This month marks the 80th anniversary of the end of one of the most important military operations of World War II – the Iasi-Chisinau Operation. For Moldovan society, this is perhaps the most important operation of the entire period of that great war, judging by the direct effects it produced on the current Republic of Moldova, but also on neighboring Romania. It’s true that during 80 years, the significance of that operation has undergone radical changes, depending on the historical data accessible to Moldovan society at different stages, and these, in turn, depended on the interests of the political regimes that governed this space. And this generated and continues to generate different visions of the events dating from 1944. The participants in IPN’s public debate “Effects of the Iasi-Chisinau Operation 80 years later” discussed the effects of the events that happened 80 years ago in the immediate, medium and long terms and the discrepancy in visions and its influence on the country’s present and future.
The permanent expert of IPN’s project Igor Boțan said that History is the study of the past, more precisely of facts and events. The past of humanity and human societies is studied in order to reconstruct them, to discover the main laws so as to use them in order to properly interpret the present and project possible developments in the future. Respectively, historical science uses historical sources, including various narratives, written documents, oral accounts, material artifacts to describe and study the human past and the cause-effect relationships of historical events and facts.
“If we refer to the Iasi-Chisinau Operation, it took place between August 20 and 29, 1944. It was a strategic military operation of the Soviet Armed Forces against Germany and its ally Romania during World War II. The operation is also known in literature as the Battle for Romania or the Second Iasi-Chisinau Offensive. The first operation was not crowned with success for the Soviet Army. The destruction of Army Group South was the objective of the Soviet offensive of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts,” explains Igor Boțan.
According to him, propaganda represents actions carried out systematically in order to spread a political, religious doctrine, etc., theories, opinions, to make them known and accepted, to attract followers. The danger of propaganda is that it is often used to distort real facts in favor of the narratives it promotes.
The president of “Alexandru Moșanu” Association of Historians of Moldova Anatol Petrencu, doctor habilitate of history, said that the year 1944 was a special one on the Eastern Front. “Closer to us, the Iasi-Chisinau Operation was this seventh enumeration. It was “Stalin’s seventh great victory”. By August 20, 1944, when this operation began, the situation in Europe was as follows – the second front in Europe had been opened on June 6. That is, for the Soviets it was a new breather in the fight against Germany. I would also like to mention the uprising of the inhabitants of Warsaw, which began on August 1, 1944. It was the Russians who instigated the townspeople of Warsaw to rise up, but they did not help them and let the Hitlerites destroy this insurrection. So, this was the situation before the Iasi-Chisinau Operation began,” said historian.
Anatol Petrencu noted that the Iasi-Chisinau Operation began on August 20, 1944. “A very important role in the entire military operation was played by aviation. The operation itself began with the shelling of the cities of Iasi and Chisinau. The aviators were Soviet and the planes were both Soviet and American predominantly. Of course, the bombing was very cruel, with destruction, with other disasters,” stated said the president of “Alexandru Mosanu” Association of Historians of Moldova.
Doctor of history Dumitru Lisnic, researcher at the Institute of History of the Moldova State University, lecturer at the Balti State University, said that was is an operation of the 2nd Ukrainian Front and the 3rd Ukrainian Front against the Army Group South Ukraine that included both German and Romanian troops. “The advance plan and the defensive plan of the two sides were strongly affected by the lack of infrastructure. The defense line went along the Eastern Carpathians to the area near Iasi and then passed north of Iasi, Orhei, reaching the Nistru. Of course, the Nistru was not a clear line of defense due to the fact that the Soviets managed to create a bridgehead on the sector between Tiraspol and Răscăieți. So, the big problem was the fact that the Romanian infrastructure at that time could not sufficiently supply the military troops,” stated Dumitru Lisnic, the author of the monograph “The Elites of Soviet Moldova. Recruitment, Informal Networks, Social and Ethnic Identities in Balti, 1940-41; 1944-50”.
According to the researcher, the situation in Bessarabia was even worse and the Soviets managed to advance in the corridor between the Prut and Siret rivers, which was the most vulnerable because further westwards there were the Carpathians, hilly terrain, to the north of Bessarabia there were the forested plateaus, etc. As for the Serpeni bridgehead, it was an advance that practically isolated the armies on the left bank of the Prut, especially the German Sixth Army, which was in the northeastern part of the Romanian-German Flank. “This advance, combined with the advance along the Prut on the right side of this river of the armies of the 2nd Ukrainian Front, led to the taking of many Romanian and German soldiers hostage. And it practically led to a catastrophe in combination with August 23 – the coup d'état. It practically forced the Germans to retreat westwards the Carpathians,” said the doctor of history.
Petru Pasenco worked as a history teacher in Șerpeni village of Anenii Noi district and, after he retired, he worked as a guide at the Șerpeni Bridgehead Memorial Complex. “The Serpeni bridgehead was created during April 12-16, 1944. An attempt was made on April 11 to April 12 to cross the Nistru with the help of rafts and boats. The pontoons were left behind. But the Soviets were greeted by a devastating German artillery fire and gave up. The next day, on April 12, a bridge was built out of empty barrels, beams, etc., opposite the church in Tașlâc village. On this bridge, in the middle of the day, the Red Army soldiers crossed the Nistru River without a shot. Only when they reached the height, from the left-side Șerpeni, did they come across a series of machine guns and the shooting began. For four days, two of the three lines of defense of the German Army were occupied,” related Petru Pasenco.
The former history teacher noted that this bridgehead initially had a depth of 3-4 kilometers, and a length of 7-8 kilometers. This territory included the villages of Speia and Șerpeni and the latter was much larger. The Șerpeni bridgehead was maintained until August 23. “The Șerpeni bridgehead was a bait for the Germans. From Serpeni to Chisinau, there are about 30 kilometers in a direct line, while from Chițcani, the distance was much longer. The Germans also believed that the Iasi-Chisinau military operation would start from there. In fact, the offensive was being prepared from Chițcani, not from Șerpeni, but that territory was defended at any cost. The Soviet soldiers were not allowed to flee across the Nistru. If they tried to, they were shot by Soviet machine gunners. It was defended at all costs to mislead the Germans,” said Petru Pasenco said.
The public debate entitled “Effects of the Iasi-Chisinau Operation 80 years later” was the 40th installment of IPN’s project “Impact of the past on confidence- and peace-building processes”. IPN Agency implements the project with support from the German Hanns Seidel Foundation.
