Andrei Popov – The biggest contribution of Moldova in settling the Transnistrian conflict is Europeanization and reforms on the right bank of Nistru. IPN Political Analysis

The last week’s visit to Chisinau of Iuri Zubakov, deputy of the Secretary of the Russian Security Council aimed to explore the ground on whether the position of Chisinau regarding the Transnistrian file changed comparing to the situation until March 3, declared for Info-Prim Neo the political analyst, president of the Association for Foreign Policy, Andrei Popov. He considers that the visit of the Russian high official coincides with the visit of the OSCE Chairman to Moldova. At the same time, under the circumstances of the lack of information related to the content of the discussions in Chisinau, examining the context within which it happened could offer some clues referring to the objectives followed by Zubacov. Zubakov, ex-ambassador of the Russian Federation to Moldova previously visited the Republic of Moldova in October 2005 and February 2006. 3 months and a half passed since his last visit to Chisinau, marked by a tensioning of the Moldovan-Russian relationships, especially in the Transnistrian problem. The expert considers that during this period, Russia has displayed bluntly, the support offered to Tiraspol in this conflict, at the same time, engaging itself into increasingly peremptory declarations and actions against the Republic of Moldova. 3 months after the new customs regime came into force, Chisinau, the West and Ukraine haven’t made any signals of being prone to change their stance and seem to be determined insisting on the new customs regime at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. According to the analyst, the Moldovan-Russian relationships comprised several distinct stages over the last years. The first one lasted from 2001 till the appearance of the Kozak memorandum, in November 2003, characterized by Chisinau’s quasi total reliance on the Russian factor as the main force to guarantee a sustainable settlement of the conflict. Seven months after the Memorandum failed to come into force, from December 2003 to July 2004, were marked by the Moldovan leadership’s attempts to restore the relationships with Russia and to get into its good graces, a desire disclosed by the Moldovan careful language and acts. A year after the “schools crisis”, from July 2004 to 2005, Moldova neglected the attempts to make up with Russia and undertook unilateral actions to implement its own points of view on the settlement of the conflict, which were not necessarily taking into consideration Moscow’s possible reactions. The Law dating July 22, 2005, was the climax of this policy. Starting August 2005 till present, a new stage is developing. The leadership of Moldova is trying to include Russia in the area of some constructive actions in the Transnistrain dossier. But if in 2001-2004 these actions were made by offering new concessions on the settlement modalities, this time Moldova intends to persuade Russaia through other arguments and not with the price of unilateral compromises of the positions on this issue. The mentioned above paradigm was proposed to Russia within the meeting of the Russian and Moldovan presidents in Kazani. It looked like they agreed on the necessity of resuming the dialogue and identifying a compromise acceptable both for Russia and Moldova. In order to “sweeten the pill”, Moldova offered to undertake a series of actions which would reinsure the Russia’s interest. In this perspective, in October 2005, Zubakov headed a numerous delegation of Russian high officials to Chisinau, to which the Moldovan side presented an offer composed of three elements: security, economics and humanitarian. According to Andrei Popov, regarding the security chapter, the leadership of the Republic of Moldova proposed that in case Russia will support the settlement of the Transnistrian dispute, to institutionalize its statute of neutral state. The second component, the economic, means that Moldova recognizes integrally the results of the Transnistrian enterprises’ privatization by Russian companies and creates advantageous conditions for the Russian Business on the right side of Nistru. The third element included creating a maximum favorable environment for studying and using Russian language, respecting all the rights of the Russian-speaking persons. In this context, especially when the reaction of Moscow was waited Moldova tempered the way of speaking with Russia regarding its role in the Transnistrian conflict. Despite the expectations that Russia would act the same way, on February 3, through diplomatic declarations, the Russian President Vladimir Putin, stated that this offer is not pleasing Russia. Particularly, he said that while Russia is showing its openness in resuming the dialogue with Moldova, Chisinau is to still prove it wants the same thing. Afterwards, the new customs rules came into force, system that generated the worsening of the relationships within which the Russian Federation openly displayed a “pro-Tiraspol” position. More, the two visits of Smirnov to Moscow, in May, within which he was treated like a head of state, constituted clear indicators that Russia is determined to raise the stakes, trying probably to obtain more Chisinau already offered. And this more, could be giving up to the European integration policy or redirecting it but on the Russian channel. The visit of Zubakov in this moment appears like an inspection, during which the Russian official wants to see if Moldova is holding the previous positions or if it could scede more than before, considers Popov. The Analyst “sees not” what Moldova could offer to Russia, to make it adopt another position on the Transnistrian conflict. “The Moldovan Authorities must be careful and realist, must understand that Russia is on a radicalization trajectory of its external political speech and on the eve of presidential elections from 2008 it is hard to suppose Russia will give up to its policy”. “It is hard to deal with such kind of Russia”, said Popov. Settling the Transnistrian dispute can not be performed grounding on a tough speech and policy toward Moscow, considers the analyst. Anyway, in the next 2-3 years Russia will not change its point of view. The solution of Chisinau is to support the necessary reforms within the country, to improve the social-economic situation, and to make the Republic of Moldova move continuously closer toward the European Union, Andrei Popov concluded. [IPN Note:] A “chary of words” press release spread by the Presidential staff, informed that Vladimir Voronin met with Iuri Zubakov, the deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council, officially visiting Chisinau. According to the press release “within the meeting there were discussed the perspectives and mechanisms of some new solutions for the development of the Moldovan-Russian relationships. A special attention was drawn to the issue of the Transnistrian conflict.”