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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
With the campaign prior to the presidential elections coming to an end, the chances of winning of the pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon, of the Party of Socialists, increase. Polls confirm this as they show a distinctly superior popular approval in favor of Dodon (27%) compared with that of Maia Sandu (9.3%) (IPP, October 2016). The last polls reveal much clearer preferences for Russia and its geopolitical projects which, even if they weren’t put into practice, continuously attract the Moldovan public attached to the Russia socioeconomic, media and cultural-identity space.
Meanwhile, the joint candidate of the anti-government opposition Maia Sandu asks for indirect pressure from the European players so as to ensure correct presidential elections (Reuters, October 2016). According to her, the manipulation of the vote by the current government will lead to massive protests and to the election of a pro-Russian President. In reality, the quality of the elections does not influence radically the chances of winning of the pro-Russian opposition leader. All the polls (more or less authentic) presented in May – October 2016 were favorable for Igor Dodon. However, the Central Election Commission could have reacted to the accusations according to which Igor Dodon receives financing from outside, through offshore areas, by excluding this from the electoral race, as it was done in relation to candidate Inna Popenko. That’s why really correct elections would have increased the chances of Maia Sandu to win the presidential elections. None of the foreign partners makes allusions as to such scenarios because this will affect the fragile political balance, fueling even more the pro-Russian course and, simultaneously, the antipathies to the EU.
Large sections of the population continue to associate the whole process of European integration and even the EU with the political system controlled by the Democratic Party of Moldova (PDM) and Vladimir Plahotniuc, even if the EU keeps a particular distance in the relations with Chisinau, from which it seeks reforms in key areas (justice, financial-banking etc.), which were confirmed within the Association Committee in a meeting in Brussels (October 17, 2016), but also in the EU Council Cimon Foreign and Security Policy Report (October 17, 2016). The Europeans appreciate authorities’ efforts, but, after the banking frauds, these prefer to be precarious and more pragmatic. In this regard, they resort to alterative critical reports on the part of Moldovan civil society organizations, which recently highlighted that the reforms done by the government are either defective or insufficient.
What will a pro-Russian President mean?
The victory of a pro-Russian candidate will have a series of unfavorable consequences for the current public agenda that are, for now, overlooked. First of all, this will be equal to a failure of the pro-European forces (IPN, August 2016). This will be the second image blow for the EU after the massive discrediting of 2014-2015, caused by the banking frauds and the simulated reforms of the ostensible pro-European governments that ruled after 2009. Evidently, the pro-Russian President cannot impose his opinions in the political decision-making process in a parliamentary regime. At the same time, in the current conditions, both Parliament and the Government are de facto controlled by one political party (PDM), which is officially managed by oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc.
Secondly, the pro-Russian President will be able to consolidate the pro-Russian public perception. In this regard, besides the own rhetoric and the pro-Russian behavior as regards the foreign policy, the pro-Russian President can hold consultative referendums that, even if they do not imply legal obligations, will confirm the diminution of the pro-European sympathies in society. Polls (IPP, October 2016) show that the antipathy to the EU is more significant than to the Customs Union (37.3% as opposed to 23.7%), which is fully unknown to the Moldovan public and is thus more attractive. We must bear in mind that the reality projected in polls can be distorted, sometimes as a result of the intention of those who conduct the poll or as a consequence of the profile of those interviewed (often unemployed, seasonal workers in Russia, pensioners etc. who are more available than those with pro-EU views who work, are younger, etc.).
Least, but not last, a pro-Russian President as Igor Dodon will contribute significantly to the consolidation of the pro-Russian opposition that will control the presidential institution. Unlike this, the pro-European opposition will continue to be only extra-parliamentary, having only the protests as an instrument of pressure. Thus, the Socialists in Parliament will have the Head of State as a partner and this will enable them to abrogate the unwanted laws and to resort to consultative referendums (on the Moldovan language, the status of neutrality, the entry into the Customs Union, etc.). In the main, owing to the parliamentary opposition and the office of President, the Socialists will strengthen their position on the political left (to the detriment of the Party of Communists and even the “Our Party” that is led by the moderate pro-Russian Renato Usatyi). These moves will be essential for extending the political influence after the parliamentary elections of 2018 and, respectively, for the taking over the Chisinau City Hall, where the Socialists are the main political force.
Underestimation of negative effects of eventual pro-Russian presidency
In Chisinau, and in Brussels too, the negative impact of a pro-Russian presidency is powerfully underestimated. The idea that Moldova is so dependent on the EU that nobody will dare to cut the source by which the country is fuelled with cheap or even gratis financial resources by the EU prevails.
This argument is perfectly valid as a pro-Russian President will not renounce a favorable commercial regime, grants and investments or a visa-free regime. This can seriously affect his image and the image of his party and can drastically diminish the public support. But what a pro-Russian President will want is to promote the idea of renegotiating the Association Agreement, using the Armenian model (IPN, December 2015) or other accords agreed in the trilateral EU-Moldova-Russia format.
Before the ordinary parliamentary elections of 2018, an eventual pro-Russian President will be able to pave the way for such a move: pro-Russian consultative referendums, rhetoric and political statements critical of the European legislation (anti-discrimination law, etc.), political partnerships with Russian players.
It is logical that the President cannot reverse the flow of political processes if he does not have a ruling parliamentary party or a party that is powerful enough to dictate what the government collation should do. That’s why the ‘small steps tactic’ is exactly what can be used by a pro-Russian President to gradually short-circuit the European agenda. The final goal of this is to remodel the public agenda. This would mean that the European money will be accepted strictly for reforms useful to the political regime (infrastructure, investments, Transnistrian conflict, etc.). They will want less to reform the country in terms of democratic institutions, human rights or the rule of law, without which a European perspective is impossible.
Ultimately, an eventual pro-Russian President would become an efficient method for Russia to reenter the game and to weaken the EU’s positions. In this regard, Russia can gradually unblock exports to the Russian market, influencing the balance of foreign trade to the East and the West. Indirectly, this will encourage more the voting for such political parties as the Party of Socialists that can convince Russia to fully restore the commercial relations. As a result, Russia will be able to strengthen its positions without investing something, by only removing the barriers placed earlier by it.
Instead of conclusion...
The capacity of an eventual pro-Russian President to distort the European agenda must not be neglected. Evidently, its actions are not planned for a short term and are aimed at strategic changes, being thus thought up for a long term.
An eventual pro-Russian President elected in a context where the pro-Russian opposition is stronger than the pro-European one is a major risk to the sustainability and continuity of the European integration process. If the hypothesis of ‘small steps’ is confirmed, in 2017-2018 we will witness the intensification of the pro-Russian rhetoric, strengthening of the political positions of the pro-Russian parties and an increased presence of Russia.
The pro-European forces have not much time available to mobilize their supporters and even less time to act as a magnet in relation to those who are undecided. It is yet very important for the efforts made in the campaign prior to the presidential elections to be dedicated also to the general objective of strengthening the pro-European parties at local and national levels.
The stake of the October 30, 2016 elections is not only the office of President, but also the sustainability and continuity of the European agenda in the medium and long terms.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.