2012 is a promising year, but it didn’t bring irreversible changes, Kalman Mizsei

{Info-Prim Neo analysis, post-scriptum to the series “Moldova-20! Where to?” ORIGINALLY published on 24 August 2012} *** {For several days, Info-Prim Neo agency has resumed the series of analyses done last year under the title “Moldova-20! Where to?” We thought it was important to remind that each of the 20 years (then) of Moldova’s independence had its marks and role in what happened in this period and, doubtlessly, in what will still happen to the country and the people in future. The agency asked politicians, analysts, experts and personalities from various fields to appreciate the main events of each year and their impact on the country as a whole. A year has passed since and we found it useful to look at it in the same form and in the same light.} *** [January:] Vadim Pisari is killed by a Russian peacekeeper. Protests take place against the peacekeeping post in Vadul lui Vadu. Proposals are made to change the status of the peacekeeping mission in the Security Zone. Protests take place at the Russian Embassy in Chisinau. The Communists’ Party (PCRM) nominates the first governor of the National Bank for President’s Office. Political analyst Oazu Nantoi proposes himself for President. The Constitutional Court invalidates the presidential elections in December 2011. The Alliance for European Integration (AIE) proposes a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution regarding the method of electing the President. [February:] PCRM protests at the meetings of the parliamentary commission. The Communists demand early elections. AIE gives up the referendum. The Liberal Party (PL) gives up the office of Speaker and accuses the other Alliance members of shady games. The Communist MPs boycott the meetings of the Parliament. PL didn’t vote for holding the presidential elections on March 15. Igor Dodon announces he would negotiate with AIE only after a candidate is found. Veronica Bacalu is nominated by the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM) and the Democratic Party (PDM), but PL doesn’t agree. They call for the removal of Artur Resetnicov from the position of Deputy Speaker. [March:] The common meeting of the Romanian and Moldovan Governments takes place in Iasi. PL announces that the future President must sign an agreement with the party. Presidential elections are scheduled for March 16. Dodon demands a ‘statehood test’ for the future President. PCRM announces it would not participate in the elections and that it would organize mass protests on March 16. Nicolae Timofti is nominated as the Alliance’s presidential candidate. The Dodon group votes for him and Nicolae Timofti is elected President. PL demands the office of Prosecutor General. The Communist MPs don’t give up their boycott. The elected President commits to defend the supremacy of the Law. Nicolae Timofti supports the amendment of the Constitution. The presidential elections are validated. Vladimir Voronin remains the political figure whom people trust most. [April: ] Igor Dodon demands positions of power for the opposition. NIT TV channel’s license is withdrawn. PCRM supports the protests against the Antidiscrimination Law. Moldovans from abroad communities demand the Antidiscrimination Law to be adopted. The Russian Youth League distributes St. George’s ribbon in the center of the capital. The President doesn’t promulgate the Law regarding the chemical castration of pedophiles. The Governor of Gagauzia claims he would elaborate his own law regarding the studying of Moldova’s history. The Government approves the decision to recall the Moldovan Ambassador in Moscow. Vladimir Voronin states that the President’s election didn’t change the political situation in the country. [May:] The Ministry of Justice finalized a new draft of the Antidiscrimination Law. Marian Lupu is skeptical that Moldova could obtain a regime without visas for the EU in 1-2 years. Vlad Filat announces that the Government would resign if the regime without visas for the EU isn’t obtained. The Antidiscrimination Law becomes the Law on equality of chances. PDM aims at becoming the no.1 party till the next elections. Marian Lupu stresses that Moldovans would not travel in the EU without visas starting January 1, 2013. Filat recommends Lupu to be more optimistic and to keep to administering the Parliament. The Law on equality of chances is voted. The governing Alliance is accused of betraying the people. A German official declares that Moldova could join the EU even without the Transnistrian region. [June:] Three MPs leave PCRM, claiming they had enough of the parliamentary boycott. Vladimir Voronin is reelected head of PCRM. Vadim Misin announces he would create his own party. PCRM returns to the Parliament meetings. PCRM demands Vlad Plahotniuc to be suspended. Lupu is reelected leader of PDM and Plahotniuc promoted to the position of first deputy leader. The European Commission promotes Moldova to the second stage regarding the visa negotiations. Statements are made that the liberalization of the visa regime could be achieved by the end of 2013. The visit of Angela Merkel in Chisinau is announced for the end of August. [July:] The Volkov scandal breaks out, with accusations that money are laundered from European funds by Roman Revenco, at the time head of the Border Guards, and Alexei Roibu, at the time Minister of the Interior. Tarlev and Misin create a party. The Parliament condemns the totalitarian Communist regime. The Legislative approved the fiscal-budgetary policy for 2013. Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta comes in a working visit in Chisinau. The heads of Moldovan diplomatic missions gather in Chisinau. Roman Revenco is sacked. Gagauzia proposes criminal penalties against calls for the annulation of statehood. Minister of Interior Alexei Roibu and Minister of Education Mihail Sleahtitchi resign. They are replaced by Dorin Recean and Maia Sandu respectively. Local councilors in Balti decide to organize a referendum to enlarge the local autonomy. Farmers’ protests take place in the whole country. [August:] The Government meets in Balti and approves the raising of Balti Municipality to a second-level territorial-administrative unit. The new Ministry of the Interior declares that MAI could follow Georgia’s example in the police reform. A large part of the signatures for the organization of the referendum to join the Customs Union are invalidated. The head of the Fiscal Inspectorate Nicolae Platon is fired. A unionist march that took place in Balti ended with street clashes between the unionists and their opponents. The visit of German Chancellor Angela Merkel is awaited. [{Selection of events, compiled from the Info-Prim Neo news flow, by Marian Galben }] ***** [Year 2012 as seen by Kalman Mizsei, former special representative of the European Union to Moldova ] When I am getting a question to assess Moldova in 2012 – a year that not has ended yet – inevitably I think about three aspects: Moldova’s long term state building and also the long term well-being of its people. Finally, I also include the roughly half million people on the left bank of the Nistru. From all three perspectives 2012 promises to be a good year but one that has not (yet) achieved irreversible changes as to the long term perspectives. Also, the good news is all coupled with not only challenges but large paradoxes. Still, I think it is important to say firmly: 2012 is a relatively good year for Moldova. First, the constitutional crisis about the Presidency has ended. And it has ended with some important positive notes. For those who follow my political thinking on Moldova – and who are not doing it from one or the other trench, it will not be surprising that, while I cannot feel comfortable about the procedure by which the president was elected since it raises legitimate questions about its constitutionality, at the same time I welcome the nomination of the person of the President and the fact that he was elected by consensus, at least in the governing coalition. For long I have argued that the relatively weak powers of the President need not be strengthened and that the President has to be kept elected by the Parliament, underlining the supremacy of the legislative over the power of one single person. I should also add that it is not without risks what I am advocating for in a fragile state. However, constitutional solutions that others propose, often out of political convenience, contain higher risks for the long term democratic development of Moldova. My readers will also remember that I was staunchly against the kind of „flexible” tinkering with the Constitution that the interim President displayed from the beginning of 2010. I think the country would be better off if all the international institutions took the same principal position then. The most important reason I welcome the election of the President is that in his person I see the chance that Nicolae Timofti is not going to try to usurp more power than it is conferred to him by the Constitution; moreover, with his professional and personal background, one can strongly hope that he will show the example of prudent, uncorrupted behavior in high office. As a constitutional expert he is somebody whom one can trust to protect the constitution beyond any political games. He can do much to strengthen the rule-of-law (verhovienstvo prava) in Moldova and by an impartial approach to political parties he can also contribute to deepening democracy. Of course, there is a paradox in all this: as Moldova’s outstanding democrats, Igor Botan, Arcadie Barbarosie and others have rightly pointed out, the favorable outcome is a result of a deeply flawed two years long process where members of the coalition – each of them – played with the interpretation of the Moldovan Constitution „flexibly” (When I tried to resist this in 2010 as a European official, I did it because I was worried about the risk of changing the rule of the game (i.e. electing the president) because of political expediency to be treated by the Moldovan political class as a precedent exactly in the way it has in the last two years indeed materialized). There is plenty to blame on the opposition as well: The Party of Communists has not played the role in this period that a constructive opposition should play in a democracy. Much is understandable in their attitude but overall their transition towards a European democratic party is still ahead. Their first reflex remains to boycott the Parliament, their accusation of the European officials of displaying double standards is exaggerated, their television channel’s propaganda is often beyond what is customary in a democracy, some of their reflexes and adherences to Lenin are deeply atavistic. However, the course to de-legalize an opposition for which 40 or so per cent of the political spectrum is voting is deeply troubling for any democrat. Here we have a situation for which nobody is to be blamed alone; everybody is performing worse than what would be desirable. We are living in an imperfect international environment; in the region the quality of democracy has deteriorated, in some countries even to the point of authoritarian trends. We shall value that Moldova is, however, imperfectly, still a democracy and this value has to be protected. However, the Moldovan elite need to perform better than now if it truly wants to integrate with Europe and if it genuinely wants to reintegrate Transnistria. Starting with the second issue, the country must become attractive to the region’s inhabitants. How it should happen: first of all, the economy needs to become much more dynamic through reforms. As I keep emphasizing, Moldova should be encouraged by the example of the Georgian economic and state reforms – to achieve higher efficiency is profoundly doable. I do understand the political worries: the 1999 reform government fell perhaps because of the short term social unpopularity of the reforms then. Yet the reforms are badly needed. Moldova has to create more efficient, de-monopolized markets that are inviting foreign investment. Important is to remember that in 2008 the country already attracted about a billion euros of foreign investment. Foreign investment – particularly from a variety of economic areas from European investors – is not only advisable because of its direct impact but also because of its influence over the economic culture and governance. These reforms are almost not happening at all, and this needs to change. In this respect 2012 has been another lost year except for one very important area: the macroeconomic situation remains balanced – unlike in the last years before the Filat government took it over. Reform of the state bureaucracy is the equally important twin-challenge, including a courageous wage reform so that corruption can be fought. Creating anti-corruption institutions is profoundly not the solution but can aggravate the problem because such institutions in the former Soviet Union are traditionally used to harass political