (Case of the mayor of Taraclia), which favored the EU’s image in the eyes of the Moldovan citizens and not vice versa. If we analyze these observations, we see that the IRI poll is more precise as regards the public perceptions of the EU than the IPP poll. Both of the polls coincide yet in terms of the low popularity of the EU, which didn’t undergo major changes even if the current commitments of Brussels are more powerful than earlier (before the signing of the Association Agreement).

Stagnation, decline or renewal of pro-European feelings?

The results of the two surveys create particular confusion as to the real evolution of the pro-European sympathies. But none of these – the more positive (IRI) poll or the more negative (IPP) poll – are wrong when they say that the EU enjoys reduced popularity.

These data also show that the positive perceptions of the EU/European integration can yet increase (IRI poll) even in unfavorable conditions of anti-European Moldovan or Russian propaganda. In other words, the European aspirations can yet renew, while the involvement of the Europeans players in the monitoring and criticizing of the (in)action of the Government plays a positive role (among the main critics are Pirkka Tapiola, MEPs Siegfried Muresan and Andi Cristea, and EU Commissioner Johannes Hahn). Also, the improvement of the EU’s image can be due to the fact that both Brussels and the ruling parties renounced the label of ‘pro-European government’ used broadly in July 2009-2015. The abandonment of this practice must be irreversible. It is the level of fulfilling the commitments to the EU deriving from the Association Agreement that must be taken into account, not the intensity of the pro-European rhetoric.

On the other hand, the IPP poll preserves concerns about the sustainability of the pro-European feelings at a time when the Eurasian course is embraced by numerous groups of Moldovans.  

Why the pro-Eurasian sympathies do not decrease?

The pro-Eurasian feelings are in vogue even if there is no positive precondition for this enthusiasm, except for the unsubstantiated arguments of the main promoters of the Eurasian Union in Moldova – the Party of Socialists. The main argument used by this is the fact that the Eurasian course is beneficial to foreign trade because it opens up the Russian market for Moldovan products. In reality, all the member states of the Customs Union are in commercial deficit with Russia, which really benefits from the Eurasian Union (See Table 2). It’s certain that the exports from Russia include mainly hydrocarbons and the commercial deficit is partially due to this. However, the formation of a Eurasian Union, and until then the presence in the Customs Union, should have contributed to a balance in the trade between Belarus and Kazakhstan with Russia, but this didn’t happen.

Table 2. Trade of Eurasian Union countries with Russia, USD

Source: UN Comtrade, without data for 2015; Armenia joined the Eurasian Union in January 2015, while Kirgizstan in August 2015.

Moreover, the bilateral relations between Russia and the other Eurasian Union countries worsened during the last few years, except for Kirgizstan. On Belarus, the Russian authorities waged different commercial wars. Kazakhstan reviews its position on the Russian language and on the traditional symbols associated with Russia, related to the Soviet period, especially after the events in Ukraine. The public opinion in Armenia is dissatisfied with Russia’s involvement in the national corruption-related scandals and with its extended monopoly (via Gazprom and other companies) on the energy sector.

Such a conflict context existing in the Eurasian Union, determined in most of the cases by Russia, must be interpreted appropriately by the Moldova citizens. But these are very indulgent or even ignorant in relation to Russia’s actions and constantly support the Eurasian course. This solidarity with the Russian Eurasian projects is due to the circular migration of the Moldovans to Russia. Thus, about 500,000 Moldovans become voluntary ‘ambassadors’ of Russia’s causes, including the one related to the extension of the Eurasian Union to the West. Also, the pro-Eurasian feelings are due to the greater support coming from Moldova’s rural areas, where the European agenda loses ground to the stereotypes about Russia as a perfect market for easily selling Moldovan products.

The Russian propaganda is another key factor. Ultimately, regardless of the commercial sanctions applied by Moscow to Moldovan producers and the aggressive Russian rhetoric fueled by the deeper EU-Moldova dialogue, the Eurasian ideas have many sympathizers in the country.

Instead of conclusion…

Polls confirm that the EU enjoys reduced popularity among the Moldovans, lower than the popularity enjoyed by the Eurasian initiatives of Russia. The causes for such geopolitical preferences are diverse and are related to the EU’s communication abilities, the image of the EU and Russia in Moldova and the Moldovan political realities.

Risks related to the weak durability of the pro-European sympathies persist. This aspect should be seriously addressed by the EU. A communication strategy is urgently needed to better coordinate the communication activities and to maintain a positive image of the EU, which would exactly reflect the major contribution of the EU member states to Moldova’s modernization. At the same time, the mass media and civil society should devote more time to subjects concerning the Eurasian integrationist processes about which the Moldovans know not much or nothing at all. Namely because of the lack of objective public discussions about the Eurasian Union, the Socialists and other political players and those who conduct the Russian propaganda manage to extend their influence, recruiting new supporters of the Eurasian ideas. 

IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.