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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The setting up of a national platform for European integration, which would gather together the pro-European political forces, is a good and necessary idea, but includes a very high risk component, given the unpredictability and inconsistency of the Moldovan political players.
From political viewpoint, there are no leaders devoted to the European course that would unconditionally promote the whole set of European values (including the human rights), even with the risk of being harshly penalized by the voters. At the same time, there is no unity inside the Western-oriented political forces. These are on opposite barricades and pursue firstly the goal of politically destroying each other, followed by the goal of promoting the national interests. Moreover, on the sociological dimension, it is ascertained a powerful non-concordance between the geopolitical options of the people, the Russian-Eurasian course oscillating as a political alternative acceptable to the general public. These circumstances are fully unfriendly for the good functioning of a really pro-European platform or partnership.
Ignoring these aspects, the parliamentary alliance led by the Democratic Party, including the Liberal Party, together with representatives of the European People’s Party of Moldova headed by Iurie Leanca, voted a Declaration on the National Partnership for European Integration (June 29, 2016). It is an initiative inspired from the experience of the Central and Southeast European states (Romania, Slovakia, etc.), where the mobilization of most of the political forces was crucial for joining the European Union. But Moldova is something different. Neither the EU offers a clear European prospect to it nor the country is in satisfactory political and economic conditions for forcing the change of the regional geopolitical reality, where the Western Balkans form part of the enlargement agenda, while the countries that signed Association Agreements/DCFTA do not.
From discredited pro-European governments to ‘minority’ national pro-European partnerships
The task of the current government is to come out of the internal and external political isolation. Without this, no government can remain in power. Ideally, the external and internal legitimacy must coexist harmoniously so that the government is safe, while in cases of crisis, these can complement each other. The current government does not benefit from any of the two variants, while a simple self-proclaiming as a pro-European party is no longer credible for the domestic public and for the public in Brussels.
We must take into account the fact that the Europeans requested the ruling parties to stop abusing the European symbols that have been considerably discredited during the last 3-5 years. Consequently, the government is looking for new instruments for attracting sympathies and the partnership for European integration corresponds to these intentions.
It is yet rather naive to consider that a partnership that includes three parties – the Democratic Party, the Liberal Party and the European People’s Party of Moldova – with the first being accused of monopolization of power and capturing of the state institutions, and a group of unaffiliated MPs can change the very negative general perception of the government.
Also, it is impossible for other parliamentary parties and opposition parties (Liberal Democratic Party, Action and Solidarity Party, Civic Platform “Dignity and Truth”, “The Right”, etc.), which are oriented to the West, to establish partnerships with the government that they describe as ‘corrupt’ or even ‘criminal’. The same type of reticence applies to the representatives of civil society.
About rupture from reality
The provisions of the national partnership show that this meets the reality to a small extent. First of all, the political parties, the ruling and the opposition ones, are not ready to sign pacts for the sake of a European future for the country given that the ruling parties lost their authority, even if they make effort to restore it. At the same time, the parliamentary opposition is mixed and includes anti-European pro-Russian parties, as the extra-parliamentary opposition does.
Secondly, nobody in Brussels speaks about a future enlargement. The row of crises experienced by the EU makes the survival of the European project, not its enlargement, the top priority. Consequently, the approach in favor of a calendar for Moldova’s accession to the EU seems unserious.
Last but not least, the national partnership’s provision about the institution of an EU-Just Mission for the justice sector reform in Moldova points to an erroneous understanding of the European policies. The first EU-Just Mission was launched at the request of Georgia in 2004 and ended in a year, immediately after contributing to working out a strategy for reforming the Georgian penal legislation. So, an EU-Just Mission usually pursues very well-defined objectives and cannot last long, as the EUBAM Mission that has worked since 2005 (being renewed four times, until 2017). Moreover, the EU already offers enough technical assistance through advisers and experts, in particular for the justice sector. At the same time, no one else than the ruling parties possesses the political and institutional instruments needed for reforming the justice or combating corruption, especially because these have access to European financial assistance.
The EU cannot and should not replace the national sovereign authorities that are responsible before the voters. The deviation from this rule implies risks for the EU’s image and the sustainability of the pro-European values and views in Moldova. Nevertheless, the EU is obliged to strictly audit the European funds spent in Moldova, imposing strict conditions and immediately blocking the assistance in case of abuses.
Instead of conclusion
Judging by the way in which the National Partnership for European Integration was initiated, we can see that the European People’s Party of Moldova and the ruling alliance didn’t set the goal of attracting as many players as possible on their side. Thus, a partnership that includes only several parties (three entities) with public support of about 10% in polls cannot be called a national one. Thus, without other pro-European parties from the opposition, including the extra-parliamentary one, and in the absence of the support for the NGOs sector, the partnership for European integration represents a minority political one and no way a national one.
Surely, the pro-European rhetoric is indispensable to a country that signed the Association Agreement/DCFTA. But the messages in favor of the entry into the EU are premature when a government is not able to do credible reforms in justice, but controls the whole power and all the state institutions.
Mandatorily, the pro-EU messages must come from political players with incontestable political and moral authority. Otherwise, the pro-European sympathies will diminish instead of multiplying. Therefore, the National Partnership for European Integration seems to be a useless political formality, not a logical, assumed and realistic political measure.
Finally, the larger the number of discredited political parties that will speak about the European integration is, the greater the repugnance to the EU will be in society, including among the people who traditionally oppose the Russian-Eurasian course.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.