Entry into EU as Moldova’s national idea – analysis by Boris Asarov, chairman of “Pro Europa” Association, for Info-Prim Neo

The political developments in Moldova after the formation of the Alliance for European Integration (AEI) confirms the fact that the ruling political elites are ready to pursue the policy that will help carry out the major tasks for the country. Incontestably, the main task is to create conditions for Moldova to make maximal progress on the path to European integration, which is now in fact the country’s national idea. We can mention for example the talks over the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU that the AEI opened in January this year. The previous agreement with the EU expired last year, but the negotiations on the Association Agreement between Chisinau and Brussels were frozen owing to the anti-European policy promoted by the PCRM, which became more obvious especially after the April 2009 events. Until 2009, the senior authorities pretended to be implementing reforms, as they disregarded them in fact and misled the EU. In 2009, the former government showed their real attitude to Brussels and started to openly promote the anti-European policy. They took discriminatory measures towards Romania’s EU citizens, introducing illegally and groundlessly a visa regime. After the authorities organized provocations on April 7, the former administration of Moldova staged an unprecedented attack on democracy, which aroused the European Union’s discontent and was seriously criticized in the European Parliament’s resolution. The European Parliament vehemently condemned the power’s anti-democratic and anti-European actions. After the constitution of the AEI, the new government of Moldova normalized the relations with Romania and created preconditions for bringing the relations between Moldova and Romania to a level of a much higher quality. After the Moldovan-Romanian relations improved, the European Commission expressed its readiness to open talks with the Moldovan authorities on a new agreement that will regulate the relations between the EU and Moldova. [European integration and admission to the EU] If the Association Agreement with the EU is signed, Moldova will complete a very important task. However, the given agreement, though it constitutes an important step towards accession to the EU, does not envision the possibility of joining later the European family. It should be noted that 'European integration' does not mean entry into the EU. For example, the authorities of Morocco signed the Association Agreement wit the EU nine years ago, but the issue of membership has not been yet raised. Brussels and Casablanca now work on an Intense Partnership Agreement that also does not provide the status of accession state to Morocco. Certainly, before becoming EU members the Eastern European countries signed the Association Agreement, but none of these states had a ‘frozen’ conflict on its territory. The main barrier for Morocco is its location as it is situated on another continent. For Moldova, this barrier is the unsolved Transnistrian conflict, which makes Moldova’s entry into the EU unreal, if taking into account the accession model of the Eastern European countries, and places it in the group of states that can count on an intense partnership, not yet on European prospects. [Transnistrian conflict: past and present] The Transnistrian conflict is regarded as a ‘frozen’ conflict and is assessed using the instruments designed for such conflicts. At the same time, a very important historical aspect is ignored when assessing the conflictuality degree – the Republic of Moldova was proclaimed in 1991 instead of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) formed in 1940. In 1940, Bessarabia and Transnistria were unified artificially and conferred the status of republic of the USSR, which was the only republic that did not sign at least formally an agreement with the union center. Bucovina and Southern Bessarabia were artificially attached to Ukraine. The official Chisinau and Tiraspol had been permanently in confrontation while MSSR existed. The elites in Chisinau included the senior administration of the Communist Party of the MSSR, while those in Tiraspol – mainly directors of large industrial companies that were subordinated directly to Moscow. The events that happened at the end of 1980s and the start of the 1990s made the latent confrontation turn into a conflict, political and then armed. Though the given events were 'catalyzed' from outside, they revealed the existing contradictions and gave them a hypertrophying form. Russia is the ‘moderator’ of the Transnistrian conflict and until it keeps this role, the conflict can be solved only by federalizing Moldova and legalizing the Russian military presence, in a certain form. Given that Moldova aspires to European integration, neither the first nor the second aspect is acceptable. In fact, the federalization will make Moldova vulnerable to Moscow, which will have the possibility of exerting pressure on it through Transnistria. The present Russian authorities aim to create and keep under control so-called areas of influence and are therefore not objectively interested in Moldova’s acceptance into the EU as it will thus get away from its influence. In case of a federation, the fragile pro-European balance reached by the Moldovan political forces after forming the AEI will be inevitably damaged. The 5+2 format of the Transnistria conflict settlement talks may guarantee that the resolution of the conflict will not evidently affect Moldova’s national interests, but will not be able to identify a solution that will not have a negative influence on Moldova’s entry into the EU. [Cypriot model] The European Union is rather flexible in its extension policy as it combines organically the general standards for all the countries and the individual, differentiated approach. Cyprus’ entry into the EU is a conclusive