Latest evolutions in the process of reintegration of the R. of Moldova

https://www.ipn.md/en/latest-evolutions-in-the-process-of-reintegration-of-the-r-of-moldova-7542_1064758.html

APE Press Club, 31.05.2011

Latest evolutions in the process of reintegration of the R. of Moldova:

positive trends and negotiation deficiencies

During the last two months, in the framework of the process of transnistrian conflict resolution had taken place a series of positive evolutions:

Informal discussions in the framework of the 5+2 format in Vienna on April 4-5, where Russia proposed that the next meeting in the 5+2 format to be held in June, in Moscow;
Set up of the Intergovernmental Commission for Reintegration that includes all relevant ministries and governmental agencies. From our point of view, this commission should contribute to a larger involvement of state institutions in country’s reintegration process;
Release from prison of Ernest Vardanean;
Presence of the Transnistrian issue on the agenda of high level meetings of our foreign partners. Thus, the issue was discussed during the following events:

a. Meeting of the Foreign Ministers in the framework of the Weimar Triangle (Poland, Germany and France) on May 20, in Bydgoszcz (Poland), where Moldovan Foreign Minister Iurie Leanca participated as a special guest;

b. Kaliningrad meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Weimar Triangle with the Russian Foreign Minister Serghei Lavrov, which took place on May 21^st;

c. Meeting of the Prime Minister Vlad Filat with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel during his official visit to Berlin, on May 17-20.

These evolutions create a favorable environment for re-launching the official negotiations in the 5+2 format with the occasion of its next meeting in Moscow. In this context, we consider that it is necessary to draw attention on the following deficiencies related to the negotiation process:

1. There is no consensus on the subject of the future official negotiations. While Chisinau wants to focus on the future special legal status of the transnistrian region, Tiraspol is insisting on obtaining the recognition of its legal equality (ravnopravie) with Chisinau and on normalization of Transnistria’s relations with R. of Moldova. Or, as long as this disagreement will exist, the future negotiations risk to become a dialogue between two deaf sides;

2. Russian Federation insists on the fact that the political solution must be negotiated only by Chisinau and Tiraspol, on the basis of the legal equality (ravnopravie storon). This is the failure paradigm of ’90 that ensures Moscow the dominant role of arbitrator and excludes a potential involvement of EU and/or USA as mediators at the table of negotiations. Moreover, as long as Chisinau and Tiraspol pursue different finalities we risk repeating the experience of ‘90s, when Chisinau was making concessions after concessions without achieving any substantial progress.

3.                  The Alliance for European Integration doesn’t have a clearly defined strategy of how to settle the conflict and to reintegrate the transnistrian region. At the moment, the Law on the main provisions of the special legal status of Moldovan districts from the left bank of the Nistru River is the only strategic document that should be followed by our politicians during the negotiation process. According to this Law, the negotiations must lead to demilitarization, democratization and reintegration of the transnistrian region on the basis of a special legal status. Currently, Moscow and Tiraspol condition the re-launch of the official negotiations on the cancellation of the respective Law, which, in their view, is an obstacle in the path of negotiations. This vision seems to be perceived positively even in some European capitals, which in fact is not in anyway a good news for Chisinau;

4.                  Moscow insists on its own sequence of the Transnistrian settlement process following the formula – first, negotiation of Transnistria’s status, then withdrawal of the Russian troops and ammunition from the region, ignoring, at the same time, two fundamental elements of the future success of Transnistria’s reintegration: its demilitarization and democratization. This approach contradicts the Law on the main provisions of the special legal status of Moldovan districts from the left bank of the Nistru River.

5.                  EU is still hesitating to engage itself as a full-fledged mediator at the table of negotiations and as a guarantor of the future political settlement. The current observer status doesn’t allow EU to exercise meaningful influence on the negotiations, both on their development and substance. The EU’s hesitancy to claim and play the status of mediator at the table of negotiations, as well as the status of guarantor of the final political settlement, undermine substantially EU’s political power in the Transnistrian region and deprives it of real leverages over Tiraspol.

Recommendations:

In this context, we consider that the success of the future negotiations depend on:

1. Compelling Tiraspol not only to sit down at the table of negotiations, but also to accept that the final outcome of the 5+2 negotiations is the Transnistrian region’s special legal status within Moldova;

2. Negotiating a political and legal settlement that would rely on the following pillars: demilitarization, democratization, guarantees and reintegration. Only such a solution could ensure a functioning reintegrated state and continuation of Moldova’s European integration reform agenda;

3. Developing a long and medium term strategy for the conflict settlement and reintegration of the Transnistrian region, which would focus on facilitating the gradual reintegration of the Transnistrian region in accordance with the principles of demilitarization, democratization and guaranteeing a special legal status within Moldova;

4. EU’s engagement in the negotiations as a mediator and guarantor of the future political solution.