IPN analysis: An IPN analysis, published two weeks ago, presented the then candidate for premiership, acting Prime Minister Iurie Leanca, as one of the relevant symbols of the continuation of the country’s European course, who should be thus voted by almost all the parliamentary factions. But the Leanca 2 Government wasn’t invested. To what extent the disappearance or the removal of such a symbol from the front stage points to the appearance of a higher level of danger for the European integration process itself? What are the real reasons of such a danger and what solutions the parties declaring themselves ‘pro-European’ still have to diminish or annihilate this danger?
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Superficial and profound reasons
One of the reasons of the current political crisis, which is deepening vertiginously and not only at political level, was formulated trenchantly by the already ex-candidate for premiership Iurie Leanca, immediately after his non-voting by Parliament. A minority government is not a solution because it does not have majority parliamentary support, he said, noting that he personally will not vote for such a government as an MP of the Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM). He underlined that the success of the government, respectively, of the European integration process, depends not on the name of the Prime Minister, but rather on the quality and certainty of the support that the Government enjoys in Parliament, including in promoting reforms and the European integration course.
However, such a conclusion refers more to particular effects, while the real reasons are situated somewhere in the basement.
Among the obvious reasons are evidently the low capacity of the political class, in particular of the leaders of the pro-European parties, to negotiate, make compromises and differentiate between essential and secondary things, the matters of general interest from those of personal or group interest. Or, if they theoretically have this capacity, they do not have the necessary political will to use it. The fully nontransparent atmosphere in which the so-called ‘negotiations’ that ended in complete failure were held serves as an element and expression of the deficiency of capacity and political will. All the leaders of the given parties accepted and used such a style of communication between them and with society, and the responsibility in this respect is borne by each of them.
It’s a pity that not even the instinct of political self-conservation suggested making the negotiations more transparent as this would have brought benefits in the relations with the dialogue partners and before society. However, the PLDM and its leader Vlad Filat should assume greater responsibility for this ‘sin’ because the negotiations were associated to a greater extent with the image of those who, given that they possess a larger number of seats of MP, showed initiative in staging the negotiations and offered their own head office for holding them there, being widely presented by the media as a background of general disappointments and failures.
The regret of the PLDM should be greater because the negative results of the negotiations were dictated especially by the misunderstandings between the PL and PDM. The party’s ambitious leader Vlad Filat assumed a foreign image in the same way as he later assumed responsibility, or was made to assume responsibility, for the non-formation of the pro-European government coalition, proposing a new candidate for premiership, whom the PLDM was obliged to present if it wanted to avoid early elections.
Declared reasons…
Ultimately, there were announced a number of disagreements that made the formation of a pro-European coalition between the PLDM, PDM and PL impossible, namely:
1. The position on the distribution of the post of head of state;
2. The position on the method of appointing the prosecutor general;
3. The position on the neutrality status of Moldova and the prospects of joining NATO;
4. The position on the necessity of the territorial-administrative reform;
5. The control over the Ministry of Transport and Road Infrastructure.
Maybe there were also other disagreements too, but these were the most important and the most disseminated ones. But mainly the PL and PDM could not reach an agreement on the aforementioned matters. In its demands, intentionally or not, the PL entered almost exclusively the field of the PDM. A proof is the harsh and non-conciliatory tone of the PDM leader Marian Lupu, which appeared every time he referred to the abovementioned demands of the PL. It is a conclusive proof if we take into account the fact that this harsh tone is not typical of Lupu and of the PDM in general. Maybe only once did Lupu and the PDM have a similar behavior in the history of this centrist party – during the profound crisis generated by the hunting incident in the Domneasca Forest in 2013. This analogy suggests as exactly as possible that the PL got on the PDM’s nerves and, respectively, affected its interests in the most direct and profound way possible. Unlike the PLDM, whose tone and position in all the five matters is much closer to the PL, also because of varied reasons and interests.
We will not speak again about the nature of those interests disputed by the two parties firstly because these have been described in different ways - from serious and honest to odd and evidently speculative, and secondly because not many of the actors involved in this process could or wanted to provide evidence or arguments, and thirdly because the discussions on the real or invented interests of the two parties were spectacularly replaced with those on the names and performance of the candidates for premiership, proposed by the third party – the PLDM. Before centering on this shift of emphasis, we should note that never before were things examined so seriously through the angle of the relations between the PDM and PL, neither by the PLDM nor by the PDM, if only under the (PLDM+PDM)-PL format.
Shift of emphasis
In such conditions, the center of attention of the public opinion switched or was rather moved to a chiefly false field: who will be proposed for the post of Prime Minister of Moldova. The real or invented contradictions between Vlad Filat and Iurie Leanca were resumed and maintained ‘with care’. Afterward, stress was laid on the ‘less noble origin’ of Chiril Gaburici, who turned out to be related to one of the high-ranking officials. Unexpected, or even very logically, the main violins played in this ‘concert’ started to include the violins of the opposition and of former, current and future partners of the ‘pro-European’ government coalition. The blame for the ‘inappropriate’ selection is most often shifted onto the leader of the PLDM, by taking this theme further, up to the area of social psychosis, by forcedly invoking personal features of the Liberal-Democratic leader that are typical of fairytale monsters that are able to kill not yet born babies (not long ago such accusations were made against a woman of a particular political color trough social networking sites).