example. The essence of the Cypriot conflict is different from that of the Transnistrian conflict. The economic and political situation in Moldova and Cyprus is also different. But the Cypriot conflict is to a certain extent more complicated as the breakaway Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus is officially recognized by Turkey, which is a NATO member state and possible accession candidate of the EU. However, the EU member states decided not to hinder Cyprus’ accession to the EU. Such a position became possible also because Cyprus had a solid strategic European partner in the European integration process – Greece, whose authorities promoted the idea of Curpus’ admission inside the EU. Without such a partner that is an EU member, Cyprus' accession would have been postponed until the conflict was solved. Greece’s efforts to promote the interests of Cyprus were so efficient that Cyprus could join the EU even after the Greek majority of Cyprus rejected the Brussels-backed settlement plan proposed by the UN. The model of Cyrus should not be obligatorily used in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict as every dispute has its distinct features. However, Moldova must have a serious strategic European partner that will efficiently promote Moldova’s European aspirations. [Moldova’s European partner] Romania is the country that can play an important role in Moldova’s fate, even more important than Greece for Cyprus. It should be noted that Romania’s diplomatic service is considered one of the most powerful in Europe, even since the union of the Romanian Principates. After Romania joined the EU, it started to benefit from opportunities allowing it to significantly develop. A recent example is that one of the most important and responsible posts of EU Commissioner, of the Commissioner for Agriculture, whose institution has a very large budget, is held by Romania. Its diplomatic service turned out to be more powerful than that of the UK, which is traditionally considered the strongest in Europe, and also applied for this post. Besides its positions inside the EU, Romania is one of the major strategic partners of the U.S. in the Black Sea region, after it replaced Turkey in this role in 2003. As the U.S. authorities changed up their minds and decided to base anti-missile defense systems in the Black Sea region, Romania can become the main strategic partner of the United States not only in this region, but also in Eastern Europe. Therefore, Washington will be ready to take into consideration the position of the country that represents the key exporter of security in Eastern Europe and in the Black Sea region. Furthermore, while Moldova’s Prime Minister Vlad Filat had been in the U.S. on a visit, vice president Joseph Biden said the United States will support Moldova on the path to European integration. Enjoying such possibilities, Romania’s diplomatic service is capable of strengthening even more this support, which will be of special importance when Brussels adopts its policy on Moldova’s entry into the EU. After the democratic parties took power in Moldova in 2009, Romania showed it is ready to promote Moldova’s interests and to become its European partner, as it was declared earlier. Romanian President Traian Basescu is a powerful and refined politician and can become one of the most important politicians in the EU, as it was projected several years ago. If adequately safeguarding Romania’s interests, this politician can provide significant support to Moldova in its European integration efforts. The club of Moldova’s friends in the EU, which was founded at Romania’s suggestion and includes 16 foreign ministers of EU member states, shows that the Romanian diplomatic service initiated intense actions to promote Moldova’s interests. This is only the beginning of its contribution and real support that Romania can offer to Moldova in its European integration plans. Romania’s efforts to help Moldova make progress in coming closer to the EU will intensify after Bucharest and Chisinau sign the European Partnership Agreement. Indubitably, the given agreement will be much more comprehensive and consistent than the standard Basic Treaty between countries. Besides the fact that Romania can help Moldova join the EU, Romania and Moldova have a common ethnolinguistic area and it would be irrational and unsound to ignore this aspect when signing the interstate agreement. The highlighting of the ethnolinguistic identity when signing the European Partnership Agreement between Romania and Moldova will increase the EU’s responsibility towards Moldova as the European Union will not be able to ignore that a part of the Moldovan Romanians, who constitute the major ethnic group in Moldova, is outside the EU, while the largest part of the Romanians is inside the EU. The European Partnership Agreement could include the agreement on the creation of the Council for Moldova’s Entry into the EU that would consist of Romanian and Moldovan politicians, functionaries and experts who would deal with the implementation of the program aimed at adjusting the Moldovan legislation and state institutions to EU norms and standards. The support on the part of Romania, which covered the accession path to the EU and has a large number of highly qualified specialists in all the areas, will help improve Moldova’s legislation and state institutions and bring them in compliance with the EU standards. In Chisinau, the Council for Moldova’s Entry into the EU can be founded on the basis of the National Participation Council set up by the Government of Moldova. The agreement could also contain the common measures that the Moldovan and Romanian diplomats will take to contribute to Moldova’s accession to the EU. While in Moldova on a visit in January this year, President Traian Basescu announced Romania’s readiness to provide a grant of 100 million euros and support to the reforms implemented in education. The education