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Kalman Mizsei EXCLUSIVELY for IPN: Ukraine and Moldovan Challenges


https://www.ipn.md/en/kalman-mizsei-exclusively-for-ipn-ukraine-and-moldovan-challenges-7978_1011747.html

"March 1 has heralded a new, more dangerous world in our region. The Russian President on that day order the occupation of Crimea, this way violating the international ordered more than any leader on the European continent since World War 2."

OpEd
Kalman Mizsei*

March 1 has heralded a new, more dangerous world in our region. The Russian President on that day order the occupation of Crimea, this way violating the international ordered more than any leader on the European continent since World War 2. The annexation of a large chunk of its neighbor Ukraine violated the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances in 1994 (which provided guarantee of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in exchange for Ukraine giving up its large nuclear arsenal), the Almaty Declaration on the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 21, 1991, the Sevastopol Naval Base Treaty and the Russia-Ukraine Friendship Treaty from 1997.

The aggression and land grab has been magnified by the justification that used the most unpalatable argument: Russian soldiers were put into unmarked uniforms and pretended to be “Crimean self-defense“ formations as if such could grow out of the land like mushrooms overnight; the threat by Ukrainian “fascist” in Crimea that was not supported by any evidence while the opposite, threats to peaceful Ukrainian simple patriots is richly documented; the illegality of the Ukrainian government as if it was not elected by the Parliament following the Ukrainian law.  President Putin’s press conference on March 4 laid bare the unsustainable nature of the Russian justifications.   Disregard of international law and norms on such a scale is shocking because it is isolating Russia for a very long time not only from the community of democratic countries – by far the strongest players on the international arena – but from any country for which international predictability is dear and which are afraid of land grab of neighbors on the simple basis of them being stronger than they are.  Invoking self-determination in such an arbitrary and cruel way will serve for a very long time as pretext for secessionist movements within Russia itself and, unlike in the case of the 1990s in Chechnya, Russia will not be able to possibly claim the moral high ground in such cases. Moreover, this aggression is a kiss of death to the efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation, starting with neighboring Iran since every country will suspect that they may arrive at the fate of Ukraine that remained vulnerable after subordinating its nuclear weapons.  The ages’ old tragedy of Russia is that they dream to be loved but they end up to do things so that they are feared – and so they create ever more risks in the globe.

Most analysts compared Russia’s annexation of Crimea to Hitler’s Anschluss of Austria as well as to the occupation of the Sudetenland, both in 1938. The comparison is deeply founded: Russia’s dubious argument about the protection of “Russian citizens and compatriots” and the mythical link of Sevastopol and the Crimea to Russia is identical to the Germans’ argument at the time. Deputy Prime Minister Rogozin’s facebook page does not make secret of the historical analogy by talking about “nash otvet Chamberlainu” and his admiration of Marin Le Pen and other far right leaders.  The energy invested into the campaign of dezinformatsia is also highly reminiscent of the 1930s’ two totalitarian regimes, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Russia is increasingly authoritarian, and the war moment was used to crack down on the remaining independent media, such as the Dozhd television channel, Ekho Moskvy or the popular lenta.ru internet news portal and Navalny’s blog site. The cult of personality, so characteristic to totalitarian regimes, the lack of religious, ethnic tolerance or violence against gay people are all characteristic of fascistic trends in Russia, as well as the kind of mass psychosis that makes people believe propaganda that is totally contrary to the observed reality which we are witnessing in Russia towards the revolution in Ukraine.

Ukraine is portrayed in Russia as a country overrun by fascists and totally ungovernable where fascist bands are roaming and beating up minorities, particularly Russians.  For those who are not under the psychological impact of this intensive media campaign, it is not difficult to see the balanced truth about Ukraine, a country where consecutive leaderships have robbed the nation through unbelievable corruption similarly to Russia. Both countries have had their moments of public discontent but so far only in Ukraine did it develop into revolution not because of Western financing but because of a stronger civil society there. And exactly the fear from the repetition of the Ukrainian events is one of the major reasons that made the Russian president move on Crimea and to amass a very large military force on the Ukrainian border.  But again, the sheer economic consequences globally but much more on the Russian economy will cause a break in the process of enrichment of the Russian middle classes – such a fundamental pillar of Putin’s popularity. Wars may increase this popularity temporarily but are doomed to collapse as economic hardship sets in.

Ukraine’s “ungovernability” is caused predominantly by continuous Russian provocations in the East Ukrainian areas as well as by the mess left over by the Yanukovich regime.  What concerns Ukrainian “nationalists” and “fascists”, the truth is that 40% of Maidan were Russian speakers and the Russian aggression on the country has rather cemented in the country a unity between ethnic groups. In Eastern Ukraine the demonstrations for Ukraine were usually stronger than the ones against it and it would have been even more so if not for the many well trained troublemakers thrown into Ukraine by its neighbor.