It’s true that the PLDM and Vlad Filat bear the blame for the bad developments, including in the negotiations and as regards the promotion of the own candidates for the post of Prime Minister. But they are the only ones that have now the responsibility to field mainly sacrifice candidates for premiership, who can gain no support, or propose Cabinets that would fall in several months. The key reason is the absence of a majority pro-European government and all the leaders of the pro-European parties bear responsibility for this, maybe to a different extent, but this matters less. The powerful influence that the Party of Communists now has in the process of naming the Cabinet does nothing but confirm the aforementioned conclusions concerning the (in)capacity or (ir)responsibility of all the ‘pro-Europeans’ for this uncertain and dangerous state of affairs, especially for the country’s development course according to the European model.
In dark ’drawers’ of history
The major danger to the European integration course, which multiplies other dangers, if not all of the dangers threatening Moldova now, is the early parliamentary elections. They can take place if a Government is not installed by March 9, either a minority one, even for several months during which the efforts to form a majority pro-European coalition could be continued. This can happen if not all the ‘bridges’ are burned until then.
The behavior of the three pro-European parties can be understood or even justified. But the insistence in this behavior will be neither understood nor justified, either today or in the future, possibly during many decades of a future placed in the same dark ‘drawers’ of history. For explanation: in 1812 not many people could predict that the given drawer of history would close for 200 years on.
…and undeclared ones
The mentioned events happened because two of the three pro-European parties leave the impression that they are not afraid of early elections or are even ready to cause them now or in the near future, only in order to protect their interests and to impose themselves on the opponents-partners. That’s why they are ready to stretch the cord until it breaks.
PDM’s reasons
The PDM’s trend after 2010 has been positive. It had a slow, but steady ascension. It has solid human, financial and administrative resources, but we will not develop this issue. By all appearances, the PDM hopes to be able to maintain the trend and resources in all the conditions: now, with the minority or majority pro-European government, with a minority or majority pro-Eastern government, in conditions of early elections with all the possible subsequent forms of government, and even in conditions of impossibility of forming a government during a long period of time. That’s why it affords to stretch the cord and to express harsh notes. Regretfully, Moldova does not have such a variety of chances. It has only one chance and only now – the European development and security course. It has waited for this chance for 200 years.
PL’s reasons
The PL is also not afraid of early elections because its resources, of all kinds, are more or less constant. The current role of ‘fighter for justice’, of the ‘main pillar of the European integration course’ could bring some political benefits to it, but not many, given the party’s character of a niche. Its weight can increase if the current role would help it win again in several months the mayoral elections in Chisinau, with its candidate Dorin Chirtoaca. This explains many of the motives of its behavior at this stage. But, in the current conditions, when the people are very disappointed and the pro-Eastern forces gain ground, it will be harder for Chirtoaca to win the elections again. But nowhere in the world did they manage to build a European capital in a country that follows non-European rules and the PL’s possible victory becomes only a goal if this party does not have guarantees nationwide.
Furthermore, the PL should not deprive again its supporters and sympathizers of the possibility of being represented in government and of really influencing things in this country. No matter what the leaders of the PL say now, their absence from government until now was rather a wish than exclusion. They exclude those who do not have capacity and will to impose themselves and to negotiate. The only purpose of the political struggle, including for the people who vote the political parties, is to be represented in the government.
PLDM’s reasons
Even if the PLDM now has the largest number of seats of MP among the pro-European parties and is recognized as a leader of the possible pro-European coalition, sometimes jokingly by those who have fewer seats, its position is not at all enviable, especially in the event of early elections. For different reasons, its trend and resources are declining, but in certain conditions this can become the problem not only of the PLDM. If the pro-European coalition is now able to secure at most 54 votes in Parliament of the 101, after early elections that would be unsuccessful for at least one of the three pro-European parties, the chances of forming a European government would be nil because none of the other two parties can recover the general losses and there are now regretfully no other political players with governmental and pro-European potential.
Therefore, the PLDM can only play the role that derives from the current conjuncture and can field candidates in the hope that one of them will gain support, at least temporarily. The same situation made this party accept a minority government alliance and to choose a partner with more seats of MP out of the two possible partners – the PDM and PL. Together with the PDM, the PLDM can now count on 42 votes of MP and has more chances of continuing the European course that is now uncertain yet. What was the result if the PLDM had chosen the PL and had only 36 seats of MP together with it and could attract no other votes, at least for unblocking the work of Parliament and for installing a government that would offer the necessary break?
Old and new solutions
The safer European course, which implies the development of the country by doing reforms, can be continued by a majority coalition. Thus, each of the three players should take a step backward, return to the negotiations and ensure their transparency, possibly with the participation of observers from inside and outside the country and possibly in the presence of the media. A minority or majority Government should be voted in by then, possibly today, February 18, or later, but not later than March 9, and if the drastic deprecation of the leu, the massive price rises and the loss of European financing do not make the people take to the streets and the ‘check’ does not become a ‘mate’ for the pro-European parties and for the country’s European destinies.
Valeriu Vasilică, IPN