level in Moldova, including in the higher education establishments, leaves much to be desired. The diplomas are not recognized in Europe as the education level is still low, while the level of corruption in the higher education institutions is rather high. Despite this, Romania’s support in education is a very important in improving this area. It would be reasonable to open a branch of the University of Bucharest in Chisinau, where the lectures will be given by teachers from Bucharest. The University of Bucharest is a prestigious institution with highly qualified lecturers and the implementation of such a project will significantly contribute to the improvement of the education process in Moldova. The Moldovan lecturers should also attend training seminars at Romanian universities. The Russian-language speakers in Moldova should be efficiently instructed as, owing to the propaganda of the mass media institutions controlled by the PCRM, they know insufficiently the policy pursued by Romania and the Romanian culture and history in general. The training programs for Russian-language speakers will help reestablish harmony in the relations between the ethnic groups in Moldova, which was damaged by the extremely large number of lies spread during many years by the mass media organizations controlled by the PCRM. Consequently, the instruction of the Russian-language speakers will contribute to a better culture, including political, and this will have favorable consequences both for the citizens and for Moldova in general. As regards the border between Romania and Moldova, the Bessarabian political forces that demand that the standard Border Treaty should be signed ignore the historical context of the given issue and their demands are in fact anti-European. The border with Romania is the border with the EU and the official Chisinau should not make bureaucratic claims if they want Moldova to join the EU, but make effort to remove the barriers and borders and allow the citizens, goods, capital and services to move freely. The issue concerning the regulation of the border was politicized by the representatives of the vulgar Moldovenism who disrespected the Bessarabian policy during many years, this being actually a technical matter that is solved easily by signing a technical agreement on the border regime. The decision to liquidate the Soviet atavism – the barbed-wire fence at the border – is also very important. Besides the necessity of removing this shameful anachronism, the given decision represents a symbolic act of coming closer to the EU, whose border on the Prut still separates the people. The Romanian authorities are ready to give a new, qualitative impetus to the process of regaining Romanian nationality by the citizens entitled to this. This decision is rather important as those who will become EU citizens will have more freedoms. If, by form, the granting of Romanian nationality represents an act of equity towards those who lost it not through their fault (and their successors), by content the given process represents an act of coming closer to the EU, not at state but private level. For their part, the authorities in Romania took an unprecedented step and asked Brussels to cancel the obligation for the Moldovans to have 500 euros for being issued with visas for Romania. This is a standard obligation imposed on the EU member states. If Brussels accepts such a request, this will be another accomplishment for the Romanian diplomatic service and a confirmation of the fact that the EU is ready to consider Romania’s initiatives on Moldova. In principle, Brussels has already agreed its new policy on Moldova and the appointment of the Romanian MEP Monica Macovei as chairwoman of the European Parliament’s EU-Moldova commission is a proof of its openness. [Hungarian mandate] The European Union realized that Romania can make the most efficient contribution towards promoting its policy in Moldova and can provide the most efficient support to the democratic changes in Moldova. Until 2009, this role was played by Hungary, also because the former Moldovan government promoted in fact a Stalinist conception of vulgar Moldovenism and sent absurd and misleading signals against Romania to Brussels, which ran counter to Moldova’s national interests. The appointment of Hungary’s Kalman Mizsei as EU Special Representative for Moldova and Ferenc Banfi as Head of the EUBAM Mission as well as the decision to open a Common Visa Issuing Center at the Hungarian Embassy in Christian constituted phases of the EU’s policy on Moldova. The events that happened in April 2009, when the ruling PCRM decreased the level of democracy in Bessarabia to a lower level than that existing in Transnistria, showed that the EU’s policy promoted in Moldova through the agency of Hungary failed. Kalman Mizsei was unable to identify and inform the EU administration about the former government's anti-European attitude during 2007-2009 and to convince the PCRM to accept a broader dialogue with the former Opposition parties, as the European Parliament asked in its resolution. These changes pointed to the necessity of introducing modifications in the EU’s policy on Moldova. The EU’s “Hungarian mandate” on Moldova expired and its expiration coincided practically with the end of the term in office of Vladimir Voronin and his party. In general, the only serious accomplishment done while Hungary held this mandate and Vladimir Voronin was in power was the formation of the national idea that Moldova should join the EU in the Moldova citizens’ conscience. In realty, the European integration course declared by the previous government was chimerical and imitative in character, despite the efforts made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. This is explained by the fact that the PCRM used the European integration to mislead the EU and for electoral purposes. Even if the policy pursued by the PCRM was fraudulent, the idea of joining the EU