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| Anatol Țăranu | |
In the Republic of Moldova, the Orthodox Church is divided into two metropolitan churches: the Metropolitan Church of Chisinau and All Moldova, which works under the jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, which is part of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The relationship between these two metropolitan churches is marked by an ongoing conflict, which has become even more pronounced after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Russian Orthodox Church has openly and militantly supported the position of the Russian authorities in this fratricidal war against the Orthodox people in Ukraine. The situation degenerated so embarrassingly for the Russian Church that even Pope Francis warned the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill, not to become “Putin’s altar boy”.
A large dose of discomfort
However, the war induced a large dose of discomfort and even embarrassment for the hierarchs in Chisinau to the relationship between the Metropolis of Moldova and the Russian Orthodox Church, raising more and more questions about the public presentation of the position of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and Metropolitan Bishop Vladimir on the issue of the war in Ukraine. The Metropolitan Church of Moldova avoided openly calling Russia an aggressor state and continued to participate in church services held in Moscow, while Metropolitan Bishop Vladimir received from the hands of Patriarch Kirill the Patriarchal Order of Venerable Seraphim of Sarov, first degree, for “uniting Moldovan society around Orthodox values”. The award was handed over after the war started.
The Metropolitan Church of Moldova has the status of autonomous unit within the Russian Church, but it is canonically subordinated to the mother church, which means that, although it is located on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, the Metropolitan Church of Moldova is part of the Russian Orthodox Church and, therefore, tends to align itself with the positions that are officially expressed by the Moscow Patriarchate.
No direct criticism of Russian aggression
However, there is domestic and international criticism and pressure on the Metropolitan Church of Moldova to adopt a clearer and firmer stance on the conflict, especially given the humanitarian and moral impact of the war. Although the Metropolitan Church of Moldova has promoted messages of peace and unity, but without resorting to criticism of the Russian aggression. This caused discontent among some of the parishioners and local religious leaders who oppose the war.
It is worth noting that, in addition to the equivocal position of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova, there is also the much more trenchant position of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, which is canonically subordinated to the Romanian Orthodox Church and which openly criticizes Russia’s actions in Ukraine, thus reflecting the differences in orientation and political and religious influence in the Republic of Moldova. The ambiguous position of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova on the war in Ukraine led to the intensification of the process by which dissident priests began to transfer to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.
Letter to the Patriarch
Concerned about this trend, Metropolitan Bishop Vladimir last October sent a letter to Patriarch Kirill, noting that the Moldovan Orthodox Church is moving to the periphery of Moldovan society due to the fact that it is associated with the promotion of pro-Russian interests in Moldova. “This is due to its affiliation to the Moscow Patriarchate, which, in turn, is perceived in Moldovan society as an outpost of the Kremlin and a champion of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. For the Orthodox Church of Moldova, such an association amounts to our disappearance from the religious and social scene of the country due to the persistent rejection by our fellow citizens of Russia’s aggressive interference in the affairs of the neighboring and friendly state - Ukraine,” Metropolitan Bishop Vladimir warned in his letter. He also mentioned the lack of financial support from the Russian Orthodox Church and the massive transfer of priests from the Metropolitan Church of Moldova to the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia.
Similarities and dissimilarities in Ukraine
Public opinion in the Republic of Moldova carefully follows the developments taking place in the ecclesiastical sphere in the neighboring country Ukraine. The outbreak of a full-scale war exacerbated the conflict between the two main Orthodox churches of this country - the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, established in 2018 and associated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, which has existed since 1990 as an autonomous part of the Moscow Patriarchate. The presence in Ukraine of a religious body that is officially controlled by Moscow has particularly outraged the Ukrainian patriotic public in the conditions of Russian military aggression, provoking a reaction from the official Kiev. As a result, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine adopted a law prohibiting the existence of religious organizations associated with Russia in the country. The law targeted primarily the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.
Not at all accidentally, President Zelensky symbolically signed a law against the “Church of Moscow” on August 24, the Independence Day of Ukraine, appealing to patriotic feelings in Ukrainian society, which began to grow after the successful operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the territory of Russia. Such a move is not baseless as, according to polls, the majority of Ukrainians (63%) support banning the “Russian Church” in Ukraine, and even in the eastern regions 46% are in favor of banning it. The current head of the “Russian Church”, Metropolitan Bishop Onuphry (Berezovsky), is also not popular and 82% of the respondents do not trust him.
The Ukrainian example had an echo in the Republic of Moldova, a state that is constantly threatened by Moscow that it can become the object of Russian military aggression, according to the neighboring country’s scenario. Recently, an MP of the ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) said that the Russian Orthodox Church should be banned in the Republic of Moldova. He made this statement when commenting on the trip by a group of priests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova to Moscow, which, according to press reports, was organized by fugitive politician Ilan Shor, who is suspected of working at the behest and with the assistance of the Russian special services to destabilize the Republic of Moldova.
Pilgrimage without riddles
Even if the Metropolitan Church of Moldova denied the connection between the trip of the subordinate priests with Shor and said that it did not organize this so-called pilgrimage to Moscow, these statements did not convince many people, as didn’t the statements of a number of priests who returned from Moscow and denied that they received any financial assistance from the people who hosted them.
A presidential election will be held in the Republic of Moldova in less than two months, on October 20. Despite the decrease in the level of trust in the church, this still remains the most credible public institution: over 65% of the population of Moldova trusts it. Furthermore, the Metropolitan Church of Moldavia still has more parishes and clergy than the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia. And the destructive actions of the Shor team, aimed at destabilizing the Republic of Moldova, are well known and expand at several levels. There is certainty that Shor is guided in his actions by Moscow’s special services, whose main effort at this stage is focused on the discrediting of the European referendum of October 20 and of the presidential election.
Old traditions and deep roots
It is well known that the Russian Church since the times of the Soviet KGB has been deeply infiltrated by agents of the service, first of all, at the level of the great hierarchs. Patriarch Kirill himself is the hero of a series of press revelations about his close relationship with the KGB. In such conditions, the so-called pilgrimage of the priests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova to Moscow, ahead of the referendum and the presidential election of October 20, does not leave much room for certitude that this “trip” by the priests affiliated to the Metropolitan Church of Moldova was strictly religious in character. The arguments that the Russian Church in Moldova is used for destabilizing political purposes are numerous and undeniable.
Ukraine’s example of defending itself in wartime from the malign influence of the Russian Church should be a warning to Moldovan politicians concerned with the national interest. However, this concern should not lead to reckless steps in the religious issue in the Republic of Moldova, but, in any case, the waters are to be cleared. Every state needs a national church that in its religious activity is concerned with the national interest and not with the interest of a foreign state, all the more if the latter nurtures aggressive aspirations. Relevant in this regard is the fact that only priests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova and no priests of the Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia were involved in the alleged religious pilgrimage to Moscow.
Monitoring imposed by situation
The specialized bodies of the Republic of Moldova in the coming months will have the mission to closely monitor the behavior of the priests of the Metropolitan Church of Moldova as regards their involvement in political life. The result of this audit will serve in the future as an argument for the inevitable dispute in Moldovan society about the purposes of the national church and how its activity should relate to the national interest. Without a national church, the Republic of Moldova cannot fully rely on the quality of an independent state and will remain a semi-colony in the fiefdom of the interests of the former metropolis, which continues to impose its church in Moldova eastward the Prut.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.