For Russia this ill-defined action is going to be very costly – and the price depends on how quickly the course will be corrected.  Sanctions, the costs of war and international isolation will be the major consequences.  Russia has given a new purpose to NATO that has almost lost focus in the last years – now its planners will busily rewrite strategies. It is likely that troop allocations will change in reaction to the perception of Russian unpredictability and defense budgets in NATO countries will restart their growth after many years of sharp decline. In this context it is important to realize that, although Russia is territorially a big country, its economy is only about one-tenth of Europe’s.  The tragic mistake of the Crimea incursion has the potential of breaking Russia’s modernization again for a generation.  Those, who now jubilantly celebrate the faceless robbery of the weak in unmarked uniforms – should know that the dinner is going to be soon over. They would be well advised to think about their own long term.

As a consequence of the aggressive posture of Russia, the regional situation will obviously change too.  First of all, all countries will be even more cautious than so far to engage into any integration process with such an untrustworthy big neighbor.  Second, they will even more energetically try to move under the Western protective umbrella.  Moldova’s, Ukraine’s and Georgia’s European integration process has a potential to accelerate. As to Moldova, the country has achieved large foreign policy successes that will be felt by its citizens in the way of the visa free regime soon. But the Association Agreement will have a positive impact on the economic situation as well.  However, this is not an automatic process.  As I wrote many times earlier, it remains true that the country badly needs a much more competitive and, particularly, much less corrupted economic environment.  Reforms are vitally needed. As the regional experience, including that of Ukraine, show, the natural local allies – practically agents – of Russian interference are local organized criminal groups and highly corrupt officials.  The best geopolitical action for Moldova would be serious cleaning up the state apparatus, including at the top levels.

I am deeply convinced that European integration would hugely benefit the Transnistrian region as well. Only the future developments will make it clear if the half million Transnistrians will get the chance to peacefully, freely consider what their best interests are.  Moldova needs to remain open to embrace the Region should the attitudes of its rulers allow.  In Gagauzia a dialogue is going on about firming up the autonomy.  However, Gagauzia’s leaders need to be very circumspect to act within the frames of Moldova’s laws and the law needs to be enforced for the autonomous region.  They should understand, and be mature about that, it is not the Gagauz’ interest to allow themselves instrumentalised by outside powers for the purpose of undermining the stability of Moldova.

Usually in times of external threat, in democracies governing and opposition parties unite to fend off that threat.  It imposes certain requirements on opposition and governing parties alike also in Moldova. Siding with the external aggressor discredits political parties. Welcoming acts like the obviously arbitrary Russian wine and agricultural goods’ embargo is a very regrettable development.  The justification for this arbitrary act was as convincing as the justification for annexing Crimea. Similarly, the moral credibility of a rhetoric that sees fascism at every corner for years but does not recognize it and remains silent when one really occurs, is very low.  I do understand much of the outrage about the oligarch’s arbitrariness who earlier served their interests; I also think that the feeling of “double standards” is sometimes justified; however, now it is the time to show solidarity with one’s state – without giving up party identities and interests.  The same token, it is upon the governing elites to try to engage the opposition in a constructive true partnership. Also, it is upon the government to make real measures against, ant cut back on, particularly high level corruption.

Ultimately it is up to Moldova’s population to embrace the country’s European integration.  The two entirely different philosophies now are particularly clear.  With European integration the Moldovans – including the left bank – chose for the rule-of-law and long term prosperity, for peaceful, positive social model.  The other model has been in display in Crimea in the first half of March: arbitrariness, the sheer and brute use of force against the weaker, ultimately stagnation and lack of human dignity. I trust Moldova keeps the course of the European integration even if it means courageous reforms and more transparency. Particularly, that these would not only improve the country’s economy but are crucial to consolidating a more resistant statehood.  It seems that Moldova is at crossroads – and the Ukraine crisis highlights this even more.  On the top, a mentality change is needed to meet the current – formidable – challenge. The old, post-Soviet, mentality of entitlement to privilege should cede place to truly serving the people and feeling accountable to them. In a broader perspective this is at the heart of the current legitimacy crisis of Eastern European political life, a crisis intertwined with the geopolitical challenges. Once more Moldova, along Ukraine, is at the fault lines of history. I trust elites and society will this time find the way to answer these challenges in a way that it distances them finally from imperial arbitrariness coming from the East.



*Kalman Mizsei served as European Union's Special Representative for the Republic of Moldova in 2007-2011. He still keeps a live interest in the developments in our country. Previously he served as UNDP Regional Director for Europe and CSI . Kalman Mizsei holds a PhD from the Budapest University of Economics.