became a national idea for Moldova. The “Hungarian mandate” bears similarity to the appearance of the Romanian Principate Moldova. The King of Hungary Ludovic of Anjou in 1343 issued a so-called 'mandate' to the Romanian Wallachian from Maramures Dragos Voda to found the Hungarian border region. This region called Moldova was created by the Wallachians from Maramures. It was named by the name of the river flowing through the Carpathians – Moldova, which is of German origin. Baia, which was founded by the Saxons of Transylvania, became the capital city. In 1359, Wallachian Bogdan the First transformed the Hungarian region Moldova into a Romanian (Wallachian) state. Thus, Hungary contributed to the appearance of the Romanian Principate Moldova. The lily – the symbol of the Anjou dynasty – had remained long on Moldova's flag after that. Now Hungary contributed to the appearance of the national idea in Moldova – the entry into the European Union. The Moldovan citizens will continue to apply for visas for the EU to the embassy of this country for a certain period ahead. The term in office of the EU Special Representative for Moldova Kalman Mizsei expires in 2010. The European Union decided to give this year the status of embassy to a number of its representative offices abroad as after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU underwent qualitative changes. For Moldova, it will be ideal if the EU Ambassador to Moldova will be from Romania. Thus, the Moldovan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration is obliged to ask Brussels to appoint a Romanian candidate as this would be an optimal decision. [Romania, Ukraine and resolution of the Transnistrian dispute] Romania can also play an important role in the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict. At the start of the 1990s, Romania, together with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE, took part in the settlement process, but withdrew afterward from the talks owing to the policy prompted by the Social-Democratic Party that ruled then in Romania. In fact, Romania's withdrawal from the talks represented a manifestation of the policy that satisfied neither Romania's nor Moldova's needs. Moreover, it was in fact an anti-European act as the European presence e at the negotiations diminished. After the format of the talks was modified by including representatives of the EU and U.S. as observes, and Romania was accepted into the EU, the official Bucharest had the chance of returning to the negotiations. As the exiting format is actually closed and no new players will be accepted, Romania can participate in the talks through the EU Ambassador in Chisinau, who would promote the EU's interests at the talks in the 5+2 format. Given the seriousness of the Transnistrian conflict settlement talks, the EU could consider naming a special representative at the talks at the request of Chisinau and Tiraspol. If such an issue is raised, the EU's special representative at the Transnistrian conflict settlement talks could be from Romania, which knows the specific features of the Bessarabia and Transnistria better than other EU countries. Romania's participation in the talks as EU Ambassador will represent that lever that could break the deadlock in the settlement process and increase the efficiency of the format of the talks. The present 5+2 format of the talks can guarantee only protection from negative developments, but if Romania gets involved in the negotiation process, it could gradually identify an acceptable solution to the Transnistrian conflict. Romania's role in resolving the Transnistrian dispute, as promoter of the EU's interests, can reside also in providing support to Ukraine so that the role of 'moderator' of the Transnistrian conflict is switched from Moscow to Kiev. Ukraine's role in the negotiation process can be stimulated by promoting Ukraine's interests in the EU. This role can be played by Romania in the same was as Poland does at present. If Romania and Ukraine obtain greater roles in the settlement process, the problems existing in the relations between Bucharest and Kiev can be gradually overcome under advantageous conditions for both of the sides. The analysis of the wholes set of problems in the Romanian-Ukrainian relations, if the two countries participate jointly in the Transnistrian conflict settlement talks, can help identify a solution to all the existing problems by improving the trend in the settlement process. The EU will approve of Ukraine playing a greater role in the settlement process and taking on the role of 'moderator with the help of Romania, if Russia is not against. Ukraine is a possible accession candidate of the EU and will be ready for such decisions that would be accepted by the EU and would bring Ukraine, as well as Moldova, closer to the EU. Also, the Ukrainian authorities will have additional possibilities in examining the bilateral relations with Russia. The election of Viktor Yanukovych as president of Ukraine could give a new impetus to the settlement process for identifying a constructive solution. Though Yanukovych will not force Ukraine's entry into NATO, Ukraine will continue to come closer to the EU. As he has better relations with Moscow than Yushchenko, Yanukovych may convince the Russian Federation not to oppose Ukraine's role of 'moderator'. On the other hand, unlike his predecessor, he never confronted Bucharest and will be ready to establish constructive contacts. This is rather certain given that after his election as president Viktor Yanukovych expressed his readiness to grant the status of regional language in Bucovina to the Romanian language and to include the Romanians living in Ukraine in the Party of Regions' lists for the elections for the Supreme Rada. Yanukovych signed a relevant agreement with the chairwoman of the Council of Romanians in Ukraine Aurica Bojescu. He is also approved of Transnistria, where the residents holding Ukrainian