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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The Moldovan political class enters a new phase after the presidential elections. There is a significant dose of uncertainty as regards the country’s European trajectory. The new political context makes the local political players to regroup, pursuing the political objective of conquering the legislative body by the parliamentary elections of 2018. Meanwhile, the European partners (European Union and the member states) look at Moldova with a series of expectations as well as with particular fear. At the same time, the Europeans’ position is dominated by precaution that can be easily confounded with impatience owing to the European cause in Moldova.
Brussels’ mood in relations with Moldova after presidential elections
The presidential elections caused a particular interest in Brussels, but this was much smaller than in the parliamentary elections of November 2014. The EU’s position on the preliminary election outcome was purely pragmatic and precautious in character (IPN, November 17) and invoked no positive feelings towards the Moldovans’ vote.
On the one hand, the powers of the Head of State are insufficient for upsetting the EU-Moldova relations. The situation was different in the case of the parliamentary elections of 2014, where the risk of a pro-Russian majority caused nerves in Brussels. On the other hand, the Moldovan case lost weight during the last few years, in particular after the banking frauds revealed at the end of 2014. They speak less about Moldova in Brussels now. If it is mentioned, then from the angle of the banking frauds, the oligarchization of the political system or deepening of the ‘captured state’ phenomenon. Currently, the discussions about Moldova seldom refer to positive examples.
The expectations and, respectively, the fears, witnessed among the European players in relation to the prospects of the Moldova-EU relations, are dominated by two opinion currents.
The first current, visible among the European players closer to Moldova, describes Igor Dodon’s victory as major political regression, while the “state of alert” in which these are results from a combination of circumstances: a) decreasing interest and a kind of “fatigue” towards Moldova in Brussels; b) increasing influence of the pro-Russian forces in Chisinau following Dodon’s victory; c) setting of other cases as EU priorities at foreign level.
The second current thinks pragmatically and shows firm calmness. Under this, the risks related to Igor Dodon’s presidency are rather exaggerated. The main argument invoked is that Moldova depends on the EU from economic viewpoint. This would prevent Dodon from taking radical action in relation to the EU. The same current considers the maintaining of the liberalized visa regime, access to EU assistance and the European market will condition a moderate attitude of the pro-Russian President to the European agenda. Also, there is the conviction that Dodon will convert into a supporter of the EU at a certain moment. The calm pragmatism shown by this group derives from the fact that Dodon is a rational politician who will not want to discredit himself before the voters by undermining the benefits offered by the EU.
The reality is yet more complex and this also contains Russia’s interests and the voters with pro-Russian views. Dodon makes considerable effort to show his loyalty to Moscow. Instead he asks for political support and confirmation of the status of the most important pro-Russian party of the country. Dodon’s supporters could become disappointed in the Party of Socialists if the pro-Russian President does not deliver at least something of his electoral program in 2016-2017, before the elections planned for 2018. That’s why it is not enough for the effects of Dodon’s presidency to be judged strictly by Moldova’s dependence on the EU, without taking into account the commitments he made to Russia and the pro-Russian voters of the country.
Regrouping of local political players
Definitely, the election of a pro-Russian president represents a change of paradigm for Moldovan politics. Since 2009, in different forms and with a different intensity, all the institutions have been controlled by those who declared themselves pro-Europeans, but actually showed to be anti-Russians more than pro-Europeans. In seven years, the presidential institution enters a new stage where the President’s foreign policy will be moderated and then, eventually, can incline to the East. In this connection, three essential aspects must be highlighted.
First of all, the Party of Socialists and other pro-Russian forces (including in the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia) obtain voice and representation in the state institutions not only as parliamentary opposition. Even if Igor Dodon is considered a President with serious deficiencies (integrity, political coherence, credibility, etc.), this will represent the pro-Russian views of society during the next four years. He will not limit himself to the domestic public and will also cover the foreign one. For now, he does not and cannot renounce the relations with the EU, given that the European assistance is crucial for the stability of the national budget, while Russia is weakened by the cheap oil and western sanctions related to Ukraine. That’s why its mission will be to temper the pro-European rhetoric in Chisinau, to highlight the necessity of coming closer to Russia and to pave the way for a better position of Russia in the Moldova-EU relations. Most of these objectives can be achieved only if and after the Party of Socialists strengthens its positions in Parliament after the legislative elections of 2018.
Secondly, the pro-EU government obtains new possibilities of distinguishing itself with a pro-Russian President in office. This scenario prevails in most of the analyses of the post-electoral situation in Moldova. The coordinator of the government in Moldova, oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, showed he is interested more in a pro-Russian President – Igor Dodon – than in a pro-European one – Maia Sandu. Thus, President-elect Igor Dodon creates a new (geo)political maneuvering space within which the government can exploit the geopolitical fears of the West regarding Russia. Maia Sandu would have posed a threat to the government’s image as she would have become the new face of the pro-European opposition in the state institutions. The risk that Sandu could have become an attraction magnet for the pro-European and reformist voters made Plahotniuc choose the option of a pro-Russian President. Additionally, the option with Dodon as President suits not only Plahotniuc, but Russia too. Thus, the latter can resuscitate the influence leverage in Moldova (access to the Russian market), presenting it as a reaction to Dodon’s victory and less as the product of the cooperation with the pro-European government in Chisinau.
Last, but not least, the presidential elections contributed to the regeneration of more credible pro-European political forces (Party “Action and Solidarity” (PAS), Platform “Dignity and Truth” (DA) rather than of those that existed in 2009-2016. An important period of adjustment to the new political realities will follow. Thus, the PAS and Platform “DA” will have to confront politically not only an ostensible pro-European government with obscure interests, coordinated by an oligarchic group, but also a pro-Russian President convenient to the government.
The weight of the two parties in the future post-2018 Parliament will depend on their ability to carry out a series of actions. To begin with, these should separate their political identities that can be now easily confounded by the people. Also, each of the two parties needs to affiliate itself with different pan-European parties: center (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats) – rather PAS, and center-right (European People’s Party) – rather the platform “DA”. This can contribute to building new political identities at internal level and can prevent the risk of overlapping of the two parties. Ultimately, the parties must concentrate their attention on voters from districts and on efficient communication with them. The people must by be attracted by the pro-European parties because they propose necessary reforms, not only because they protest against the current regime or against the pro-Russian forces.
Instead of conclusion
After the “fatigue” towards Ukraine, there are signals that a similar feeling spreads among the Europeans in relation to Moldova too. This trend is worrisome given that the pro-Russian forces of Moldova strengthen positions. The causes for this ascension vary from the oligarchization of the political power, banking frauds and discrediting of the pro-European forces to the insufficiency and deficiency of reforms.
The elections of 2018 become the new objective of the political forces. The ruling parties, in particular the Democratic Party, will be able to use the rivalry with the pro-Russian President to disguise its errors and to move the European players. The pro-Russian forces are in the ascendant, but have neither capacities nor immediate wish to block radically the European integration. However, their anti-European criticism will increase and will become more frequent, targeted and coordinated. The new pro-European forces are to take the resistance test while in double opposition – to the Government and Parliament coordinated by the oligarchized government, and to the presidential institution led by a pro-Russian politician.
The EU’s attitude requires pragmatism, precaution and greater involvement in terms of communication and effective reforms. The EU’s view must include strategic calculations, based on the prevention of eventual (geo)political crises, with the involvement of Moldova, owing to the pro-Russian President.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
