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| Dionis Cenuşa | |
The government’s stability in Moldova remains directly proportional to the level of political support, but also to that of financial support, which the development partners, in particular the EU, are ready to offer. This interdependence can be deduced from the approaches communicated by Prime Minister Pavel Filip during his recent visit to Brussels (November 28-30, 2016).
At the European Commission, the European External Action Service and in the discussions with the President of the European Council (Donald Tusk), the Moldovan authorities stated openly that they need the political and financial support of the EU for commencing reforms (Gov.md, November 29, 2016). But the current government is perceived by the Moldovan public namely through the quality of reforms, while the absolute majority of reforms result from the way in which the Association Agreement is transposed. Such types of messages contain hidden risks to the image and credibility of the EU because they substitute the role of indispensable internal political will to do the reforms expected by the external players – the EU.
Thus, the public opinion is misled, expectations being created more of the EU than of the government, which is the only one responsible for governance and, respectively, for the quality of the done reforms.
Brussels confirms importance of fully implemented reforms
In Brussels, the European institutions clearly noted that the Moldovan authorities “must continue and deepen reforms” and that their performance will be judged strictly by actions and less by statements. Leaving aside the diplomatic stratus of these statements, the respective attitude confirmed by the EU does not show full confidence in the government of Moldova.
Anyway, the Europeans decided not to ignore the efforts made by the authorities in 2016, without which the agreement with the IMF would have been impossible. That’s why, even if they transmitted positive signals to Chisinau, these were well-thought out, especially if we compare them with the exalted attitude shown recently to Georgia and the high positivism in relation to Ukraine. Unlike the other two countries, Moldova received rather general, moderate and vague references on the part of the EU (EU Delegation, November 28, 2016).
Brussels sure of Moldova’s European course
In another development, the European officials expressed their conviction that the political situation in Moldova didn’t change essentially after the presidential elections. These highlighted the current stable character of the Moldova – EU relations. Consequently, for now most of the European players perceive no major risk to the stability of the European course in Moldova.
This state of confidence is not yet a collective one (IPN, November 21, 2016) because there are voices in the EU that anticipate different risks in the medium and long run, related to Igor Dodon’s presidency, Russia’s actions and the results of the parliamentary elections of 2018 (IPN, November 28, 2016).
At the same time, the Moldovan officials reiterated that the European course is immutable, regardless of the actions of the new President (Euronews, November 29, 2016).
Double significance of unfreezing of European assistance
The EU announcement about the disbursement of €45 million, which was blocked in 2015, until thus yearend and the readiness to allocate another €100 million in macro-financial assistance starting with 2017 are the major aspects promoted as a success obtained by the current government.
The Moldovan authorities regard the budgetary assistance unlocked by the EU as something complementary to the loan provided by the IMF (first tranche of US$36m). But the EU’s decision to unlock financing for Moldova is not a gesture of charity or special support offered to the current government, but a logical effect of the agreement with the IMF, which imposes harsh reforms and an efficient assessment mechanism, focused on the financial-banking sector.
So, on the one hand, the EU delivers the political promise to unfreeze financing. On the other hand, this obtains the intervention of an additional external player (IMF), which will complement the efforts to monitor Chisinau and to make it do the necessary reforms till the end. Consequently, the Moldovan government’s euphoria related to the restoration of the EU’s confidence is exaggerated. However, the result achieved in Brussels generates new preconditions for the government and, respectively, the Democratic Party to gradually build their legitimacy at home.
Instead of conclusion
The Moldovan authorities confirmed in Brussels their interest in obtaining the political and financial support of the EU rather than in doing reforms.
The authorities keep an unhealthy behavior and condition reforms on the offering of political and financial support by the EU.
The logic of reforms and the way in which they are done in Moldova give the impression that the authorities consciously increase their dependence on external factors, without doing tangible reforms, generating further the necessity of considerable financial resources from foreign donors.
Finally, it is true that the European integration is a process that implies a lot of investment and this makes the European assistance indispensable. But this assistance must not substitute the authorities’ obligation to do reforms and use them as a method of earning additional revenues for the state budget. These incomes can be obtained by correctly applying the anticorruption policies and by better managing the public funds and property.
IPN publishes in the Op-Ed rubric opinion pieces submitted by authors not affiliated with our editorial board. The opinions expressed in these articles do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of our editorial board.