competitors and not to fight corruption systemically. The European Union has contributed to the positive changes significantly, including to the election of the president. Also, its financial support is generous. I also refer to Victor Chirila’s convincing article here in info-prim that clearly makes the case why it is in Moldova’s best long-term interest to integrate to the European Union, in spite of its current difficulties, and not to the Eurasian space. Still, the EU also needs to do more if it wants to support in a sustainable manner its best hope for an East European success story. In its current political situation Moldova needs the clever authority of the EU, a kind of arbiter that only our Union can play, based on its democratic credibility and political impartiality. The EU has an irreplaceable role to intervene regarding such political conflicts as over the closing of the television channel of the opposition and now that legislation is threatening the very existence of that opposition – which is still the largest party of the country. Both sides need to do more to avoid creating a deeply undemocratic outcome and I see the EU as the only credible interlocutor to assist the conflicting parties to find a solution that evolves and not undermines Moldovan democracy. If anyone had a doubt that Moldovan democracy needs this deepening, the ugly events in Balti should serve as a wake-up call. It also illustrates what the costs of delaying vital reforms are: a blueprint for administrative decentralization has already been available for some time but the political resolve so far has been missing. One can only hope that the process now will not be panicky but will use the expert work fully to achieve a right balance – unlike in the case of the Gagauz autonomy in 1993 that resulted in a situation where decentralization on paper was too much whereas its realization for a long time too little. The European Union could also help more to shepherd a process towards real economic and state reform that is vital for economic efficiency which, on the other hand, is a precondition to finding good political solutions. Moldova’s economy needs to grow faster as it is still the poorest country in Europe; and growth requires investments which will only come if less Soviet-type regulation stands in the way of businesses and state bureaucrats become much less corrupt. In 2012 external diplomacy has remained the success branch of the Moldovan government. Moldova has made very important and real progress in its European integration without alienating its neighbors and its vital long term partner, Russia. It has navigated competently among uneasy tasks. Essential progress has been made in negotiating a visa free situation for Moldovans and a free trade agreement with the EU. This is a slower process than what the Moldovan public expects – but much faster than anyone else would achieve in the given circumstances. Here is another paradox: while Moldova has become “the darling of the European Union” so much so that its reform and democratic performance are reviewed with less critical eyes than it would be desirable, the perceived slowness of the two critical integration processes and the perceived bias in the way the EU is approaching the internal political conflict has decreased our Union’s popularity among the people. Both issues need to be addressed because, again, Moldova’s prosperous, democratic future lays in the EU. And here are the links to the Transnistrian settlement. First, if anyone had any doubt that the Transnistrian issue needs to be solved, this year’s internal political events offered again the answer: the interethnic challenge cannot be escaped by walking away from the Transnistrian challenge. In fact, similar governmental approaches are needed towards the internal political and social tasks as towards Transnistria. Moldova needs a deeply democratic state that is able to cope with its ethnic problems. Perhaps it is unfair to the poorest European country to expect democratic maturity that often is in short supply even in richer West European countries with much longer democratic traditions. But we cannot avoid the challenge – it is a precondition to Moldova’s long term success. 2012 saw a steady progress in the Transnistrian settlement process. Issues such as the rail cargo have been solved, and many others are being discussed in the 5+2 format as well as in the revived bilateral working groups. This bottom-up aspect, as I have always advocated, is vital to create the conditions to the settlement. Very encouraging is the strong personal chemistry between Vlad Filat and Yevgeny Shevchuk. It can help to solve many disputes that earlier would have led to escalating negative rhetoric on both sides. There are also limits to this personal diplomacy and the Moldovan bureaucracy clearly needs to do more to accelerate progress in the working groups and in involving the Transnistrians in solving problems that affect it after reintegration – though their inclusion in the free trade negotiations is again a very promising development. Moldova needs to become attractive to the Transnistrians – and this requires exactly the same internal reforms and EU support that are required to tackle the internal problems of the Moldovan society on the right bank of the Nistru. Let us not forget about the promising changes in the Transnistrian region: in elections where the inhabitants expressed their free will they asked Igor Smirnov to step down after being at the helm of the power there for 20 turbulent years and to give way to Yevgeny Shevchuk. He now needs to handle very difficult economic problems that he has inherited. Clearly, Transnistria’s economy cannot be revived if isolation continues: he needs to energetically continue the policy of opening to Moldova as well as to the outside world. Democratization of Transnistria remains challenging but is not impossible after the changes last December. So, overall, 2012 is a promising year but Moldova remains, as ever, a country with huge complexities where different cultures meet and where, perhaps unfairly, this requires more difficult, wiser solutions that happier places may not need to tackle. The visit of Angela Merkel reminds us that Moldova has succeeded to put itself on the European map – this political capital now needs to be used to its utmost for the long term goal of economic prosperity for its people and the long term viability of its state. [Kalman Mizsei, former special representative of the European Union to Moldova, for Info-Prim Neo ]