The formation of the Alliance for European Integration 3 (AEI 3) represents a victory of the pro-European parties and of the categories of people who support the European integration idea, but it is a bitter victory because the fifth pro-European governing coalition seems to be the last one that can achieve the country’s European ambition and this puts unprecedented responsibility on the ruling parties. Such a thesis is formulated in the IPN analysis “Last pro-European alliance of Moldova” that was published on July 24, 2015. The author of the analysis Valeriu Vasilica says this is due to the gradual diminution of the credibility of the previous pro-European coalitions.
The author distinguishes five stages of diminution of credibility of the pro-European coalitions, which, for their part, cause the attractiveness of the European idea in Moldovan society to shrink.
At the first stage, which coincided with the time of the AEI 1, the diminution of credibility was fueled by the settling of accounts in public by the leaders of the parties that came to power in 2009. Even if particular reciprocal criticism is useful and even necessary in a governing coalition in a democratic country, the vehement and permanent, often speculative, planned and concerted mutual attacks generated a first dose of disappointment in these parties and, by ricochet, in the European idea promoted by the ‘new pro-Europeans’.
At the second stage, which coincided with the time of the AEI 2, the ‘pro-European’ parties completed the process of politically subduing the state institutions, including them in the interparty rivalries, each on its side, and in the promotion of the political and economic interests, which were not always transparent and legal, at national and international levels. The worst result of this process was the dysfunctionality of most of the state institutions, which mainly lost the connection with the state and the population, working in an autonomous regime, as they reduced their task to serving primarily the interests of the political-economic ‘patrons’, openly and cynically. The ordinary people’s reaction was simple and understood: ‘if these parties and these institutions are European, we do not have to accept something like this’.
According to the author, the culminant point of this second stage coincides with the tragedy that happened in the Domneasca Forest at the end of 2012 and the profound political crisis that derived from it. If we believe one of the sides involved in this conflict, we can say that an attempt was made to demolish the system of institutions that were fully controlled by the political class, but this attempt failed, if it existed.
The temptation to fully control the state institutions appeared in the previous Communist government, when the Party of Communists (PCRM) was the only ruling party and it had neither to divide nor to tear away something from somebody. The people got used to accepting the superiority of the ‘father of the nation’ and his right to decide everything in the country, while the ensured media coverage of this behavior was ‘perfect’. Furthermore, the PCRM didn’t disseminate European slogans and thus the important component that would have discredited the European development option was absent. Possibly not even the hidden goals of the former Communist government had been so great, but its incontestable ‘merit’ resides in the creation of models and schemes, which the current rulers took over ‘successfully’.
The third stage was marked by uncertain legal actions related to the concession of the controlling interest of the state in Banca de Economii (BEM) of Moldova, with the subsequent return to the initial position, the concession of the Chisinau International Airport and the ‘theft of the century’ of 1 billion US dollars or euros through the BEM.
According to the author, the situation is due to the fact that cases of laundering foreign money through Moldovan banks happened earlier too, but it was considered ‘beneficial’ for the public budget owing to the commissions obtained from the illegal transactions and, possibly, for other more private and more corporate budgets. In the case of the ‘billion from the BEM’, the experienced ‘gamblers’ from the country and/or abroad staged the finishing stroke for which they skillfully used the trap set in time, of the ‘virtues’ and ‘public, private and corporate benefits’.
This stage provides conclusive evidence of the complete control of the state institutions because this control was actually divided politically between the coalition partners/competitors, which theoretically would have ensured the mandatory development of the ‘operation’ at the initial stages, but this didn’t happen. The conclusion is that these different controls either cooperated between them at the top or there are no longer different controls, but only one complete control. None of the variants is in the interests of society and the people. All of them pose direct internal political and social threats and indirect threats for the European destinies of Moldova, in case of the extrapolation of the social approval from the European government to the European cause.
All these actions and signs form part of the government periods named the Pro-European Coalition and, respectively, the minority and short-term Alliance for European Moldova.
The fourth stage of credibility diminution took shape the previous days, when the electricity and gas tariffs were raised. This will cause a massive wave of chain price rises, which, amid the economic recession, will generate a wave of serious poverty among the largest social sections. In the social perception and in the perception of many experts, the rises, poverty and the ‘theft of the billion’ form a logical chain of causes and effects for which the past and future pro-European government is responsible.
As to the fifth stage, the author considers that a decisive and newer credibility diminution stage could shortly appear, related to the negotiations on the formation of this last pro-European coalition. “If it’s true that the sides involved in the negotiations, through the controlled state institutions, exerted, unilaterally or reciprocally, pressure and used blackmail to obtain more control over the state institutions, we will have to ascertain the definitive deviation of the pro-European parties from the European models, standards and values and to make all their leaders to blame for these deviations. The variant of early parliamentary elections could be the best of all the bad variants that remained available,” says the author of the IPN analysis “Last pro-European alliance of Moldova”.