nationality, as well as the Romanians living in Ukraine, voted for him in the presidential election. Besides, Viktor Yanukovych has certain influence on the Transnistrian authorities and on the business circles and can contribute to the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute. In the relations with Transnistria, Romania could provide support to the Romanian high schools, giving then the necessary teaching materials and books. The Transnistrian authorities said they are willing to cooperate directly with the Romanian authorities in this area. In order to intensify the contacts with the region, Romania could open a consulate in Bender after coordinating such a move with Chisinau and Tiraspol. While the PCRM governed Moldova, the opening of consulates on the territory controlled by the secessionist authorities was impossible, but the ruling AEI said it will not oppose if a country wants to open a consulate in Tiraspol or Bender. [Constitutional reform and responsible government] For Romania to be able to provide the support that Moldova needs on the path to European integration, the ruling elites should realize the importance of such a step and assume overall responsibility and concentrate on Moldova's acceptance into the EU. Thus, the outlook on the situation and the instruments used to adopt the decisions on the foreign and domestic policy will improve. It is also very important that not only the authorities, but all citizens of the country acknowledge that the accession to the EU is possible only if Moldova has a European strategic partner that can be Romania. The previous years, the citizens realized the necessity of joining the EU, but now they should realize who can help Moldova become part of the European family. The steps and decisions taken by the AEI show that the government of Moldova follow the right path in promoting Moldova's interests. At the same time, the process of reforming the power is not yet over as the head of state was not yet elected, owing to the political and constitutional crisis. Only a powerful and efficient government with clear objectives can make effort to achieve them and prepare Moldova for its accession to the EU. In a parliamentary or a parliamentary-presidential republic, such a policy is adopted by a constitutional majority of the pro-European forces in the Parliament. In Moldova this is possible if the Communists Party falls apart, which is rather improbable as the investigations of the April events that could lead to the dissolution of the PCRM are slow as the previous administration instructed that a large part of the documents be destroyed, and for other reasons. It is absolutely necessary that the Parliament of Moldova subscribes to the resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, condemns the crimes committed by the Communist regimes and organizations in the 20th century and bans the use of totalitarian regimes' symbols. Another method of forming a stable government able to make progress on the path to European integration is the election of the President of Moldova and giving of important powers to him. If the decision to hold direct presidential elections is taken, but the powers of the head of state remain the same, a conflict situation can appear as the head of state will have a powerful mandate, but insignificant powers and, sooner or later, will demand that they are increased, invoking that he/she was elected by the people. The Alliance for European Integration adopted the decision to finalize the Constitution as this has been necessary since its adoption. The constitutional reform of 2000 did not result in the best possible improvement of the Constitution. A constitutional referendum will be held in Moldova in 2010 to modify the system for electing the head of state. According to sociological investigations, most of the people in Moldova are in favor of electing the President by direct vote. If the method of electing the head of state is modified, the system of coordinates of the government will be also modified as the post of President becomes more important when the head of state is elected by direct vote. The person who will be elected to this post must realize the importance of adopting decisions and taking steps aimed at achieving Moldova's European aspirations. Undoubtedly, Moldova's future President will have no moral right to stimulate the putrefying Stalinist lies concerning vulgar Moldovenism. The fact that a part of the citizens do not yet understand matters concerning their Romanian ethnicity should not constitute a reason for which the future head of state should resort to the false conception of vulgar Modovenism, no matter what names it takes. In 1994, Moldova was subjected to a kind of spiritual diversion, when the anti-scientific term 'Moldovan language' was introduced in the Constitution. Now that the Democratic forces took power, this lies can be wiped out. The authorities should realize the necessity of doing this and of concentrating all the efforts on making progress in coming closer to the EU. [Mobilization project] Only the mobilization of all the state institutions, the readiness to adopt serious, wise and coordinated decisions and the non-spreading of untrue messages can lead to the creation of conditions for achieving the European aspirations. Such a 'mobilization project' is the common cause of all the representatives of the pro-European Bessarabian elites that are ready to make effort for this piece of land to occupy the place that it deserves inside the EU. Examining the steps taken to come closer to the EU, not only the representatives of the power, but also also the people of the country will be able to identify new approaches in addressing and solving different issues. Consequently, there will appear things that seem imperceptible, but in fact float on the surface and should be realized by those who want to develop. [For conformity – Boris Asarov, chairman of “Pro Europa” Association]