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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The European agenda in Moldova contains many weak points that regularly damage the EU’s image and affect the people’s perception of the European integration. From this viewpoint, the EU’s behavior towards the Moldovan authorities must combine pragmatism, uprightness and geopolitical clear-sightedness. Consequently, for the recipe for the political dialogue with Moldova in 2016 proposed to the Europeans to be efficient, it must mandatorily contain: 1) principled position towards the state of democracy; 2) concrete measures to strengthen the communication instruments; 3) involvement of the Moldovan media sector in the efforts to combat Russian propaganda.
Democratic principles must be above political calculations. The obligation to ensure viable democratic institutions is not negotiable. The experience of 2009-2014 showed that the EU’s indulgence of the so-called pro-European forces led to large costs for ensuring the stability of the European course, affecting simultaneously the good functioning of democracy in Moldova. To avoid similar mistakes in 2016, the EU should remain coherent and consistent when the political dependence of the intuitions, the quality of justice, the respect for the human rights and the promotion of media pluralism are targeted. When the Association Agreement fully takes effect at the start of 2016, the EU – Moldova Association Council must be convened whenever serious violations of the accord are reported.
Also, the EU Delegation should give up being timid and should become a pro-active actor that will take attitude when need be, including collective attitudes together with the embassies of the EU member states and the embassy of the U.S. The European side should regain the Moldovan people’s confidence even if it can damage the image of the declared pro-European forces when criticizing them. The more active the EU will be in defending the democratic institutions and the rule of law, the deeper the new pro-European political elite will anchor itself in the public conscience. In the long term, this will stimulate Euro-optimism among the Moldovans and will essentially reduce the demand for a pro-Eurasian political change.
Creation of robust communication instruments inside the EU Delegation. The popularity of the EU and of the political and civic players that support the European course depends on the quality of communication in the European integration process in Moldova. That’s why the communication between the EU Delegation and the mass media and the general public in Moldova should be strengthened. Therefore, a specialized department for relations with the public should be created inside the Delegation. This should possess competent human resources and modern technical instruments for communicating the EU’s and the Delegation’s messages efficiently and swiftly. Moreover, the mission of the new department should include the fight against misinformation spread by anti-European and Euro-skeptical political forces in the country or by media agents of the Russian propaganda active in Moldova.
Efficient fighting of Russian propaganda in Moldova too. The anti-European propagandistic jamming should be removed. The anti-Russian media propaganda unit set up inside the European External Action Service (East StratCom Task Force) in 2015 covers the EU member states, Ukraine and Georgia. But this does not cover the Moldovan media space, where the agents of the Russian propaganda act unimpeded, trying to discredit the European integration process, in particular by online ways. The anti-propaganda efforts made by the EU must be visible in Moldova as soon as possible, given that the EU Delegation in Chisinau has insufficient media capacities, while Rossi’s media influence in the region does not become weaker.
Instead of conclusion…
Given the EU’s responsibilities for the Moldovan European agenda, stipulated in the Association Agreement, the Europeans should calibrate their actions according to the expectations and challenges in Moldova. It is important for the European side to remind the political class of Moldova that there are ‘red lines’ and their crossing is punishable and that these are related not only to the sector reform implementation level, but also to the quality of democracy in Moldova, in general.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.